



**Vol. 14/ Issue: 32/ autumn 2020**



**Mazdak Rajabi**

*Assistant professor, faculty member, history & civilization of the west, IHCS, Tebar, Iran*

[m.rajabi@ihcs.ac.ir](mailto:m.rajabi@ihcs.ac.ir)

**The Kingdom of Ends: Comprehensive Account of Kant's  
Philosophy of History with Regard to Religion**

Received date: 2019.6.23 Accepted date: 2020.12.14  
PP.239-251

DOI: [10.22034/jpiut.2020.31903.2238](https://doi.org/10.22034/jpiut.2020.31903.2238)

**Abstract**

Kant's method on moral philosophy follows his general way of philosophizing, i.e. transcendental method. That is to say, he discovers formal conditions of moral action through the transcendental analysis rather than focusing on non-rational motivations. However, it would seem to be the case that his concept of the human being as "the end-in-itself", "the kingdom of ends", should be understood within a Kantian big picture which is the practical aspect of human existence. Firstly, I elucidate Kant's idea of the kingdom of ends which is the idea of the humanity as end in itself with respect to moral dimension; secondly, I clarify its political dimension and, to some extent, its legal implications; thirdly, I delineate its religious implications; finally, the kingdom of ends is considered within Kant's philosophy of history where I evince its final sense. Therefore, Kant's practical philosophy is taken to be accounted as a comprehensive whole based upon the kingdom of ends, although it is not a systematic whole similar to Hegelian system.

**Keywords:** The Kingdom of Ends, Unsocial Sociability, Ethical State, Kingdom of Virtue, Kingdom of Good Principle.

## Introduction

Kant's method on moral philosophy follows his general way of philosophizing, i.e. transcendental method. That is to say, he discovers formal conditions of moral action through the transcendental analysis rather than focusing on non-rational motivations. However, it would seem to be the case that his concept of the human being as "the end-in-itself", "the kingdom of ends", should be understood within a Kantian big picture which is the practical aspect of human existence. In other words, Kant's focus on moral duty, based on the idea of humanity as the end-in-itself, should be considered in relation to the historical implications of human nature.

According to Kant, the most appropriate political form in which citizen's rights could, and should, be secured is "the republic". However, even in the political form of republic, humans cannot attain their own ultimate end which is the realization of freedom. Religion as moral community prepares us to reach "the cultural state" which governs humans in a higher level than the political state. Therefore, Kantian "rational religion" is the highest form of humanity, i.e., the highest form of civilization. However, Kant does not conclude, I highlight it, that rational religion is not the last theoretical apparatus to elucidate the idea of humanity. Therefore, history is theoretical framework in which there is a prospectively developing concept of humanity from the concept of duty to the concept of right, and then to that of political form, and from political form to religious aspect of humanity respectively. Consequently, the historical aspect of humanity leads to the realization of humanity's all potentialities among which rationality is the most complete. Rationality is therefore the final end of history, which in Kant's practical philosophy is articulated by the idea of kingdom of ends. All these levels are contained within the practical sphere of Kant's philosophy, even if their relations remain systematically unexplained in Kant's own philosophy.

### (I) Moral Dimension

Kant raises four questions concerning the most fundamental issues of philosophy. The second question is "What ought I to do?" (Kant, 1996:735) He formulates the answer to this question by the categorical imperative in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. He argues that all empirical ends are material ends. They are merely relative, in the sense that they can produce no universally valid, necessary principles for all rational beings and their volitions. In other words, there is no practical, namely, rational law, if only material ends are to be accepted since such relative ends can only be the empirical ground of hypothetical imperatives. (Kant, 1999:78) He isolates the categorical imperative as law that which should not be hypothetical since any hypothetical imperative is an end other than what the Will wishes to seek.

Furthermore, there should be something that which has an absolute worth by virtue of its own existence. That is, it is an end-in-itself insofar as it is ground of determinate laws. Henceforth, a possible categorical imperative, i.e. a practical law, lies in it alone. (Ibid:78) Before defining the concept of human being as an end-in-itself, Kant distinguished incentives as subjective ends (grounds) of human

actions from motives which are objective ends (grounds) of human actions. (Ibid:78) Now it is appropriate time to state that human beings (or any rational being) exist as end-in-itself, not merely as a means which is used by others. Kant does not want to deny that humans are often seen as means, but he transcendently formulates the principle of humanity according to which human beings and any possible rational being should be regarded as end-in-itself. The transcendental principle of humanity is thus simultaneously normative as well as descriptive.

