بررسی رابطه اجتناب مالیاتی و امپراتورسازی مدیریتی با در نظر گرفتن حاکمیت شرکتی (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
اجتناب مالیاتی به طور قانونی باعث ایجاد منابع اقتصادی برای شرکت می شود. سهام داران انتظار دارند این منابع صرف افزایش ثروت آنان شود؛ اما تئوری نمایندگی بیان می کند به دلیل تضاد منافع میان مدیر و مالک، این منابع به انجام رفتارهای فرصت طلبانه مدیر همچون شرکت در فعالیت های امپراتورسازی منجر می شود. همچنین، تئوری ذی نفعان لزوم توجه به تمام ذی نفعان را درخور توجه قرار می دهد و هدف از وضع مکانیزم های نظارتی همچون حاکمیت شرکتی را کاهش رفتارهای فرصت طلبانه مدیر و همسوشدن منافع مدیران و سهام داران بیان می کند؛ بنابراین، انگیزه انجام این پژوهش بررسی تجربی رابطه اجتناب مالیاتی و امپراتورسازی مدیریتی با در نظر گرفتن حاکمیت شرکتی است. جامعه آماری این پژوهش، 729 مشاهده سال - شرکت را در بر می گیرد که از شرکت های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران طی بازه زمانی 1391 تا 1399 به دست آمده اند. همچنین، برای آزمون فرضیه های پژوهش، از الگوی رگرسیون چندمتغیره مبتنی بر داده های ترکیبی با استفاده از روش حداقل مربعات تعمیم یافته استفاده شد. یافته های حاصل از آزمون فرضیه های پژوهش نشان دادند اجتناب مالیاتی، فعالیت های امپراتورسازی مدیریتی را به طور معناداری افزایش می دهد. همچنین، مشخص شد مکانیزم های حاکمیت شرکتی توانایی تضعیف این رابطه به نحوی معنادار را ندارد.The investigation of the relationship between tax avoidance and managerial empire-building considering corporate governance
Tax avoidance legally creates economic resources for the firm. Shareholders expect managers to use these resources to increase their wealth, agency theory states that due to the conflict of interests between the manager and the owner, these resources lead to the manager's opportunistic behavior, such as participating in empire-building activities. Besides, attending to all the stakeholders is a must in the stakeholder theory and The purpose of establishing monitoring mechanisms such as corporate governance is to reduce the opportunistic behavior of managers and to align the interests of managers and shareholders. Thus, the research motives to empirically investigate the relationship between tax avoidance and managerial empire-building by considering corporate governance. The statistical population of this research includes 729 firm-year observations obtained from companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) from 2013 to 2021. Additionally, a multivariate regression model based on panel data was used to test the research hypotheses, using the generalized least squares (GLS) method.. Examining the research hypotheses showed that tax avoidance significantly increases managerial empire-building activities. In addition, it found that corporate governance mechanisms could not meaningfully deteriorate the relationship.IntroductionAs businesses have expanded, modern corporations have been formed through the collective efforts of groups such as managers, employees, shareholders, and creditors. These groups come together in a corporation through the negotiation of various formal and informal contracts. For many years in the past, economists assumed that all groups involved in a corporation worked towards a common goal, but in recent years many cases of conflict of interest between these groups and how corporations deal with these conflicts have been raised. These issues were first raised by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as the basis of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).An agency relationship is a contractual arrangement in which individuals or groups select an individual or group to act as their agent and appoint them to provide a specific set of services (Shams et al., 2022). The contract between the agent and the principal requires the delegation of decision-making authority to the agent and the payment of remuneration to him. According to Fama and Jensen (1983), agency problems typically arise in corporations due to the unlimited nature of residual rights associated with common stock, which can lead to a gap between the interests of managers and shareholders of the company (Fama & Jensen, 1983). With the creation of an agency relationship, each party seeks to maximize their interests. In some cases, increasing the wealth of managers or representatives does not necessarily lead to an increase in the interests of other stakeholders, including the owner or shareholders. Agency theory predicts that managers can make suboptimal decisions to maximize personal benefit (Chatterjee et al., 2021). An example of suboptimal decisions made by managers is empire-building, which reduces operating performance and, consequently, the value of the company (Shams et al., 2022). Therefore, the challenge ahead in the field of empire-building by managers is the loss of shareholder wealth through managers' attention to personal interests by using resources from tax avoidance. This challenge will likely be minimized by adopting appropriate supervisory approaches.Gul (2020) shows that with the growth of the company, managers gain more prestige by increasing the resources under their control, and they may also be able to receive more compensation if the company grows. Therefore, managers who intend to build an empire may keep unprofitable activities in the company only to maximize their interests (Gul, 2020). Supporters of agency theory believe that managers have incentives such as receiving more compensation and satisfying their desire for position, power, and prestige to use the company's resources to build a commercial empire in the pursuit of personal gain (Hope & Thomas, 2008).In accounting literature, tax avoidance