رضا باقری

Television series serve as tools for propaganda and influence, allowing political figures to manipulate public opinion and control how they are perceived. One notable example of this phenomenon can be seen in the representation of Boris Johnson in the TV series ‘This England’. The representation of Johnson in the midst of scandals like Party Gate and the mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic tainted his public image as a reliable leader and a dependable Prime Minister. The resulting backlash against him was so severe that he was called to testify in the official COVID-19 inquiry (2023) following his compelled resignation. The filming of the 'This England' during his time in office and its airing just 22 days after his departure, appeared as an effort to repair his damaged image. Utilizing qualitative content analysis and drawing on Stuart Hall's theory of representation, this paper explores the nuanced depiction of Johnson's leadership and contributes to our understanding of how television series can shape political narratives. The significance of this study resides in its contribution to our comprehension of the multifaceted ways in which television series can shape public perception of political leadership and contribute to broader societal and political discourse.

While writing skill is extensively studied in EFL contexts, more in-depth research is needed to explore how technology can assist its pedagogy. The present study aimed to investigate the impact of using an automated writing evaluation on Iranian EFL learners’ essay writing. Learning how to reduce errors (in an EFL context) by being corrected at the moment and being exposed to different examples regarding that error in the learners’ new texts through automated writing evaluation (AWE) tends to be the significance of this study. To this end, 50 Iranian EFL learners who were studying at the University of Qom, were randomly chosen. The sample included 25 females and 25 males, whose ages ranged from 19 to 25. The participants were given a pre-test before using AWE software. They were given a topic to write about as a pre-test. After the treatment, an IELTS Task 2 was utilized as a posttest. The IELTS writing band descriptors were used to evaluate the writings. The ANCOVA results showed a remarkable improvement in the essay writing of the EFL learners using an AWE software (i.e., Grammarly). The analysis of interview data revealed that the learners were more enthusiastic about using the AWE feedback because they were corrected while they were writing their essays. Since AWE is discovered to be a helpful device to promote learners’ writing skills, students would also be inspired to become associated with such online learning environments and utilize them earnestly and productively. This research also discovered the learners who got feedback from the AWE device got more prosperous but they also started to ask their teacher to provide more feedback to have AWE feedback and traditional feedback combined. The findings have implications for language teachers, material developers, and curriculum designers.

According to Iran's constitution, expanding relations with Africa has always been one of the strategic principles in the country’s foreign policy; all previous presidents have therefore sought to expand the country's relations with Africa. Rouhani, however, pursued a different policy in Africa. His arrival in the office marked a considerable shift in Iran’s foreign policy. Rouhani’s African policy, compared to his predecessors, presents a peculiar case, because rhetorically he highlighted the importance of improving relations with Africa, but in practice, he almost neglected Africa at least in terms of trade and official visits. In other words, in Rouhani’s presidency, Africa remained as a key principle in the IRI’s foreign policy but not as a strategic partner. This paper uses a qualitative content analysis for analysing Rouhani’s rhetorical positions on Africa. By adopting the constructivist theory of IR and the importance of policymaking theories, the paper also argues that due to the geopolitical importance of Africa, Iran’s relations with Africa, although insignificant, remained unchanged. In Rouhani’s time, however, relations declined significantly due to his Westward policy. In discussing this policy shift, the role of both structure and agency are important and emphasize the reactionary nature of Iran’s foreign policy.

With the spread of the Coronavirus in Iran and almost simultaneously around the world, universities were forced to operate online and use distance education. The efficiency of universities in these critical situations depends to a large extent on their communication and media policies to advance their educational and research goals. To review the media and communication policy of the University of Tehran and the University of Cape Town, the content of their official websites from March 2020 to January 2021 was evaluated. This paper, using a combination of qualitative and quantitative content analysis, examined the content of these websites in connection with the Corona pandemic and evaluated their  communication strategy in conveying their messages. Both universities have prioritized medical and emergency services which show the importance of students' and staff’s health for both universities but the social responsibility were  more evident in Tehran University with its deeper commitment to its social missions. In terms of communication strategy, Cape Town University adopted a "supportive and egocentric" strategy to provide the necessary news and refrain  from publishing the comments of audiences, and the University of Tehran took a "supportive and selective" strategy intending to provide the most news with selective comments. 