Incentives or inclinations are the sources of our physical and psychological needs. Therefore, they are far from having absolute value. Humans' moral actions as realization of rationality must be free from any incentives or inclinations, if they are to be deliberate actions. As far as Kant distinguishes things from persons, any physical and psychological object of our actions is always conditional. Such objects do not rest on our will but rest on nature. In other words, if humans are beings devoid of reason, such empirical objects are still considered relatively as means, and are therefore called things, whereas rational beings are called persons. (Ibid: 79)

The distinction between nature and reason, as noted above, seems to be an unfilled gap in Kant's moral philosophy, but it is not so. Shortly afterward, Kant defines (Ibid:79) reason as human nature which already makes him/her an end-in-itself. Later on I examine Kant's definition of human nature.

In addition, the only concept in which an objective end can be found is the idea of human being as end-in-itself. Only such a being is worth absolutely, that is, it is not conditional and contingent. Kant calls it "*the supreme practical principle*" which is the same universal practical law, and it is also the same categorical imperative with respect to the human will. It is universal subjective principle of human actions, but it is at the same time an objective principle as a supreme practical ground from which must be derived all laws of the Will. (Ibid:79-80)

Kant therefore reformulates the practical imperative as the principle of humanity. He states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means." (Ibid:80)

After giving four examples in order to see whether or not the principle of humanity can be carried out, Kant gives several reasons to show that it is not borrowed from experience. Firstly, it is, and should be, universal since it applies to all rational beings, and no experience is therefore sufficient to determine it in an empirical way. According to Kant's transcendental method, it is the case that if and only if a concept is universal, it cannot be derived from experience, and it thus comes necessarily from pure reason as such. Secondly, principally, because humanity is presented not as subjective end but as objective end, it ought to be the supreme limiting condition of all subjective ends. That is to say, humanity turns out to be negatively limiting condition rather than affirmatively constructive one. It must come from pure reason as such due to the foregoing argument.

Afterward, Kant entitles the principle of humanity as the principle of "autonomy of the will" exactly in contrast with any other principle of "heteronomy". According to the principle of autonomy, every single rational being must regard itself as a universal lawgiver who produces moral laws based on the

maxims of the will so as to elevate the empirical point of view. Autonomy as the unique moral principle consists with moral actions independent from all material objects. This independence is used in the negative sense, whereas pure practical reason as self-legislator of moral actions is the principle of freedom in the positive sense. (Kant, 1999:166) The principle of autonomy, “negative freedom”, leads Kant to the concept of the kingdom of ends. (Kant, 1999:83)

The concept of the kingdom of ends alludes to a two-dimensional sense; rational being should be regarded as an end-in-itself, and should also be regarded as an end of its own species in a way that each rational being might set itself as its own species. (Ibid:83) In other words, each person of the kingdom of ends is an end-in-itself, and all the ends constitute a whole at the same time.

Such a kingdom must not be considered as an aggregate of all the ends, but it should be considered as a priori universal union of various rational beings based on common laws. Pure practical laws determine the final goal of the ends in terms of their universality so as to constitute a universal kingdom in which those rational beings regard themselves as lawgiver based on the freedom of their will. Rational beings see themselves both as members within such a kingdom and as sovereigns over it.

## (II) Political Dimension

The concept of membership leads the direction of the kingdom of ends to its political dimension, since civil society as the institutional actualization of social life is the concrete foundation in which moral duty as such reveals itself. Duty does not thus apply to humans as sovereigns in the kingdom of ends, but it does apply to each single human as member of such a kingdom. (Ibid:84) Therefore, human as rational, physical and psychological being requires to fulfil moral action based on duty, which is rational as such, only if he is to be regarded as a political member of the kingdom of ends. Contrariwise, if he is regarded as sovereign, he does not need to fulfil moral action based on rational duty. Rather, he, as sovereign, fulfils moral action based on giving law itself. His will and reason will be the same from this point of view since he is a universal lawgiver.