is a way to use loopholes and tax laws to reduce taxes (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Tax avoidance is an activity of tax evasion within the framework of tax laws and without violating the rules (Agrawal, 2007). Gantchev et al. (2019) argued that tax avoidance activities, especially hidden strategies, can provide a protective shield for managerial opportunism and resource diversion (Gantchev et al., 2019). Therefore, tax avoidance can be a reflection of agency theory and may lead to tax decisions that follow the manager's interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and lead to increased empire-building through the creation of cash resources available to the manager (Shams et al., 2022).According to agency theory, the existing literature shows that monitoring mechanisms, by reducing agency problems, limit managers' tendency to engage in opportunistic behavior and have an impact on reducing companies' tax avoidance activities. One of the monitoring mechanisms that has been widely used in the literature is corporate governance (Mashayekhi & Seyyedi, 2015). Several studies argue that opportunistic behavior by managers can be limited through improved corporate governance and strong external oversight. In light of the aforementioned discussions, the empirical examination of whether tax avoidance can lead to the adoption of an opportunistic approach and specifically empire-building by the manager, and the impact of corporate governance mechanisms in reducing managers' misuse of company-generated resources through tax avoidance, has been the motivation for this research.Methods & MaterialFour criteria have been used in combination to calculate managerial empire-building. The desired criteria are the education rate, the level of capital expenditure, the growth of total assets, and the growth of property, plant, and equipment. The book tax difference (BTD) measure has been used to measure tax avoidance. Also, to measure corporate governance, 14 components are used as moderator variables. The statistical population of the current research consists of all the companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange that have submitted their financial statements from 2013 to 2021. It is worth mentioning that because the data for the 2012 and 2022 financial years are needed to calculate the variables of the research, the data for the two mentioned years were also collected. The statistical sample of this research was also selected by screening method among the mentioned companies, and a total of 81 companies were selected. To test the hypotheses of the current research, the estimation of multivariate regression models has been used.FindingThe results of the first hypothesis test show that with an increase of one unit in the company's tax avoidance activities, the empire-building activities of managers increase by approximately 4%. These findings indicate that tax avoidance has a positive and significant effect on managerial empire-building. It was also found that strong corporate governance does not affect the relationship between tax avoidance and managerial empire-building, and the second hypothesis is rejected.Conclusion & ResultsThe results obtained from the first hypothesis showed that although tax avoidance activities increase the level of economic resources owned by the company, according to what Hope and Thomas (2008) showed, in the absence of sufficient supervision, it can increase the willingness of managers to engage in opportunistic behaviors such as empire-building and help them in getting personal benefit (Hope & Thomas, 2008); Therefore, the first hypothesis is confirmed. The findings of Atwood and Lewellen (2019) in the study of tax avoidance and the level of deviation of managers showed that the managers of companies in tax havens, by paying less attention to the interests of investors, divert the tax savings obtained from tax avoidance activities towards excessive investment and research costs, and development expenses (Atwood & Lewellen, 2019). The research results of Shams et al. (2022) also showed that tax avoidance leads to an increase in managerial empire-building activities, because managers can gain fame, power, and credibility in this way. The results of the current research are also in the same direction as the mentioned research. The results also confirm the view that tax avoidance can be a reflection of agency theory and may lead to decisions about tax sources that follow the manager's interests.The results of the second hypothesis showed that strong corporate governance mechanisms do not affect the relationship between tax avoidance and managerial empire-building. The results of the current research are different from the findings of Gharanjik and Garkeaz (2015) in terms of the relationship between corporate governance and tax avoidance because their research has confirmed the existence of a significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate tax avoidance. Many studies have shown that opportunistic behavior by managers can be limited through improving corporate governance and strong external supervision (Crocker & Slemrod, 2005; Gaertner, 2014), but the results of this study showed the opposite of this view. The reason for this may be attributed to the conditions in which the research was conducted; it seems that in Iran, the understanding of the basic principles of the corporate governance system, which is in the theoretical perspective and its final implementation, has not been done correctly. Corresponding author
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