Prof. Haack answers a series of questions on pragmatism, beginning with the origins of this tradition in the work of Peirce and James, its evolution in the work of Dewey and Mead, and its influence beyond the United States in, for example, the Italian pragmatists and the radical British pragmatist F. C. S. Schiller. Classical pragmatism, she observes, is a rich and varied tradition from which there is still much to be learned—as the many ways her own work in logic, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of law has been informed by the old pragmatists testify. Of late, however, this tradition has been misunderstood, impoverished, and vulgarized by self-styled neo-pragmatists; here, Haack turns her attention specifically to the conception of pragmatism as essentially a political philosophy, and the near-vacuous equation of pragmatism with “problem-solving.”
This paper argues that a language can exist and flourish in a community even if none of of the members of the community has any communication intentions; and that reference to the notion of communication intention can therefore be dispensed with in the core account of the nature oflinguistic meaning. Certainly one cannot elucidate the notion of linguistic meaning without reference to psychological notions; the communication-intention theorists are right about this. They are, however, wrong about which psychological notions are needed. It is not possession of the ability to (intentionally) mean something that is crucial—the possession and exercise of communication intentions. What is crucial is rather the possession of certain semantic psychological attitudes. To possess such semantic psychological attitudes (semantic attitudes for short) is to be disposed to take certain publicly observable phenomena—such as sights and sounds—as (non-naturally) meaning something. The paper argues that it is possible to describe circumstances in which one can in so doing be said to understand their meaning.
Carlo Cellucci has rightly pointed out that contemporary professional academic philosophy has a serious problem of irrelevance. Performance philosophy and public philosophy are two recent attempts to solve that problem and radically transform professional academic philosophy into what I call real philosophy. Nevertheless, performance philosophy and public philosophy have some prima facie problems. My goal in this essay is to make some headway towards solving these two prima facie problems, first, by briefly describing ways of conceptually clarifying and purposively unifying performance philosophy and public philosophy individually; second, by briefly presenting a mediating theoretical and practical framework that could solve the incoherence problem and the two solitudes problem, and also directly and reciprocally connect performance philosophy and public philosophy: a framework I call borderless philosophy; and third and finally, against the backdrop of that mediating framework, in response to a possible objection to my argument, by briefly proposing a way in which performance philosophy, via borderless philosophy, could significantly enrich public philosophy. The upshot is that borderless philosophy, together with performance philosophy and public philosophy, collectively yield a fully adequate solution to the problem of irrelevance.
Adam Smith and J-J Rousseau share some common ground when it comes to religion, namely that they were born into and educated in cultural contexts deeply shaped by Reformed Christianity. However, close consideration of their writings on religion reveal marked difference. This paper explores those differences and finds that Rousseau and Smith are radically at odds on this score. Smith has almost nothing to say about personal spirituality, and locates the significance of religion in its social role. Rousseau, on the other hand, accords religion no social role whatever, and finds its value to be purely of a personal and spiritual nature. This difference is not without some contemporary relevance, since it highlights some of the issues surrounding the distinction between ‘religion’ and ‘spirituality’ in modern secularized societies.
The paper aims at reevaluating a conception of the aesthetic that was developed by Kant and Hegel but that has been widely neglected due to the fact that their positions in aesthetics have been wrongly considered to be antagonistic to one another. The conception states that the aesthetic is a practice of reflecting on other human practices. Kant was the first to articulate this conception, but nevertheless falls short of giving a satisfying account of it, as he doesn’t succeed in explaining its objective aspect. I claim that Hegel resolves this problem by understanding works of art as objects that thermalize essential orientations of historical-cultural practices. But his explanation fails to grasp the specificity of art as a reflective practice. However, Hegel’s position gives us a hint for how to deal with this problem: Reflection has to be understood in a practical, and not in a cognitive sense.
Ṣadrā presents the usefulness of the faculties of perception governed by the intellect as a fitting paradigm for understanding man’s being in the world in relation to the divine purpose and source of this being. Perception raises challenging questions which, while peripheral to philosophy proper, have contributed to the debate on knowing and being. Dating back to the Presocratics, this debate came to a head in Islamicate civilization, where perception played a paradigmatic role that also put civilization, on a human scale, at the forefront of the philosophical enterprise. Contemporary historians of thought obscure this role when their interpretations of past traditions are too heavily colored by the positivist conception of perception.