The political aspect of the kingdom of ends also turns out to have a teleological aspect, when Kant states that all maxims have three dimensions: firstly, they have a form which consists in universality already expressed in the formula of the categorical imperative; secondly, they have a matter, namely that the human is a rational being as well as the end by its own nature, and hence he is an end-in-itself which must be regarded in all maxims as the limiting condition of all arbitrary empirical ends. That is to say, being the end is the negative aspect of the principle of freedom based on which every possible community, social and political unit, can be constituted politically; thirdly, moral concepts imply a complete determination of all maxims. That is, all maxims are supposed to be harmonized with a possible kingdom of ends as well as with a kingdom of nature.

The third dimension of maxims is the same Leibniz's principle of progression, perfection, which is the third principle of his practical philosophy. It would seem to be the case that the first dimension of maxims, with regard to Kant's understanding of its political dimension, is a different formulation of

Leibniz's first principle which is "the principle of spontaneity", and the second dimension of maxims is a new formulation of Leibniz's second principle which is "the principle of equity". (Leibniz, :161-162)

The third principle which is the "principle of progression", i.e. "perfection", states that teleological aspect of reason regards nature as the kingdom of ends, and vice versa, moral aspect of reason considers a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In other words, morality sees a possible kingdom of intelligent beings as the end of nature itself. Teleology sees the kingdom of ends as a theoretical idea for explaining what really exists, whereas the metaphysics of morals sees the kingdom of ends as a practical idea in order to bring about what does not exist. It can only become real by means of our conduct. (Kant, 1999:86) Therefore, the principle of progression, i.e. perfection, is the conformity of teleology with morality.

Afterwards, Kant concludes: "... that categorical imperative can also expressed thus: act in accordance with maxims that can at the same time have as their object themselves as universal laws of nature." (Ibid:86)

This is his new formulation of Leibniz's third principle. That is to say, the laws of morality are in accordance with the laws of nature within which human beings can bring about what is not existent before. Henceforth, nature is always becoming perfect through human moral actions, as if humans' moral perfection gives its own quality to nature in general. Consequently, the human being as a rational being within nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by being end-in-itself. The unity of rational beings as the kingdom of ends is possible since each human is a lawgiver in a way that his laws are universal.

Consequently, each rational being of such a kingdom of ends must always act as a member of the universal kingdom of ends. As mentioned above, the Kingdom of ends is based on an analogy with the kingdom of nature. The kingdom of nature is a methodologically regulative expression by which Kant states that we can explain natural phenomena only through the universal laws of nature based upon the concept of efficient cause. The Kingdom of ends is a practical expression in order to go beyond the sphere of natural phenomena explained by the theoretical knowledge that which is pertaining to the concept of efficient cause. Despite the kingdom of nature, which considers nature as mechanically explainable non-living machine, kingdom of ends considers nature as a living being which is always becoming perfect, and it therefore requires to be explained teleologically.

It seems to be the case that each human's perfection in accordance with others' perfection is the real foundation on which Kant attempts to clarify the principle of humanity. In other words, every human being is a member of the kingdom of ends at least as an ideal principle, but he is a member of state, i.e. civil society, as the real political unit of human community. Therefore, according to Kant, the metaphysics of morals should also define the principles of right. In other words, discovering the a priori principles of private and public rights is a part of the metaphysics of morals.

Kant establishes the metaphysics of morals based on the principle of innate freedom since human's freedom independent from being constrained by another human's choice can coexist with other humans' freedom in accordance with a

universal law. Such a freedom is the only original and natural right belonging to each person by virtue of his humanity as such. Kant states that the principle of innate freedom which is the only natural right. It already involves the principle of natural right, as if humans are members of the division of some higher concept of right. This is the same point I mentioned above on how membership of the kingdom of ends as an ideal moral principle of humanity can lead the moral aspect of reason to the sphere of political and legal sphere.

The human being, not as sovereign but only as member of the kingdom of ends, is really a member of the state at the same time. A civil community is the real union in which a multitude of human beings live, and they affect one another. Therefore, they need a rightful condition under a united will, which is the constitution. (Kant, 1999:455) A state (civitas) is a real union of a multitude of human beings under the laws of right. They bring into existence the concepts of external right as such. That is to say, the form of the state is its form as an idea, as it ought to be in accordance with the pure principles of right. This idea is a normative concept for each actual union or community in commonwealth. (Ibid:457)

The concept of the kingdom of ends has already been expressed as ideally moral principle of humanity that now it is to be expressed as the principle of right. The kingdom of ends implies morality and rightfulness at the same time. Furthermore, it seems to be the case that the most vital aspect of the kingdom of ends, according to Kant philosophy as a whole, is religious-historical dimension.