Since the 9/11 bombings in New York, and the 7/7 bombings in London, Muslims’ integration in the UK has been under intense scrutiny. Muslim integration, however, has long been a matter of debate in Britain, revolving around the maintenance of Muslims’ distinctive identity and practice. For instance, David Cameron (Cameron, 2011), Britain’s then Prime Minister, announced at the Munich Security Conference that “state multiculturalism” has encouraged “different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream”. In criticizing multiculturalism, most critics mainly refer to Muslims as being less integrated into wider society than people from other minority groups, and Muslims are shown to be disloyal. The complexity of Muslims’ integration and its dependency on different social, structural and cultural factors are, however, mostly less studied. This paper is designed to understand the social and cultural barriers to Muslim integration. In doing so, it aims to explore Muslims’ integrational strategies to deal with these barriers. Findings of this paper draw on research that involved 43 semi-structured interviews with Muslims across Scotland’s major cities and small towns.

Existing evidence seems to indicate that Muslims in Scotland have constructed hyphenated or hybrid identities that draw on religion, ethnicity and nationality. However, minor attention has been given to the differences in importance, meanings, and strengths of these identities, or the significance of their identity markers. Ethnic minority people can be identified with both their ethnic groups and their country of residence; each identity can be either strong or weak, or identification with both can be high. The extent and degree of identification with specific identity markers (such as ethnicity, nationality or religion) can be varied and subjected to difference. This paper discusses the importance, meaning, and strength of these markers in Muslims’ identity negotiation in Scotland through an analysis of the importance of ethnicity, religion and nation. Drawing on a study based on twenty-seven semi-structured and qualitative interviews carried out in 2011 with second-generation[1] Muslims across Scotland’s major cities and small towns, this research suggests the importance of social imposition (labelling behaviour and mis-recognition), family education and cultural ties in varying the meanings and the strength of  second-generation Muslims’ national and ethnic identities in Scotland. In addition, this paper  highlights the significance of various levels of religiosity in differentiating the meanings and strength of participants’ religious identities. [1] In this paper, ‘first generations’ are those Muslims who were born outside the UK and immigrated to UK and the term ‘second generation’ refers to those Muslims who were born in the UK to non-native parents.

According to some researchers (Hopkins, 2004a; Hopkins & Smith, 2008), there is a perception among certain Muslims that anti-Muslim racism is higher in areas where there is a high density of Muslim residents, such as Glasgow. In contrast, other Muslims may feel that Islamophobia is higher in places with fewer numbers of Muslim residents. Through an investigation of Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia in major Scottish cities, this paper discusses the influence of the size of Muslim communities in experiencing Islamophobia[1]. It also examines the importance of other possible factors, such as socio-economic status and deprivation on Islamophobia. To this end, the experience and accounts of 33 Muslim participants in major Scottish cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Dundee) were documented and analyzed through qualitative methods. The findings of this paper suggest that Muslims’ individual and social aspects of life play a more important role on Islamophobia, as opposed to the size of their population in a certain area. More precisely, the analysis of Muslims who experienced Islamophobia suggests that Muslims’ identity and visibility, especially racial and religious signifiers such as skin color, beard or hijab, were crucial to their experiences of Islamophobia. [1]. This is compared, in another research (Author, 2015), to the experiences of 10 Muslim participants in small Scottish cities and towns (Falkirk, Dunfermline, East Kilbride and Stirling) where that the number of Muslims living in those areas is less than one percent of the local population (National Records of Scotland, 2013).