The crucial problem of self-consciousness is how to account for knowing self-reference without launching into a regress or without presupposing self-consciousness rather than accounting for it (circle). In the literature we find two bottom-up proposals for solving the traditional problem: the postulation of nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness and the postulation of a pre-reflexive form of self-consciousness. However, none of them seems satisfactory for several reasons. In contrast, I believe that the only way of solving this traditional puzzle is to assume another bottom-up approach, namely the one that accepts Baker’s challenge to naturalism and provides a naturalist framework for self-consciousness; in Baker’s terms, to account for self-consciousness in non-intentional, non-semantic, and non-mental terms. That is the aim of this paper. My thesis rests on two claims. The first is the metaphysical claim that every creature enjoys a fundamental relation to itself, namely identity. The second is Dretske’s epistemological claim that representations do not require a Self, traditionally understood as the principle that spontaneously organizes mental activity and lies behind all intentional acts. Briefly, I argue for a naturalization of self-consciousness that postulates non-linguistic, naturalized, and selfless form of representation of the cognitive system based on the metaphysical, fundamental relation everyone has to himself, namely identity. Self-consciousness emerges when brain states are selflessly recruited through learning to represent the cognitive system itself as a subject.
Due to the the movements in European thought from the 16th-17th centuries that have generated enough controversy around the ideas of ʻnatural philosophyʼ and ʻexperimental philosophyʼ, I think it would be appropriate to focus our attention on the evolution of the idea of ʻsubstantialismʼ in ʻtranscendental philosophyʼ from the Islamic philosophy. Mulla Sadrā was the most important philosopher and he established a truly hermeneutics on the idea of the ʻBeingʼ. Due tot the new fields of research into the prejudicative hermeneutics, I can say that I will follow in this paper to manage this idea. I will follow the similarities between the Kitab written by Mulla Sadrā and the european idea of ʻnatural philosophyʼ, I will show some similarities between the ″Kitab al-Mashaʻir″ and ″Treatise on Heavens of Kant″, and i will bring those perspectives into a hermeneutical field of interpretation.The ideas of Kitab are very close to Heideggerʼs perspective on Being and aristotelian perspective of non-Being. Because of this reason, we say is necessary to .open a prejudicative perspective to investigate how works the play between Being and non-Being .
The philosophical investigations into universals was entangled with the combination of a certain Christian faith and Ontology, especially in ancient and medieval times. That is, God’s creative activity provided us with the ontological presumption which enabled universals to be predicated, be perceived and be thought about. Times then have changed, and “the modern turn” in Philosophy tends to resolve universals into concepts or linguistic phenomenon, which resulted that its certain Christian ontology no longer dominates the discourse on universals. On the contrary to this philosophical tendency, modern theological discussions try to learn the development of philosophical investigations into universals, and to tackle the theological problems provoked by the modern natural science. Especially Karl Barth’s use of Universals-theory would obtain the assessment of “revolution in content” in the Church history, which, in previous studies, was yet entangled with the ambiguous word “…in motion…” and with the unclear argument “…understand true human nature from the nature of this one particular man Jesus Christ…” The present article will attempt to clarify this Barth’s practical use of Universals-theory by referring to philosophical arguments, then proving Barth’s intention and the difficulty of his complicated argument that Jesus Christ was one exemplar and in the same time was also the model, which is inconsistent with the basis of Universals-theory. It resulted that this Barth’s attempt will provide us with the possibility today of Universals-theory especially in the field of Religion.
The theoretical basis for the new philosophy was laid by the American philosopher James Joseph Dagenais (1923-1981), who came to the conclusion that philosophical anthropology is not a science, but a domain unto itself, and that a philosophy of man can only come about as a joint undertaking of all sciences, in which the object of study must be man himself. The final explanation of man lies outside all possible scientific views that have ever been formulated, because they lie within the origins of every branch of science, including the science of philosophy. It is the final ground on which the philosophies, of any nature whatsoever, can be practised implicitly or explicitly. The methods of a post-modern philosophical anthropology will have to be based on reflection, on the claim that it is possible to debate differences and contrasts on reasonable grounds, and on the individual responsibility for the decisions we all make for ourselves in respect of changes in body and mind. A post-modern version of Sartre’s creed: man is and always will be what he makes of himself. I have given philosophical anthropology a new concrete substance on the basis of the definition of Jim Dagenais: “a consistent overall vision of man and his world”, so that it can serve as the basis for philosophy and thus as the foundation for human life.
What this essay is to discuss is Plato''s theory of explanation in Phaedo. In this dialogue, we observe that Socrates criticizes both the natural scientists’ explanations and Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind since he thinks they could not explain all things, firstly, in a unitary and, secondary, in a real way. Thence, we are to call what Plato is seeking as his ideal explanation in Phaedo “One Real Explanation”. He talks at least about three kinds of explanation, two of which, the confused and foolish way of explanation by Forms and the explanation by Forms appealing to essence, are just "second best" and lower degrees of explanation. His ideal explanation is an explanation that can explain all things by one thing and in a real way. Though he cannot show, at least in Phaedo, how this One Real Explanation can work, we can see Plato completing his plan by the Form of the Good in Republic.
