According to Muslim logicians, the quantifier, in categorical logic, shows the quantity of the individuals of the subject in a statement; so its place is before the subject. Hence, if it comes before the predicate there arises some deviation in the main form of the statement, and such a statement is called a "deviant statement" (al-qaḍiyah al-munḥarifah). In modern logic, by contrast, the main characteristic of a predicate is being general or unsaturated and since a predicate has a propositional function, i.e. has free variables (or arguments), it can or should be quantified; hence, putting the quantifier before the predicate is consistent with the conditions and rules on constructing a well formed statement. Among contemporary logicians Hamilton is famous for his claim that predicates should also be quantified just like subjects. The viewpoints of Muslim and modern logicians, concerning the place of the quantifier in a statement, seems to be conflicted. Among Muslim logicians, Avicenna is the one who considers no problem in using such statements, although he calls them “deviant”, and gives an explanation and analysis for them. In this paper, I have examined these views and shown that the conflict may be superfluous if Muslim logicians’ approach to predicates is extensional, which, of course, can hardly be attributed to them<em>.</em>
It seems obvious that the mere acknowledgment of a norm cannot explain the agent’s undertaking what the norm prescribes; Steglich-Petersen makes the point as there is <em>no</em> strong relation between normative judgments and motivation from such judgments. To explain why someone does what a norm prescribes, according to Steglich-Petersen, we need to know not only that they acknowledge the norm, but that they are motivated to follow it. I will argue that this apparent truism is false in the case of constitutive norms. In a constitutive norm, the action specified in the correctness condition is constitutive of what is governed by the norm. I will focus on the constitutive norm of belief to argue that the mere acknowledgment of the norm suffices to explain the transparency of belief. That is to say, I explain why a subject who deliberates whether to believe that p thereby, in virtue of acknowledgment of the belief norm, deliberates whether p.
In this paper I propose an argument against the conciliatory view in peer disagreement. One of the most important grounds for conciliatory views is the assumption that the epistemic situation in peer disagreement between two peers is symmetri cal. Symmetry justifies the conciliatory views. If so, showing that the situation is actually asymmetric should count as a refutation to conciliatory views of disagreement. By appealing to the difference between the processes by which the beliefs of the two parties have been formed, I try to show that there is a difference between the reliabilities of the two beliefs. This means the asymmetrical situation between two peers in disagreement. Since the conciliatory and steadfast views are contradictory views, any argument against one of them should be considered as an argument for the other.
According to traditional philosophical literature, Akrasia is defined as acting against one’s best judgment. Philosophers have considered Akrasia as synonymous with the weakness of will. However, Holton considers these two phenomena to be distinct and argues that weakness of will is better understood as over-readily giving up on one's resolutions. This study seeks to show that these two phenomena – unlike Holton's claim – are not distinct, but the accounts of Akrasia and weakness of will take two approaches to explain the reasons behind quitting actions: (1) in terms of its relationship to the agent; and (2) in terms of its relationship to the action. The researcher attempts to show that Holton's interpretation of the weakness of will refers to the second perspective whereas Aristotle approaches it from two perspectives. However, on duly analyzing the elements put forward by Holton, we can see them to be consistent with those of Aristotle.
In this inquiry, we try to find a way to deal with moral problems and dilemmas in the realm of technology. We use a procedure that has been introduced in recent years in applied ethics, which is that of design analogy. According to this procedure, we can draw on insights and structures that are used in design processes to solve moral problems. Moreover, for the sake of moral evaluation in this structure, we need an ethical theory. Our proposed ethical theories are Kantian rule consequentialism and triple theory, which is a combination of Kantian and Scanlonian contractualism and rule consequentialism. It seems that these formulas do not have the weaknesses of other moral theories, and because they offer a compromise between three moral theories, they can reduce moral disagreement among stakeholders and even decrease the complexity of moral problems. At the end of this paper, with the help of a case study, we will show how we can use this framework in actual instances. We will see that this systematic approach can help us state our problem clearly and comprehensively, and that its steps reduce the complexity of our moral problem. Finally, we will be able to evaluate the case with two efficient moral theories without neglecting any important relevant elements. This will lead us to take the right decision, prohibiting or decreasing disastrous impacts of our actions<em>.</em>
Living in Felicity or in the Shadow of Death: A Kierkegaardian Existentialistic Reading of Ionesco’s The Killer
Eugène Ionesco in his play, The killer (1960) depicts a true reflection of the human condition; he depicts the images of life and death, being and non-being, and the reality of man’s reduction into the cypher of non-being. He wants man to come to grips with his true situation; hence, man's existence is fundamentally a conflict between the infinite extensions of the human urge as opposed to the necessary and limited state of being. The aim of this paper is to examine Ionesco's ideas on the loneliness of man in this alienated universe, his hidden anxieties and his struggle for survival within an Existential framework of Søren Kierkegaard; examples are drawn from The killer (1960) in order to fully examine Ionesco’s particular vision of life. Such a study aims at bringing about a realization and understanding of the conditions man is exposed to in the universe. It is too hard for Bérenger to believe that nothingness precedes, envelops, and conditions all being. He faces the two coexistent side of living: in felicity and in the shadow of death.
Political Authority and Tragedy in the Shahnameh: A Study of the Shahnameh on the Basis of Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy
The paper aims to study the Shahnameh on the basis of Hegel’s theory of tragedy. For Hegel, political authority was closely related to tragedy and the two formed a unique worldview that helps us understand Greek society and polity in a new way. It is hoped that by studying the Shahnameh on this basis, we may be able to come to a better understating of Iranian society and polity.
Future Contingency has been an old debate between philosophers throughout history. On one hand, Aristotle thinks events of the future happen contingently. On the other hand, Diodorus believes what happens in the future is now determined. Diodorus has presented an argument for determinism based on a few premises. Logicians and philosophers try to avoid determinism by denying the first premise of Diodorus, which is the necessity of the past. However, they only regard a qualified version of this premise based on the medieval argument for determinism while some other philosophers consider this premise in a general way. A new argument shall be presented in this paper for determinism similar to the medieval one based on the general version of the premise which is not rejected by systems which reject the medieval argument. This flaw originates in a few properties of the branching model for time. We shall show what this property is and how it would be possible to resolve the problem this property creates.