محمدرضا عبدلی

Investment is seen as one of the most important and influential factors in economic growth and development. It is directly affected by managers' approaches to decision-making because identifying the best investment opportunities to achieve ideal returns is one of the expectations that shareholders and stakeholders have of managers to reduce agency gaps. However, the emergence of managers' overconfident behavior as a foundation for psychological bias can deepen the agency gap due to overestimating project cash flows compared to their real values under inflationary conditions. This study aims to examine the effect of inflation uncertainty on the impact managerial overconfidence has on overinvestment. The statistical population consists of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). One hundred five companies were selected as the sample size by systematic removal sampling reviewed in 2011-2018. Due to its dichotomous dependent variable, this study uses probit regression to test the research hypotheses. The results indicated the significant positive effect of CEO overconfidence on overinvestment. It was also noted that inflation uncertainty strengthens the positive effect of CEO overconfidence on overinvestment. Based on these results, the CEO's decisions as a decision-maker in charge of any company, especially under inflationary conditions, can play a substantial role in future corporate investment levels. Thus, with an increase in behavioral bias, it can be assumed that the company will confront grave competitive challenges under economic conditions.

Several financial soundness frameworks, such as CAMELS, are currently present in the banking industry, but some evidence suggests that the present frameworks have inefficiencies in an Islamic banking environment. This study is aimed at identifying and prioritizing the adjusted financial soundness indicators in Iranian banks. In this paper, the factors affecting financial soundness in banking industry were investigated and rated based on the viewpoints of 382 banking experts. Data gathering is done by designing a questionnaire. The research method is descriptive-correlation. For data analysis and the testing of the hypotheses, R-test software and confirmatory factor analysis have been used. TOPSIS method is used to rate the indicators from the points of view of senior banking managers. The findings showed capital adequacy, asset quality, profitability, liquidity, management quality, sensitivity to market risk, Islamic banking, corporate governance, and facilities with technical and economic backing affect the financial soundness of banks, while the liquidity and profitability indexes have the most impact.

The current research sets out to identify and scrutinize the impact of the CEO’s perceptual biases in judgment and economic decision-making on the reporting quality of the firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Adopting a mixed method, the present study first seeks to detect the components and indices of CEO’s perceptual biases via critical appraisal and with the special participation of 10 accounting experts. Afterwards, the rec-ognized indices are set to undergo a Delphi analysis given the mean and the coefficient of agreement. The verified indices are then adapted to the ac-counting models and analyzed in the form of research hypotheses. The re-sults of qualitative analysis using Delphi method verify the reliability of 16 indices out of 22 ones. Regarding the quantitative analysis, the association between the indices of the CEO’s perceptual biases in judgment and econom-ic decision-making, and the primary proxies of financial reporting, namely reliability and competitiveness is tested. The findings reveal that the indices of the CEO’s perceptual biases in judgment and economic decision-making exert a significantly negative effect on financial reporting reliability and competitiveness.

Purpose: In the shadow of separation of the ownership from the control and the problem of representation arising from it in the modern business world, there is a need to pay attention to the CEOs' approaches toward takeover as decision makers in this area. Managerial entrenchment is considered as one of the consequences of separation of ownership from control that explains the difference between the incentives in the corporate management and causes a disturbance in internal control as a communication mechanism between the corporate's performance and the capital market. Paying attention to operant conditioning behavior like tournament incentives as a functional behavioral stimulus in CEOs reduces the profit-seeking attitudes among them and increases the effectiveness of the corporates' performance mechanisms in disclosing financial reporting. The purpose of this research is to study the relationship between the managerial entrenchment and the internal control weakness by operant conditioning behavior theory test. Design/methodology/approach: In this research, 95 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange were evaluated between  2013 and 2018. Considering the duality of internal control assessment, logistic regression in SPSS software was used in this research. Findings: Results of the research showed that there is positive and significant relationship between the managerial entrenchment and the internal control weakness. But there is a negative and significant relationship between the tournament incentive and the internal control weakness. Moreover, it was found that the negative relationship between the managerial entrenchment and the corporates' internal control is mediated by the tournament incentive. Originality/value: Considering that little attention has been paid to motivational issues of the CEOs under the representation theory over the past few years, the present research attempts to investigate managerial entrenchment approach with the effectiveness of internal controls through analysis of the operant conditioning behavior theory to provide more reliable experimental results for the investors and the shareholders.