درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

This research seeks to answer the question “what factors affect Iranian people’s adaptation to the changes in their social welfare under the imposed sanctions?” To this end, a survey methodology based on two theories of Sanctions Acceptance Model (SAM) and Ulrich Beck’s theory of risk society is employed to analyze the opinions of 135 respondents who are experts in the fields of economic sciences, economic resistance, economic development, and sociology of development. The results reveal that government organizations and institutions play a major role in assisting people in their adaptation to the conditions resultant from the sanctions. In the next step, the context of the sanctions was addressed in relation to the characteristics of the imposed sanctions. These characteristics, namely the target of the sanctions, the duration of the sanctions, the depth of the impact of the sanctions, threat or imposition of sanctions, and the unilateral or multilateral nature of sanctions play a major role in Iranian people’s level of acceptance regarding the changes in their social welfare. Individuals are another important group whose mentalities and perceptions are affected by the imposed sanctions.

As a theoretical treatise, the present article brings to light the applicability of constructivism to the study of think tanks as ideational agents actively participating in the construction of ideational structures that constitute American identity, interests, and policies. It is argued that when discussing think tanks’ production of expertise and policy advice on U.S. relations with the Muslim world, American exceptionalism and Orientalism operate as two interconnected ideational structures influencing the process. Based on a constructivist framework, an investigation into the role of think tanks in U.S. foreign policy should not begin at the final stage of policy formation; rather, it is necessary to look into how think tanks influence the process of policy making at the ideational level. As such, the characteristics of U.S. foreign policy toward the Muslim world will remain unchanged as long as there is an ideational commitment to the creed of American exceptionalism; that is to say, as long as American exceptionalism constitutes American identity, American interest, and thus American foreign policy behavior toward the Muslim world. Think tanks, as the special focal points at the intersection of the political realm, the academia, and the media, serve as the hubs of American exceptionalism and Orientalism. As long as this dual creed is continually reproduced in the think tank world, it is logical to conclude that no change is in sight with regard to U.S. foreign policy and American unilateral interventionism in the Muslim world. A break with American exceptionalism and Orientalism in the think tank world, in turn, would signal the beginning of a new era in the operation of American foreign policy.

This article aims at examining Russia's relations with the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Moscow's motives and goals for the establishment and enhancement of those ties. We explore Russia's worldview to position the Middle East and Hamas in a pre-established frame, subsequently examining the reasons behind the development of these relationships. This article sets out to answer a two-fold question: What has been Russia's aim of receiving Hamas leaders and establishing high-level relations with this movement since 2006, and what components have influenced these interactions at international and regional levels? The paper argues that Russia considers its relations with Muslim nations and movements not only a foreign policy principle but also a domestic issue. Hence, it seeks to take advantage of the U.S. retrenchment from the region to expand its influence, play a mediatory role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and elevate its reputation among Muslims inside and outside the country. Recognizing Hamas' position, Russia resolved to develop its ties with Hamas' leaders, started negotiating with all the parties in the Palestinian national reconciliation process, and provided political, economic, cultural, financial, and security support to eventually affect Hamas' stance vis-à-vis Israel.

The COVID-19 pandemic brought instructional and administrative possibilities and problematics in higher education internationally. In such conditions, the developing countries suffered challenging times for less personnel preparedness, deficiencies in technological infrastructure, and restricted sources of finance for investing. This study argues that Iran's higher education was already pressured under the UCMs before the emergency transition to online education. It therefore focuses on the University of Tehran (UT), one of the most affluent Iranian universities, which stands as a role model in quality and excellence at the national and regional scales. It employs the reflexive thematic analysis method to  cover a comprehensive body of COVID-driven content at UT’s website, including news, administrative notes, and announcements on new official regulations, teaching guidelines, and consultative commentaries for mental well-being. It provides an analytical model based on three major themes, A) students: technical and emotional support vs. onerous regulations, B) prosociality and social responsibility, C) instructors at University of Tehran: highly expected simultaneously ignored. These major themes entail different subthemes and motifs that unveil UT’s developing solutions and obstacles to foster fruitful exchange within the UT community. 

In many aspects, U.S. President Donald Trump’s approach to foreign policy-making was in sharp contrast with that of his predecessors, particularly post-WWII presidents. His hostility toward the long-lasting liberal international order that was crafted and maintained by former presidents, his eccentric ways of solving foreign policy issues, and his unusual rhetoric regarding U.S. allies and adversaries, are all indications of his “unorthodox” foreign policy approach. In an attempt to explain this unorthodoxy, in this article we aim to examine Trump’s cognitions and compare them to those of his post-WWII predecessors. In particular, we have measured the cognitive complexity score for each of these presidents to determine Trump’s position among them. In order to do so, we have calculated the Flesch-Kincaid readability score of the presidents’ verbal statements, assuming that the complexity of the statements indicates the complexity of their author’s thoughts. The results have clearly demonstrated that Trump was at the lowest level of cognitive complexity among the presidents under examination, and since a low level of cognitive complexity pertains to viewing the situation from limited perspectives, a low need for broader information, adhering to a limited number of policy options, ignoring advice, and decisiveness, we may reasonably infer that his cognitive simplicity played an important role in the unorthodoxy of his foreign policy approach.