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Considering the fact that the words in the intra-religious attitude are considered in two ways, the first is towards jurisprudential words and the second is a rational and conceptual view focusing on their meanings. we have tried to deal with one of the most important issues of intra-religious attitude with a rational approach by descriptive and analytical method, which is the category of "hermeneutic interpretation" of words, especially the most influential idea of interpretation & that is the view of the "spirit of meaning" of Ghazali. After Ghazali, Ibn Arabi used this theory of Ghazali regarding the development of meaning in creating his new idea, and by re-reading Ghazali's idea with a mystical approach, he presented his own theory regarding the expansion of meaning. While accepting the argument of the focal point of the theory of the spirit of meaning, he removes it from the exclusivity to the "linear", and for this purpose, he brought up arguments as well as the Conditions of Hermeneutic Interpretation in this regard. Ibn Arabi's arguments on transversal interpretation include new formulations in the argument, which after him, this theory was favored and accepted by Mulla Sadra, and then it was accepted by his students.

The primary objective of this article is to elucidate that a comprehensive understanding of Greek political thought necessitates an examination of its origins in Ancient Greece. Traditional scholarship in Greek political thought has typically assumed that it originated concurrently with philosophy and the establishment of the polis. In this research, drawing upon the visions of Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss, we endeavor to establish a refined definition of political thought while challenging the aforementioned conventional assumption. It is argued that political reflection remains intimately intertwined with the theological-mythological beginning of thought in Greece. This theological-mythological mode of thinking initially found expression in the works of Homer and Hesiod, with these poets serving as the foremost intellectual authorities and initial educators of the Greeks. The Greeks, in their self-perception, viewed themselves through a lens of religion and in the mirror of gods and divine forces. Consequently, any exploration into Greek political thought must acknowledge the works of these poets as the seminal intellectual foundations of Greek thought. It is imperative to recognize that political thought in Ancient Greece did not commence with philosophy or the emergence of the polis, but rather with poetry and a distinct form of religious-mythical experience, namely theologia-muthologia. 

Regarding the way of facing the West and modernity, Ahmed Fardid is among the thinkers who, by adopting a philosophical and judgmental approach, rejects modernity, philosophy, and western civilization in its entirety. Fardid considers modernity and the West to have an inherent crisis and considers any attempt to patch up modernity with Eastern religions or cultures futile. Fardid, who is the creator of the word “ Gharbzadegi (Westoxification)”, considers human sciences and Western civilization to be nothing more than the inciting soul vanities and blasphemy. By adopting an essentialist and negative approach towards the modern world, he calls for a complete break from the subjectivism and humanism associated with the modern world and a return to Islamic-oriented philosophy (Hekmat-e Onsi). Seyyed Hossein Nasr, as a traditionalist thinker, rejects Western civilization and modernity as a unified whole. He wants to incorporate modern science and reason and take perennial philosophy. In this paper, via a comparative analysis method, this hypothesis is examined that although Fardid and Nasr are sympathizers in the complete negation and rejection of the modern world, Fardid confronts modernity and its consequent subjectivism using Heidegger’s western thought. This is when Nasr confronts modernity from the perspective of a traditionalist thinker who believes in the foundations of tradition. Nasr considers the return to the perennial philosophy to solve confronting the Western world and modernity, but Fardid faced with the modern world, emphasizes that although modernity is the exposure of self-fulfillment, one must strive to overcome it. It is difficult to return to the past.