One of the most important causes for comparative studying on philosophical systems is to find their commonalities for responding common questions and to emphasize on their differences for taking functional answers encountering modern philosophical challenges and problems. Here, causality is chosen as the case study. Causality is of the basic philosophical issues that have been continually considered by both Islamic and Western philosophical traditions, but the answers which have been rendered by modern western philosophers with empirical approach and Muslim philosophers, like Mulla Sadra, with intellectual and intuitive approach, is necessitated to compare such answers and clarify the efficacy of each one towards the other one. Mulla Sadra’s philosophical, intellectual and illuminative thought in Islamic tradition, in comparison to Hume’s modern empirical and phenomenal tendencies, is able to remove fundamental ahead problems concerning causality and to answer skepticism derived from it. In Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Wisdom, since the whole system of being has its plural hierarchical universes in which there are causal longitudinal relations. In fact, for Mulla Sadra, causality is not merely restricted to the natural world, and our phenomenal knowledge about it is inadequate, but whatever we see in the natural world is only the weak and thin level or surface of the deep and fundamental reality of causality. Meantime, for Mulla Sadra, in such the causal relation, the effect has nothing and no reality except it is as the manifestation, shadow and act of the cause.
Tabatabai’s theory about the meaning of life can be referred to as active objectivism, where a man plays an important role in achieving the meaningful life, rather than merely discovering the divine view about his existence. If the man chooses the divine purpose from a “real life” perspective as his meaning of life, God’s purpose and man’s purpose will converge in order to shape a meaningful life and the ultimate achievement of Pure Life (al-ḥayat al-ṭayyibah). However, if he chooses the unreal counterpart, he will be trapped in an unreal life which is referred to as the “pseudo-meaningful life.” It is necessary that human beings discover the divine purpose with the help of conceptual intellect (al-‘aql al-nazari), define the essentials of achieving the purpose with his practical intellect (al-‘aql al-‘amali) and ultimately, choose the essentials with his own free will. To achieving compliance of a man’s purpose with the divine goal requires faith and good deeds.
No special definite definition does exist for postmodernism however it has had an inordinate effect on art, architecture, music, film, literature, philosophy, sociology, communications, fashion, and technology. The main body of this work can be seen as an admiration and reverence for the values and ideals associated with postmodern philosophy as well as postmodern literature. , I have argued that postmodern has mainly influenced philosophy and literature and they are recognized and praised for their multiplicity. Postmodernism might seem exclusive in its work, its emphasis on multiplicity and the decentered subject makes very uncomfortable reading for traditional theorists or philosophers. It rejects western values and beliefs as only small part of the human experience and it rejects such ideas, beliefs, culture and norms of the western. Integrity is fragmented apart into unharmonious narratives which lead to a shattering of identity and an overall breakdown of any idea of the self. Relativism and Self- reflexivity have replaced self-confidence due to the postmodern belief that all representation distorts reality. I have also referred that in a sense; postmodernism is a part of modernism we find the instantaneous coexistence of these two methods of expression and thinking, especially in visual arts and literature.
In this paper, we will discuss what is called “Manifestation Challenge” to semantic realism, which was originally developed by Michael Dummett and has been further refined by Crispin Wright. According to this challenge, semantic realism has to meet the requirement that knowledge of meaning must be publically manifested in linguistic behaviour. In this regard, we will introduce and evaluate John McDowell’s response to this anti-realistic challenge, which was put forward to show that the challenge cannot undermine realism. According to McDowell, knowledge of undecidable sentences’ truth-conditions can be properly manifested in our ordinary practice of asserting such sentences under certain circumstances, and any further requirement will be redundant. Wright’s further objection to McDowell’s response will be also discussed and it will be argued that this objection fails to raise any serious problem for McDowell’s response and that it is an implausible objection in general.
By interrupting the traditional approach to the distinctiveness of the order of knowledge and the order of nature (which was the procedure of many philosophers like Aristotle, and his scholastic disciples, more especially of Thomas Aquinas and even Descartes and Cartesian), and acquiring a unified science, Spinoza changes the customary order of philosophizing and begins his famous book, Ethics, with a treatise on God, nature or substance, a being that, is assumed, first by nature, i.e. in the order of nature, but not first for us, i.e. in the order of knowledge. To accomplish this procedure, Spinoza, on the one hand attributes the extension to the God and on the other hand, chose the geometrical method that implies definitions, axioms and postulates that harmonize with his procedure, to expose his views. In this article, by analyzing Spinoza’s geometrical method, we try to show that how Spinoza achieved his methodological intentions.