Kant establishes the a priori principles of morality and law with regard to the rationality as the essence of the human being. However, evil is a real characteristic which is always in the human being. Kant therefore has to bring it to the domain of his practical philosophy, especially where he is to explain the ideas of religion and history. The kingdom of ends thus requires to be put within the religious-historical sphere in order to explain how the human being as multi-dimensional, which is also characterized by radical evil, can be good especially with regard to it as a universal race through history. This will consist in the second part of the paper.

### (III) Religious Dimension

Kant's third fundamental question is "What may I hope." (Kant, 1996:735 B832f)<sup>1</sup> Hope is directed to that which does not yet exist as the phenomenal thing. Henceforth, the third question adds the aspect of the future to the previous aspects. Religion as the idea of the eternal life in the future would be the hidden rational meaning of human life in general, and consequently, history should be considered as the actualization of such an idea in the phenomenal world.

He defines human being as a constant battle between freedom and evil. The source of evil can be another human. Humans will mutually corrupt each other so

---

1. Kant, Immanuel., (1996). *Critique of Pure Reason*, In *Critique of Pure Reason; Unified Edition*. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Introduction by Patricia Kitcher. Indianapolis/Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.p. 735. He raises four questions. He thinks they are the most fundamental questions for both human knowledge and practice.

as to lead them to be evil beings. (Kant, 2001:129) He seems to consider the union of humans as evil in which each person causes others to be evil. Shortly afterward, he states that such a union cannot be the final end based on which human society has been established. Only a society that relies on the laws of virtues could be the final end of human beings. Reason implies that society is a task and a duty of the entire human race to establish. (Ibid:130)

In any case, there are three points which should be considered: firstly, the end of human society cannot be evil, although evil is always in human beings from an ethical and religious point of view; secondly, the end of human society is good, and reason alone can establish such a good society based on the virtue; thirdly, the good society is attainable only through constant tasks and duties of humans as an entire race. In other words, it is not a pre-positing good, or rather, it is established only through incessantly moral self-positing of humanity as a race within history. Reason alone is able to cease evil in order to attain the virtue-based society. This would be an ethical society which contains both religious and historical sense.

Kant distinguishes an ethico-civil association in contrast to juridico-civil society in which private and public rights, based on the rational principles of right, must be exercised. The first one is an ethical community, but the second one is a political community. Without the foundation of a political community, the ethical community could never be brought into existence. It has its own principle which is virtue and its form and constitution are essentially distinct from form and constitution of political community. (Ibid:130) Kant had already introduced “the kingdom of ends” in order to reformulate the principle of humanity in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, but he reflects a hidden practical sense of the kingdom of ends considering religion.

“Ethical state”, “kingdom of virtue” and “kingdom of the good principle” are new terms Kant uses (Ibid:130) to consider the religious implications of the kingdom of ends. The most essential problem has to be dealt with is that what kind of ground could be the condition of such an ethical society. It is the case that it is an idea, but it has been entirely well-grounded as an objective reality in the human reason. (Ibid:130) The constant task (duty) of the human race to realize the ethical state is an objective goal, even though humans cannot subjectively ever hope for the complete realization of the good will within the political-juridical reality. Kant himself clearly distinguishes the foregoing distinction:

“ A juridico-civil (political) state is the relation of human beings to one another inasmuch as they stand jointly under the public juridical laws (which are all coercive laws). An ethico-civil state is one in which they are united under the laws without being coerced, i.e. under the laws of virtue alone.” (Ibid:130)

The supremacy of the good will over the evil is not a subjective hope, but it could be considered as hope for the kingdom of God which is the religious implication of the same kingdom of ends.

The good will is different from right which is the foundation of political sphere. The good will is the ethical end of the human race as a whole. Therefore, the ethical community differs from the concept of the political community. The idea

of the ethical community is related to the whole of humanity, not such and such political community. There is an analogy between such a practical idea and the regulative ideas of pure theoretical reason. The kingdom of ends as an ethical community could be a regulative practical idea based on which each real political society must be constituted in order to attain rationality as the end of human race.

