درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

The implementation of an effective tax system requires specific conditions, among the most critical being equity and efficiency. Taxation on income must align with the principle of the ability to pay; therefore, governments strive to set tax rates appropriately and impactfully. An disproportionate increase in income tax rates can lead to significant social repercussions on income distribution and public welfare. Consequently, calculating the optimal tax rate to maximize social welfare is deemed essential. This paper models the strategic interaction between taxpayers and the tax authority to achieve an optimal tax rate and identifies the factors influencing this rate. By designing a game among taxpayers, assumed to be uniformly distributed within the interval [0, 1], and evaluating the revenue generation of the tax authority, the paper delves into the game formulation and analyses the results. Findings indicate that the optimal tax rate exhibits an inverse relationship with the assessment rates set by investigating groups. Additionally, under specific conditions, the optimal performance tax rate has been determined to be 18%.

One of the most important determinants of bank profitability is the bank's financing strategy. Therefore, banks must continuously innovate to design and implement new financing instruments. Among these, Islamic financial instruments—particularly sukuk—play a significant role. The present study investigates the impact of sukuk on different levels of profitability (low, medium, and high) for 24 Islamic banks and 12 conventional banks, considering additional control variables such as GDP growth and inflation. The analysis covers the period 2003–2023 and specifically examines the role of the 2008 global financial crisis. Using dynamic panel quantile regression, the findings reveal that during the crisis, the expansion of the sukuk market positively influenced the profitability of conventional banks but negatively affected Islamic banks, with the strongest reduction observed among banks with low profitability. In contrast, outside the crisis period, sukuk development shows a mixed effect: negative for both Islamic and conventional banks at low and high levels of profitability, while remaining neutral in the middle quantiles.

Forfaiting, as one of the modern instruments of international trade finance, enables the conversion of medium- and long-term receivables into immediate liquidity while transferring the full spectrum of political, commercial, and credit risks to financial institutions. This method has played a significant role in facilitating transactions and enhancing the competitiveness of exporters in many countries, particularly in emerging economies. Despite these advantages, no clear institutional and legal framework has yet been developed for its implementation in Iran, and the existing research has largely been confined to theoretical and legal aspects. This gap highlights a critical research necessity, the examination of which can contribute to financial and trade policymaking in the country. The purpose of the present study is to assess the feasibility of establishing a forfaiting institution in Iran’s financial market and to analyze its effect on reducing investment risk. The research is applied in nature and conducted through a descriptive–survey method. The statistical population consisted of 152 experts in the monetary and banking sector as well as financial market practitioners, with data collected using a structured questionnaire. The validity of the instrument was confirmed by experts and statistical criteria, while its reliability was verified through Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability values exceeding 0.7. The collected data were analyzed using SPSS (version 24) and SmartPLS software. Within this framework, four main dimensions—risk reduction, risk coverage, operational mechanism, and institutional framework—were examined as determinants of the feasibility of forfaiting.

Both Afghanistan and Bangladesh have a per capita income below $500 early 21st century, but now Bangladesh’s per capita income is more than 3 times that of Afghanistan. Surprisingly, at the beginning of the period, Bangladesh have worser than Afghanistan in the corruption perception indices, and hence a small government has been sufficient to experience high economic growth. However, emphasizing small government such as that promoted by the World Bank’s 1980s model is not suffice for low-income, resource-scarce, landlocked countries like Afghanistan. In such contexts, institutions are not capable of transforming financial resources into effective public services. Using Paul Collier’s framework, this paper evaluates how institutional performance and economic policies function in Afghanistan’s failure to achieve development. The aim is to examine the undevelopment trap of bad governance and ineffective policies in Afghanistan. The period 2005–2019 divided into three five-year sub-periods and then each sub-period is analyzed by a stylized-facts-based approach. The findings indicate that during the first period (2005–2009), the economic management had the strongest performance with an average score above the threshold 3, while criteria of the public sector management and institutions had the weakest performance, scoring below the threshold. Since the average of all indices was remained consistently below the Collier’s threshold, it is concluded that Afghanistan entraped in a bad governance trap. This trend is been continued in the second (2010–2014) and third (2015–2019) periods, albeit criteria structural policies, instead of public sector management and institutions in the first period, has worst status.