درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

In American history, the ‘Black body’ has been commodified both during the slavery era and in the contemporary period whereby the private management of prisons has partly resulted to mass Black incarceration. The abolition of slavery some 150 years ago is still fairly recent compared to the 400 years it was practiced: thus some of the heinous treatments by slave owners were carried over into the criminal justice system, causing the police, jury, judges, etc., to treat Black people unequally and unfairly compared to their White counterparts. From the ‘proceedings of the rebellious negroes’ in the slavery era to the racialized media coverages of police brutality against Black people, Black protests, treatment of criminal suspects, etc., the American mass media have been identified as playing a major role in the maintenance of the deep racist structures that perpetuate mass Black incarceration. This paper links up some historical practices against Black people with the contemporary racist practices in order to show that slavery is still functionally alive in America and manifests concretely through the justice system: this paper aims at amplifying the ongoing debates toward obliterating the remnants of slavery in America.

This paper advances a framework for the evaluation of Sharia (Islamic law) with respect to the modern notion of international human rights law. The paper argues that certain universal standards of human rights and freedoms, as understood and formulated in international human rights documents, lack precise equivalents in Islamic law, and some generally-accepted principles of Sharia contradict corresponding principles of international human rights law. Sharia's response to the idea of human rights and traditional interpretation of Islamic law are hard to reconcile with international human rights norms and standards. It is also argued that the application of Sharia, public and criminal law in particular, is problematic and results in deficiencies and hardship in Muslim societies. This paper contributes to the debate on Islamic reformism and human rights in arguing that Sharia's contradiction of universal human rights norms cannot be avoided, and that traditional mechanisms of reform within the framework of Sharia are inadequate for achieving the necessary degree of reform. It is suggested that, based on a cross-cultural dialogue and intellectual debate, an essential and primary reform should define the objective foundations of human rights in reason and human dignity, not on Sharia criteria and qualifications.

An individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for the law. Martin Luther King, Jr. Abstract The following paper will present the theory and possibilities of implication of the phenomenon of civil disobedience understood as one of the most powerful and most effective tools of democratic society when it comes to implementing the necessary and indispensable changes required for the improvement of the political domain and the social public sphere.   In the first part I will present the narrow but orthodox and widely discussed definition of civil disobedience presented by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice (1971). Given such a definition, as well as the major conditions under which the actions undertaken in the name of civil disobedience can be justified, I will focus my analysis on two major aspects of the discussed notion.   Firstly, I will discuss civil disobedience, which is in its essense an unlawful act, paradoxically expresses the highest respect for the positive law by the person performing the civilly disobedient act through one’s submission to the judgment of the law which is an object of one’s protest. This way, civil disobedience presents itself as the phenomenon which, not having a legal recognition (not being legalized), holds super-legal force required to impose the changes on the unjust legal system or on the particular unjust regulation.   Secondly, I will point out that civil disobedience, as a public act performed by the people (the subjects of the particular law), expresses the will of the people and, therefore, it can not be used (by themselves) in the ways contradictory to their best self-interest but always supported by the “the commonly shared sense of justice” (Rawls). From this premise I conclude that the universal human rights, as thier supporters claim, are one of the main ends of the political activism in the recent decade and should be advocated in the civilly disobedient manner.   In the last part I will contrast the Rawlsean definition with a much broader and more relevant understanding of civil disobedience when it concerns today’s globalizing world. In this world, the nation-states cease to be the only political actors when confronted with the transnational public sphere, and, therefore, the understanding of civil disobedience as a transversal arena of public dissent presented by Roland Bleiker (2000) is more appropriate. In this definition civil disobedience becomes, not only a political instrument of particular subjects of a particular society, but it also becomes a tool for the international mobilization of means and of people in the name of presenting and imposing the respect for the universal human rights despite the national borders and societal paradigms. 

At a time when religion has assumed a particular potency in shaping and defining inter-community and inter-state relations the world over, the need for evolving alternate understandings of religion to creatively deal with the fact of religious pluralism has emerged as a pressing necessity. This is an issue for concerned and socially engaged believers in all religious traditions. This paper deals with how, contrary to widely-head stereotypical notions, Islam can be interpreted to promote inter-faith dialogue and amity between followers of different faiths. This discussion centers on the work of a noted Indian Muslim scholar-activist, Asghar ‘Ali Engineer, seeing how he deals with the primary sources of Islam in order to develop an Islamic theology of pluralism and social justice. Given the fact that in many parts of the world today conflicts involve Muslims and people of other faiths, Engineer’s creative approach to the Qur’an offers us an alternate way of imagining Islam and Islamic rules for relations between Muslims and others.

My study is about the Islamic reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and their compatibility under the regime of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT). It is focused in the substantive reservations invoking Shari’a Laws entered by some Muslim countries to the central articles of the Convention which are, therefore, impermissible as incompatible whit the object and purpose of the Convention. I highlight the paradox of maximizing the Convention’s universal application at the cost of compromising its integrity and how substantive reservations to the CEDAW provisions, tolerating discrepancy between states’ laws and practice and the obligations of the Convention, pose a risk to the achievement of the Convention’s goals. I also question if the compatibility criterion of the VCLT is effective in view of acceptance of some substantive reservations of a derogatory nature I consider that the “object and purpose” test is subjective, the practice by the objecting states is not uniform and that looking at those which are (or are not) the objecting states in respect of a particular reservation, it is evident how political or extralegal considerations intervene when states evaluate the compatibility of reservations. I especially focus on the paradox of the objections to a reservation which have the same effect as an acceptance when the objecting and reserving states are still maintaining treaty relation. Therefore, there is no difference in the legal effects of a reservation accepted and one objected without opposing the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving state. I further analyze how reservations invoking Shari’a Law entail conflicting norms (freedom of religion and equality rules). Recalling the view of the “balancing of interest” I argue that it could be a reasonable approach, but in practice it is difficult to find some sort of equilibrium not prejudiced against women. I then analyze if these reservations are suggestive of a wider ideological conflict between women’s rights enunciated in Islam and the ones formulated under the human rights treaties, and how they are representative of the women’s situation in the reserving states. I question what are the motivating factors behind the decision to reserve and if the reservations should be seen in the broader political and socio-economic perspective of domestic and international context? I then ask if the States ratify the Convention affording its objectives as a real commitment or if they only do so at political opportune moments? I consider that is not Islamic religious beliefs, but evolving political situations which are the determinant factors in making these kinds of reservations. I finally analyze the work of the CEDAW Committee considering its efforts disappointing as many of the new Muslim states parties did not pay attention to the criteria set out by the Committee, continuing  to enter either very general reservations or reservations to specific substantive articles. The new states parties with a predominantly Muslim population referred to the Islamic Shari’a Law as prevailing over the Convention without mentioning any specific articles, clearly not following the Committee’s recommendations in the formulation of impermissible reservations.