Humans ought to leave the ethical state of nature in order to reach the ethical community, as they ought to leave the state of nature in order to reach the political-judicial state. The principles of good and evil always appear in contrast with each other in the ethical state of nature, but going towards the ethical community is the only necessary condition to attain the good will. Such movement would not be a personal duty towards others, but it could be the duty of the human race towards itself. (Ibid:132) An important question is now raised that whether or not such a union is the sum of all moral laws.

Kant's answer to the mentioned question would be that the ethical community differs from all moral laws which are the same virtues found in each single person. The ethical community is supposed to be the public legislation under which all individuals must be subjected, and the laws binding them must be capable of being regarded as the commands of a common lawgiver. Individual persons cannot be the lawgivers of such an ethical union, but God is the only one who can be the lawgiver of the ethical society. The idea of God is the only necessary condition of realization of an ethical union, since God is the only one who knows humans' heart in order to penetrate to the dispositions of people. (Ibid:134) As far as Kant religiously explicates it, the kingdom of ends is the same people of God only through which an ethical community is a possible idea in accordance with the laws of virtue.

For the people of God, the kingdom of ends, can be considered in accordance with statutory laws, not because of the morality of their actions, but because their actions are legal under God's juridical lawgiving power. The constitution thus will be a theocracy structured in an aristocratic government. (Ibid:134) It is obvious that the concept of the kingdom of ends re-expressed as the people of God is that which has a content of religious idea pertaining to God and the Kingdom of heaven. Moreover, there is a historical aspect to which Kant points out afterwards:

“Such a constitution, however, whose existence and form rest entirely on historical grounds, ... . It will come up for examination in the historical section, as an institution under politico-civil laws, of which the lawgiver, though God, is yet external, whereas we only have to do here with an institution, of which the lawgiver is purely internal, a republic under laws of virtue, i.e. with a people of God zealous of good works.” (Ibid:134)

The kingdom of ends turns out to be an ethical republic under God's legislation. Kant's philosophical aim is not only to defend morality through the a priori principles which come from pure (practical) reason, but also to put morality within the whole practical knowledge of the human (rational) being through the

---



description of the religious dimensions of the human being. However, Kant takes account of religion and history as two aspects of practical, namely pure reason. This is a substantial point to which many scholars have not paid attention. Both God as the idea of justice and God as the principle of humanity under his legislation are the same rational foundations of transcendence in religion and progression in history. They are two practical expressions of reason.

Furthermore, the people of God has another moral implication based on which humans have a moral duty to realize such an ethical community, although only God can realise it in the end. Nonetheless, human beings are not allowed to go after their private moral duties and let God himself realize the people of God. They must conduct themselves as if the realization of such an ethical community merely depends on them. The hope for the fulfillment of their efforts through God's higher wisdom is meaningful only on such condition. Humans as the people of the God and as a historical race must endeavour to realize the idea of the kingdom of ends, as if God fulfills it only through humanity as the final end of nature.

A real *church* could be the form of such an ethical union. Its constitution under God's legislation does not resemble a political constitution. Kant clearly states that it is neither monarchical, nor aristocratic, nor even democratic. It is similar to a family under an invisible moral father, namely God, whose holy son makes the other members well acquainted with the father's will. This would be a sort of union of hearts rather than being a legislative community of members. (Ibid:136)

"Heart" seems to be in contrast with the concept to which I pointed out earlier. The heart has a religious sense in that it seems to be in contrast with reason as the end of an ethical union. It appears to be an emotional aspect of human beings. However, there are two meanings of church as the religious realization of the kingdom of ends. The first one is the constitution of some historical faith, which we can call a realized ecclesiastical faith based on the facts derived of experience. The second one is the constitution of the exclusive dominion of pure religious faith which is the coming of the kingdom of God. Kant understands the second one as *moral faith*, *moral religion*, *rational faith* and *rational theology*. The first level of faith could seemingly be in contrast with reason, since "heart" seems to have a non-rational meaning on that level. But the second level would be the realm of reason alone in which religion is the expression, manifestation, of reason alone.

Religion in the second sense would be a pure ethical religion which is based on pure ethical laws. There is also only one God in such a pure ethical religion, and all pure ethical laws based on which religious commandments come from pure, practical, reason. Therefore pure faith is a pure rational one.

