Virtue

Discussing two common critiques on theological interpretations of the concept of the highest good in Kant’s moral philosophy in his paper, Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant, Reath has invited readers to have a secular interpretation of this concept and pointed out its advantages. In the present paper, we will attempt to provide the main principles of Reath’s claims and demonstrate why Kant has stated both of these interpretations in all of his critical works—a subject that has confused Reath. For this purpose, we will indicate that in both of the above interpretations, Kant has offered the concept of the highest good in a historical context, in which the intellectual idea of the highest good as a desired ultimate totality makes the intellect to grow in history and cultivate the talents of human kind through numerous conflicts embedded in nature.

The description and pursuit of human happiness and eudaimonia has been the claim of various schools and one of the conflicts between them. Considering the position of Martyr Motahhari in presenting and explaining the intellectual foundations of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, this article examines the idea of happiness in the foundations of the political philosophy of Mortaza Motahhari, or in other words, the philosophical politics of happiness in his view. Philosophical politics of happiness are fundamental questions that arise from existing schools and ideologies and have themselves developed under larger intellectual and cultural regimes. This policy, which is closely linked to the determination of the nature of happiness, is a reflective consideration of the questions of freedom, well-being, cohesion, and integration. It shows how individual and collective happiness are taken into account in any ideology, and whether government allowed to support any idea of happiness. This article reviews the ideas of Motahhari in this regard and by assuming an account of the relationship between individual, collective and otherworldly happiness, examines the place of justice, freedom and perfectionistic government in his view.

Theological Voluntarism is the view according to which certain moral properties or statuses have to be explained in terms of God’s commands, will, or other voluntary states of God. In his God and Moral Law, Mark Murphy criticizes theological voluntarism in general and Adams’ divine command theory of the nature of moral obligations in particular. Furthermore, he puts forward the first sketches for a theory of moral obligation that is not voluntaristic. In this paper I will first introduce Murphy’s proposed theory and will show that it is implausible. Then, drawing on Adams’ views of the nature of goodness and virtue, articulated in Finite and Infinite Goods and A theory of Virtue, I will try to put forward the first sketches of a viable theory of moral obligations that does not appeal to divine commands in explaining moral obligations and explains them in terms of goodness/badness. An important feature of morality that voluntarists appeal to for motivating their view and criticizing views that explain obligations in terms of goodness is the existence of supererogatory actions, i.e., actions that are good but not required. I will focus on this feature of morality and try to show how a theory of moral obligation that explains the obligations in terms of goodness can accommodate this feature.

Freedom is an abstract concept which is more understandable by its limitations. The question is that, is there a comprehensive concept of freedom in western idealism? For this purpose, this study created some conceptual research in the poles of western idealism. Accordingly, freedom in framework of Socratic philosophy had no context except virtue orientation. Then, it was reduced to security and property in the new period. The present study used the discourse analysis of freedom to show why and how the concept of freedom has an underlying and philosophical concept in old and new schools. Thus, a single and undeniable attitude to freedom in western idealism is non-scientific and non-historical. The present study selected the analytical comparative method to discuss the concept of freedom discourse in western political thought in old and new periods, indicating why and how freedom is a discourse concept; or at least belongs to its specific community, and cannot be necessarily compared in a generalized, universal way.