Skepticism

In the preface to his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant characterizes his own critical metaphysics as the main opponent of dogmatism, which inevitably results in the assertion of conflicting dogmas especially about the existence of God, the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul. Simultaneously, Kant subtly distinguishes his critical philosophy from three other stances opposing dogmatism: the skepticism of Descartes and Hume, the empiricism of John Lock, and the indifferentism of thinkers who, without rejecting metaphysical assertions, refute any attempt to argue for them systematically and rigorously. Refusing indifferentism, Kant somehow admits a commonsensical view similar to that of indifferentism regarding principal issues of metaphysics. Touching very briefly on Kant’s view, the paper examines Nietzschechr('39')s take on especially the issue of the existence of the Christian God. Defending a kind of stance similar to skepticism or even, in some aspects, to indifferentism, Nietzsche’s chief endeavor is to look at the issue from the different perspectives of genealogical and axiological critiques in order to pave the way for an entire overlooking the issue. In this respect, such an endeavor results in a stance contrary to Kant’s commonsensical position, ending up in Nietzsche’s talk of the Death of God and the Death of the True World.

Critical rationalism faces difficulty in Karl Popper’s Socratic formulation: “I may be wrong, and you may be right, and by an effort, we may find the truth.” But the Socratic elenchus, using refutations, can only give us negative knowledge of general principles, which is not the wisdom we seek. Affirmatively, we can only find a collection of opinions to be coherent, which is one of many. Francis Bacon proposed an improved elenchus to find general truths. You must take up a limited topic to study, then cross-examine your evidence for and against its apparent nature. Experiments contrary to evidence and presumed knowledge are entered as self-contradictions in tables of opposition recorded in an “experimental and natural history.” Such an account highlights a challenging puzzle if the account is to be made coherent. With enough problematized evidence, a coherent reading, or a solution of the puzzle, will be unique. Being both coherent and unique, it will be the truth about that limited reality being investigated. Unlike the method of hypothesis (“Anticipating Nature”), deciphering a coherent model is “Interpreting Nature,” allowing us to find a general truth on a limited topic. Isaac Newton achieved great success using Robert Boyle’s mechanistic version of this method. Using the “experimental philosophy,” he discovered general principles of optics and astronomy.

In Rescher’s view, the cognitive rationality is using dialectic arguments for managing the acceptance of various beliefs and answering the individual’s questions in the best way – an approach that can entail access to rational propositions and true knowledge. While believing in the limitation of rational faculties, Rescher maintains that the intelligence endowed in human being in an evolutional way prepares the ground for his access to the authentic knowledge. The cognitive importance of the criterion of investigating the value of knowledge suggests the existence of an effective factor that can help us in qualitative and quantitative promotion of and deepening our essential information. Skepticism rejects the possibility of accessing authentic information and puts a seemingly strong obstacle on the way to implementing and realizing the goals of argument, and maintains that cognitive rationality is never possible. Rescher considers justification of skepticism based on the wrong assumption that the rational justification of a belief is restricted to the deductive reasoning founded on pre-justified propositions. However, in addition to this, we have the method of hypothetical justification that skeptics ignore.

Skepticism and fear caused serious flaws in liberalism. Skepticism made liberalism resort to reason as an Archimedean point for resolving disagreements. But reason like opinions and affections is subject to social contingencies. Liberal fear of human nature has led it to a negative notion of rights that is harmful to social solidarity. Islam can help liberalism resolve these problems