However, Kant does not want to deny every sort of requirement to a divine revelation. Humans are the members of the people of God in which they have to deal with an empirical faith as material appearance of that purely moral faith. Humans require an interpretation of the revelation as a historical appearance of moral faith, since only through knowledge of it they can harmonize that empirical faith with the universal practical rules of a pure religion of reason. (Ibid:142)

#### (IV) Historical Dimension

Despite different historical revelations, rational faith is universal. Therefore it is and it should be the one and the same. The people of God or the kingdom of ends, thus only comes to existence as a universal form. The concept of universality could be a unique mediation with which reason is to move on to the historical dimension of the kingdom of ends. Although moving towards the rational religion is a gradual movement, it has already been realized since it is a priori universal idea which is always able to be seen in humanity. From the historical standpoint, the idea of the good will as a universal principle should be fulfilled on earth in the end.

According to Allen Wood, it is the case that Kant himself has anticipated and incorporated in his philosophy his critics' worries such as sociality, character, virtue, emotions or historical change. He has not neglected or misunderstood these issues. They would be quite central to Kant's philosophy with regards to his own philosophy as a whole. (Pippin, 2014:241)

I interpret Kant's practical philosophy as a whole in which historical aspect of humanity reveals itself through the kingdom of ends. There are some vital religious and historical issues in his practical philosophy can prepare a philosophically fundamental ground in order to make his practical philosophy as a comprehensive whole.

Kant's focus on religion especially on the historical aspect of religion as conceptualized in the kingdom of ends can be read in order to take an account of his practical philosophy within a historical framework.

Kant proposes the a priori idea of history as the natural road of humanity. He attempts to prepare the formulation of a plan which he calls a *purpose in nature* behind the seemingly senseless course of human events as history of creatures who are devoid of plan of their own activities. (Kant, 1989:42) He attempts to establish a rational plan, like the laws of nature explained in Newtonian mechanics, in order to clarify the hidden natural meaning of human history. In other words, He sees history as the natural plan of humanity and something distinct from the status of all natural beings at the same time.

Kant defines the human being as the only rational being on earth whose natural capacity is reason. Therefore he states:

"Those natural capacities which are directed towards the use of his reason are such that they could be fully developed only in the species but not in the individual." (Ibid:42)

As far as he considers humanity with regard to its nature, it turns out to be a rational race. However, reason is a natural capacity which enables humanity as a race to extend far beyond the limits of natural instincts, rules and intentions by using the power of reason.

It is fascinating that reason itself is not an instinct, but it is natural thing. It would be an interesting problem to see how something could be natural and not to be instinct at the same time. The answer is that reason requires trial, practice and instruction to enable itself to progress gradually from the stage of instinct (state of nature) to the rational stage which is beyond the instinct in the end. (Ibid:43) Therefore, rationality is not a pre-established power, but it is a gradually historical potentiality. The original intention of nature is thus to transfer humanity as a race

to the state of reason since it is impossible for humanity to reach such a state individually. The human race can realize rationality in the end.

The third proposition of *Idea of a history from a cosmopolitan point of view* states that nature has willed that humanity should produce what he is able to do in order to go beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence. Furthermore, he should not partake of any other happiness or perfection than that which he has produced for himself without instinct and only by his own reason. This statement seems to be distinct from what Kant states in *Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals*, according to which, humans can see themselves from two different standpoints. The first one is the mechanistic framework that shows the human's place in nature, like any other natural thing, which is based on the law of causality. The second standpoint is the teleological framework that shows the special status of the human being in nature as the rational being who can see himself free from the cause and effect chain since he possesses the good free will by which he can freely act as an autonomous being.

The third proposition clearly states that nature does not do anything unnecessarily. Therefore, human reason and the freedom of the will based on reason have to be taken into account as the fulfillment of nature's intention. The human being thus produces everything out of himself, from barbarism era to the ethical union stage which is called the state of culture. History is the realization of human reason. Consequently, reason as the final end of nature will be realized only and only through human beings as a unique species, namely as a whole race. Kant thus states that nature should thank humans, because its final perfection is fulfilled only through humans. (Ibid:44)

The vital question is that how the human's rational capacity is to be fully realized through history. The fourth proposition clearly answers the question. The human being possesses two dispositions that they coexist at the same time. Firstly, he tends to live individually in order to be free as much as he can, without any burden. He is therefore antagonist within society. Secondly, nature has decided that the human being can realize his rational capacity only through the social order. Therefore, Kant defines humanity as "unsocial sociability" which is his tendency to come together in society, despite with a permanent resistance which constantly threatens to destroy this social order. (Ibid:44)

The society, namely the social order, is therefore the only way through which human reason can be realized according to nature's plan. Kant is forerunner of Hegel to admit the conflicts between individual and society as the contradictions within society as truly undeniable reality, which not only it is not a negative characteristic, but also is a positive and the only way which functions as the productive element of human history.

