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Ayala (American philosopher and biologist) has presented new theories on the evolutionary ethical explanations. Due to the large scope of Ayala’s discussion on evolutionary ethics, only some of his theories will be reviewed in this paper after mentioning Ayala’s theoretical foundations about the formation of moral sense and moral norms. Following Darwin, Ayala distinguishes the moral sense and the moral norms accepted by the human community. Therefore, he believes that the biological-natural processes lead to the evolution of the human mind; this growth and development in the mind results in the moral sense in the human. On the one hand, the norms and ethical systems of any human society have been emerged due to the cultural evolution in that country. Hence, cultural evolution is the foundation of Ayala’s ethical pluralism theory. As such, Ayala advocates the objectivity of moral values and Kantian subjective morality. He rejects the dependence of the moral sense on evolutionary mechanisms such as group selection and relative selection since he, like Kant, regards human rationality as the only reason for justifying moral sense. In this paper, Ayala’s theories on ethical pluralism and the role of cultural evolution in the formation of moral norms are discussed and criticized. Ayala’s success in establishing a universal normative ethical system will be approached skeptically; however, his biological explanation of the origin of moral sense can be considered as a Kantian account of morality.

The question of what is the soul is one of the fundamental questions in philosophical psychology and the answer to it, along with other psychology questions, has been and is one of the most important and first concerns of philosophers. Among the philosophers, Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi have offered a novel view of the identity of the soul in comparison with their predecessors. In order to know the identity of the soul, Ibn Sina mentions the experience of human beings suspended in space in some of his works, and Suhrawardi, while expressing and modifying Ibn Sina's experience, speaks of other experiences. Through this research, it becomes clear that the efforts of the two in recognizing the soul are not the same, because Ibn Sina comes into existence in the experience of a human suspended in space, which is a hypothetical experience, and Suhrawardi in the experience of liberation from the body and experience in sleep and wakefulness. There are some realities and not assumptions about oneself that both views have been interpreted and evaluated in this article.

W. V. Quine borrows the principle of charity from Neil Wilson, but modifies and enriches its content to fit into his naturalistic philosophy and epistemology. While Wilson ties this principle to the notion of truth, Quine’s attempts in finding a ground for it lead him to the concept of common rationality shared by all human beings, which is ultimately what makes communication, as the basis of our social life, possible. According to the paper's argument, three other expressions, that is, the principles of psychological plausibility, empathy, and projection, which Quine uses in the contexts akin to that of the principle of charity, are not but different terms for one basic idea. Given the ties between the principle of charity and rationality, Quine's wide use of the principle and its affiliated notions proves that rationality is a central, often neglected, idea in his philosophy. The paper begins with an introductory account of the brief explanation Wilson gives of the principle of charity. Then it spells out four concepts or principles of charity, psychological plausibility, empathy, and projection showing how these four notions or principles basically express the same thing. Examining the relation of these last three principles with the principle of charity and rationality, the paper's main objective is to highlight the centrality of common rationality in Quine's philosophy, despite the common view that Quine is purely engaged with semantical aspects of Language. 

Kant’s method on moral philosophy follows his general way of philosophizing, i.e. transcendental method. That is to say, he discovers formal conditions of moral action through the transcendental analysis rather than focusing on non-rational motivations. However, it would seem to be the case that his concept of the human being as “the end-in- itself”, “the kingdom of ends”, should be understood within a Kantian big picture which is the practical aspect of human existence. Firstly, I elucidate Kant’s idea of the kingdom of ends which is the idea of the humanity as end in itself with respect to moral dimension; secondly, I clarify its political dimension and, to some extent, its legal implications; thirdly, I delineate its religious implications; finally, the kingdom of ends is considered within Kant’s philosophy of history where I evince its final sense. Therefore, Kant’s practical philosophy is taken to be accounted as a comprehensive whole based upon the kingdom of ends, although it is not a systematic whole similar to Hegelian system.