The aim of this work is to demonstrate that Alfred Schütz's contribution to the social sciences is understandable only within the framework of his troubled relationship with Husserl's phenomenology. We will see how Schütz tries to take charge, to face and resolve a good part of the critical issues present in Husserl's work and, above all, to make a turning point in the field of investigation of phenomenology which will prove decisive for the human sciences as it will focus his attention on the question of intersubjectivity, considered no longer as a problem concerning only the phenomenological sphere but as a fundamental category of human existence. Therefore, we will try to show how Schütz's path assumes a considerable critical value as it contributes to raise the expectations of sociology and to strengthen the confidence of this discipline which tends to go beyond the narrow boundaries outlined by Husserl and to go in a direction diametrically opposite to "The Crisis of European sciences" outlined by the father of phenomenology, since Schütz provides stable and adequate bases for the social sciences that allow to analyze the fundamental structures that support the social world, and, in this way, at the same time, he manages to safeguard the basic nucleus of the phenomenological discipline, since, stripped of metaphysical lure and devoid of verbal and oracular enchantments, it is traced back to the Husserlian idea of rigorous science. From this point of view, Schütz's merit lies primarily in having made a critical revision of phenomenology, in having initiated a broad debate on the role of the social sciences, and in having provided the first ideas for the foundation of a phenomenologically oriented sociology.

This paper analyses social cognition by considering the analytic philosophy of mind, neurophenomenology and social neuroscience. Many social neuroscientists rely unconsciously on different philosophical answers to the question "how do we understand each other?". Consequently, we will compare the principal philosophical and experimental approaches to social cognition that have been proposed so far and join them in an integrationist account by taking into consideration the direct embeddedness of social interactors. First, the "theory theory" (T.T.) affirms that mindreading consists in inferring the other's mental state by observing his behaviour from a third-person perspective. A neural network called the "mentalizing system" (M.E.N.S.) underlies mindreading activities.Second, the Simulation Theory (S.T.) assumes that social cognition involves simulating the mental states of the other. The neural substrate for the simulatory activities is the "mirror neurons system" (i.e., M.N.S.). Both TT and S.T. are fastened to the "observer paradigm" since the experimental set-ups involve detecting the brain's activity of a participant observing or simulating someone else's movement, and intersubjective dynamics are not at play. Finally, the 2nd person approach invites to consider the other as the one who is directly intervening on our perception and is responsible for the meaning we assign to his mental states (cf. Schillbach et al., 2013). Consequently, Schilbach et al. (2013) have established an experimental setting that is "minimalist and naturalistic" because it focuses on basic kinds of embedded interactions such as mutual gaze. This paper argues that the philosophical theories underlying those approaches do not conflict with each other, but they highlight different moments of social interaction in real life. Indeed, their neural substrates partially overlap. Hence, we want to establish in which order these three moments of social interaction occur. We hold that a realistic phenomenology must consider second-person interactions as the beginning of a realistic phenomenology.

Predication is one of the significant issues in Islamic philosophical logic. “Essential Primary Predication” (al-ḥaml al-awwalī al-dhātī) is a new type of predication found mainly in late Islamic philosophers. The historical background of this predication is one of the controversial topics among post-Ṣadrīan thinkers, but it seems that it must be sought in Avicenna’s discussions on the meaning of predication. To show this, I will focus on two fragments in which Avicenna talks about the meaning of predication; one in al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt (Pointers and Reminders) and the other in Manṭiq al-Mashriqīyyīn (The Logic of the Easterners). In Ishārāt, we read that in a proposition like “A is B”, what we mean is that “What is A is B”, not that “The ḥaqīqa of A is the ḥaqīqa of B”.

Notwithstanding Karl Popper’s deep admiration for ancient Greece and his affection for modern Greece, his work has been mostly viewed with caution by Greek scholars who, until relatively recently, often chose to either ignore or downplay it. This stance can be partially attributed to the novel approach of Popper’s critique to Plato which did not fare well with the foundational biases of modern Greek academic tradition and the prevailing intellectual inclinations of Greek scholars in the fields of the methodology of science and political theory. Although this bias has begun to recede during the last decades, there remains a lot to be done to fully integrate Popper’s work into the Greek intellectual and social discourse. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at Athens University, along with the efforts of academics and public intellectuals, particularly during the Greek financial crisis of the last decade, have played a pivotal role in generating a broader interest in critical rationalism and popularizing Popper’s ideas among a wider audience. This paper examines the evolution of the reception of Popper’s ideas in Greece, both in scholarly circles and in public life, from the time of publication of his seminal work “The Open Society and its Enemies” until today, highlighting the efforts to foster a more comprehensive understanding of his important contributions