According to Kant, human being wants to live as an individual in order to isolate himself since he finds in himself the unsocial tendency of willing to direct everything in accordance with his own unlimited freedom. Therefore, he is always inclined to admit resistance within society, and he is also inclined to offer this resistance to others. It is fascinating that it is the same resistance awakens all human's natural capacity, specifically his reason. Nature therefore drives human being to accept society and to seek his status among others. This is the first step by which humans can move from the state of nature, namely the unlimited

freedom, to the state of culture. I call it the state of recognition, although Kant himself never uses such a technical term. The specific term he uses is the state of culture.

All the human's natural capacities, specifically his reason, are gradually to be developed only in the state of culture where he lives in society. (Ibid:44) The final step should now happen as enforced social union. It should be transformed into a moral whole, which is the same kingdom of ends from the ethical point of view and it is the same people of God from the religious point of view. Only after entering the social order humans are able to constitute a moral community in which they can develop their talents, especially their reason. Otherwise, all human talents would remain hidden forever in the state of nature.

As far as Kant considers social incompatibility, competitive vanity and insatiable desires for possession or even power (Ibid:44) are the hidden motivating plan of nature in order to let human reason realize itself. Kant admits the non-sociality as well as the continual resistance as real elements which are always progressive from the historical point of view since they encourage humans in finding new exertions of their reason and thus further realization of their natural capacities, especially rationality. Therefore, this seemingly negative characteristic of human nature is at the same time the same nature's plan to create moral union, the ethical state, in which reason is the highest potentiality that nature can completely realize.

The next point Kant adds to the concept of moral union with regard to its historical dimension is that the kingdom of ends, the people of God, is built up only through a universal cosmopolitan existence (Ibid:51) in which the human's rational and moral capacities are developed. However, Kant states that nature's plan should be considered as a rational plan, practical idea, (Ibid:52) with which only the philosopher is able to explain history as a whole, on the one hand, and humans can hope for the future which enables them to partake in a meaningful social life, on the other hand.

## Conclusion

Kant's idea of history, i.e. the end of humanity as realization of its rationality within the kingdom of ends is the final stage of Kant's practical philosophy. I delineate the kingdom of ends through a movement from morality to history in order to show the explanatory primacy of history within Kant's practical philosophy as whole. Therefore, If one considers his practical philosophy retrospectively, namely, through a movement from history to morality, this foregoing primacy will strikingly reveals itself. The practical importance of the idea of rationality relies on Kant's optimistic account of *the Enlightenment*. However, rationality is not just merely an a priori idea devoid of content, but it is the permanent endeavour to realize humanity, i.e., the state of culture during different historical eras.

## References

- 0 Korsgaard, Christine. M., (1996). "Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and responsibility in personal relations", in her book, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
- 0 Leibniz, G. W., (2017) *Methodus Discendae Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae*, A New Method For Learning And Teaching Jurisprudence.
- 0 Pippin, Robert B., (2014). "Kant's Theory of Value". in *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. London. Routledge. 43:2.
- 0 Kant, Immanuel.,(1989). *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*. in Kant Political Writings. Translated and Edited by H. S. Reiss. Cambridge. Cambridge university Press.
- 0 Kant, Immanuel (1996). *Critique of Pure Reason*, In *Critique of Pure Reason; Unified Edition*.translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Introduction by Patricia Kitcher. Indianapolis/Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
- 0 Kant, Immanuel (1999). *Groundwork of the metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical philosophy*.Translated and Edited By Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
- 0 Kant, Immanuel (1999). *The critique of practical reason*, in *Practical philosophy*.Translated and Edited By Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
- 0 Kant, Immanuel (1999).*The metaphysics of morals*, in *Practical philosophy*, Translated and Edited By Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
- 0 Kant, Immanuel (2001) *Religion within the boundaries of mere reason*, in *Religion and Rational Theology*. Translated and Edited by Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press