La Chouette aveugle de Sadegh Hedayat, auteur iranien, qui appartient à la catégorie des œuvres dites « noires », se fonde sur une inspiration nihiliste. Malgré l’influence indéniable de la philosophie nihiliste dans la création de cette œuvre compliquée, il n’y a aucune étude cohérente qui traite ce sujet de différents points de vue. Ce qui est certain, c’est que Hedayat était un lecteur attentif des œuvres des philosophes nihilistes et aussi des œuvres littéraires qui s’en étaient inspirées. Il semble avoir longuement médité sur l’apport des idées et des conceptions désespérées et nihilistes qui viennent de la lecture d’Ivan Tourgueniev, de Fedor Dostoïevski, d’Arthur Schopenhauer ou de Friedrich Nietzsche, et d’autres encore. Le caractère absurde de La Chouette aveugle prolongerait cette aspiration nihiliste. De la philosophie nihiliste, Sadegh Hedayat retient quelques traits caractéristiques et les développe d’une manière personnelle. Alors, il écrit un récit onirique qui évoque l’existence du mal de différents points de vue. Dans ce travail de recherche, nous essaierons d’approfondir l’aspect nihiliste de La Chouette aveugle tout en vérifiant tous les éléments qui témoignent de l’omniprésence du néant dans le récit. Dans cette perspective, nous étudierons tout d’abord l’existence du mal dans cette œuvre qui est concrétisée par quatre éléments: la souffrance physique, la maladie morale, l’empoisonnement progressif et la puissance maléfique. Nous approfondirons, ensuite, le rôle de la notion de néant dans la progression du récit qui est incarné par la fascination de l’oubli, la hantise de la mort et la tentation suicidaire. Cette démarche marquera le rôle indéniable de la philosophie nihiliste dans la création de La Chouette aveugle.
L’homme beckettien représente grosso modo sur la scène de théâtre des années cinquante le spectacle de souffrance physique et de désintégration totale du sujet qui est le fait d’un trauma et d’un complexe plus profonds, celui du vide de matières scéniques et du mal fondamental qu’on traiterait d’existentiel. En d’autres termes, le mal est dans ce monde quelque chose d’inné chez l’être humain. Ce négatif omniprésent, sur le versant duquel sont constitués la forme et le fond d’écriture beckettienne, évide la langue de son contenu sémantique et en corrode, de manière désolante, la pensée et le langage de protagonistes beckettiens, se trouvant mutilés et mis en malheur dont ils ignorent la véritable raison. Quand Vladimir appelle son compagnon d’attente de Godot, Estragon, à “se repentir”, ce dernier, répliquant “ de quoi ? / d’être né ? ”, en représente une conception insensée et tragique de l’existence qui ne dit chez eux que le néant et le mal d’être. Or l’œuvre dramatique de Samuel Beckett est en principe l’image d’un conflit verbal qui est à l’œuvre dans presque toutes les répliques échangées entre les personnages d’En attendant Godot, Fin de partie et Oh les beaux jours, qui n’ont, de leur propre aveu, “ rien à faire, rien à dire”, mais qu’ils devraient dire plus dans l’impossibilité de parler ! C’est là le sens de crise de représentation et d’incommunicabilité langagière qui est, selon la critique contemporaine, une constante phénoménologique dans la poétique du pire et du néant de S. Beckett. En ce sens, et comme occupation de cette recherche, on peut constater la violence du langage dans le théâtre de Samuel Beckett, dûe en principe au malaise du vieux corps de personnage épuisé à l’extrême qui ouvre en soi à une vision du monde pessimiste sous formes d’actes de contradiction, de disputes, d’injures, de parole lacunaire etc. pour communiquer ainsi l’incommunicable et le néant.
Il faut savoir que le mysticisme a eu toujours de grandes influences sur tout ce qui concerne la vie et la culture iraniennes, surtout sur l’éducation qui est une étape très importante dans la formation de l’avenir de la jeunesse. C’est vrai, le mysticisme est une approche individualiste alors que l’éducation reste une affaire collective et sociale. Comment arrive-t-il, étant une pratique personnelle, à marquer une activité sociale à savoir l’éducation ? La réponse se trouve dans le mot ‘’liberté’’ qu’il apporte à ceux ou à celles qui le pratiquent. Et cette liberté est ''''essentiel'''' de toute éducation. Dans cet article, nous essayerons d’illustrer d’abord toutes les caractéristiques positives et efficaces du mysticisme qui aboutiront à la liberté de l’individu, l’acteur principal de l’éducation ; et ensuite de signaler quelques risques du mysticisme et éventuellement ses inconvénients qui pourraient orienter l’objectif de l’éducation vers une sorte de fatalisme et une philosophie de contemplation. Ces derniers laisseraient des effets négatifs et des impacts irrémédiables sur le processus de l’éducation. Ils pousseraient tous ceux qui s’en occupent à ne pas assumer pleinement leurs responsabilités et leurs devoirs envers leur prochain.