The reception and influence of Popper’s philosophy of science and his political philosophy in Latin America have depended heavily on the translation of his major works originally published in German and English. Thus, for example, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, which was originally published in 1959, was translated into Spanish in 1962 and into Portuguese only in 1974. Similarly, The Open Society and Its Enemies, originally published in 1945, was translated into Spanish twelve years later in 1957 and into Portuguese in 1974. But apart from a discussion of the impact of the translations of his books, I also want to show that the political situation in some Latin American countries, for example, Chile, Cuba and Peru, has played a very important role in the introduction, reception and influence of Popper’s philosophy of science in general and his social and political thought in particular. Accordingly, the main purpose of this article is to examine the reception of Popper’s ideas in Latin America and give an account of his influence and legacy in some of the Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.

Critical rationalism faces difficulty in Karl Popper’s Socratic formulation: “I may be wrong, and you may be right, and by an effort, we may find the truth.” But the Socratic elenchus, using refutations, can only give us negative knowledge of general principles, which is not the wisdom we seek. Affirmatively, we can only find a collection of opinions to be coherent, which is one of many. Francis Bacon proposed an improved elenchus to find general truths. You must take up a limited topic to study, then cross-examine your evidence for and against its apparent nature. Experiments contrary to evidence and presumed knowledge are entered as self-contradictions in tables of opposition recorded in an “experimental and natural history.” Such an account highlights a challenging puzzle if the account is to be made coherent. With enough problematized evidence, a coherent reading, or a solution of the puzzle, will be unique. Being both coherent and unique, it will be the truth about that limited reality being investigated. Unlike the method of hypothesis (“Anticipating Nature”), deciphering a coherent model is “Interpreting Nature,” allowing us to find a general truth on a limited topic. Isaac Newton achieved great success using Robert Boyle’s mechanistic version of this method. Using the “experimental philosophy,” he discovered general principles of optics and astronomy.

Our analysis of Popper’s philosophy of science focuses on his concepts of tradition and situational analysis. These concepts represent innovative Popperian contributions to a historical and hermeneutical turn in philosophy of science that most of his critics, especially Kuhn, fail to recognize. According to his historical view, Popper conceives sciences as a complex of traditions in continuous transformation and progress by means of rational discussion of theories. In order to grasp the rational progress of scientific traditions, Popper proposes an original method that he calls “situational analysis”. This hermeneutical method seeks to understand the concepts, hypotheses, actions, practices, controversies and products that scientists made to solve problems in their specific historical contexts to improve the truth content of theories. In addition to his historical and hermeneutical turn, Popper also inquired about the social and political conditions for the progress of scientific traditions by means of intersubjective criticism of theories and conjectures. According to him, the rational discussion of ideas requires, as necessary conditions, plurality of ideas, intellectual humility, and freedom of thought and communication that can only exist in an open and democratic society. With these considerations, we may say that in addition to a historical and hermeneutical turn, Popper also contributed to a social and political turn in the philosophy of science

The paper offers a distinctive reading of Popper’s work, suggesting that his Logic of Scientific Discovery (LScD) might be re-interpreted in the light of his Open Society. Indeed, Popper can be interpreted as criticising certain aspects of his first book, and as a result improving upon them, in his second. It suggests translating what Popper says about ‘conventions’ into his later vocabulary of ‘social institutions’. Looking back, I believe that Popper never intended the language of conventions and decisions to be read individualistically. I remain unsure whether Popper was himself quite as clear about this as he could have been.  My reading makes Popper a pioneer in the sociology of science. Scientific institutions are arenas of political power; but Popper did not discuss the structure and inter-relations of the social institutions of science, or offer a politics of science in the context of his methodology. What is missing from the skeletal sociology of LScD is the politics. We could put it in Popperian terms this way: scientific institutions are both open and closed. They are closed, firmly, to the inexpert, to the non-members; supposedly they are open to the qualified, provided the prerogatives of seniority and leadership are acknowledged. Despite these shortcomings, Popper’s critical and rational approach and his insistence on openness and intellectual honesty are still important today.