تاثیر انحراف توجه سهامدار نهادی بر چسبندگی پاداش هیات مدیره با تاکید بر اطمینان بیش از حد مدیریت (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
بی توجهی یا کم توجهی سهامداران نهادی به عنوان ضعف سازوکار نظارتی و اطمینان بیش از حد مدیریت به عنوان عامل رفتاری مدیریت، می تواند اثربخشی برنامه های انگیزشی برای بیشینه سازی ارزش شرکت و کارایی قراردادها را کاهش دهد. بر این اساس هدف این پژوهش بررسی تاثیر انحراف توجه سهامدار نهادی بر چسبندگی پاداش هیات مدیره با تاکید بر اطمینان بیش از حد مدیریت شرکت های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران است. آزمون فرضیه های پژوهش، با داده های 123 شرکت در فاصله زمانی 1391-1400 با استفاده از مدل های رگرسیونی چند گانه، نشان داد ضمن وجود اثر چسبندگی پاداش، انحراف توجه سهامداران نهادی شدت چسبندگی پاداش را افزایش می دهد و با افزایش اطمینان بیش از حد مدیریت تاثیر مثبت انحراف توجه سهامدار نهادی بر چسبندگی پاداش هیات مدیره افزایش می یابد. یعنی انحراف توجه سهامداران نهادی و اطمینان بیش از حد مدیریت، می تواند کارایی قراردادهای پاداش را کاهش دهد.The effect of Institutional Investors’ Distraction on the stickiness of the board of directors' compensation with an emphasis on management's overconfidence
The institutional shareholders inattention or lack of attention as the weakness of the supervisory mechanism and management overconfidence as the management’s behavioral factor can reduce the effectiveness of the incentive programs to maximize the company value and contracts efficiency. Based on this, the aim of this research is to investigate the effect of Institutional Investors’ Distraction on the stickiness of the board of directors' compensation with an emphasis on the management overconfidence of the companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange. The test of the research hypotheses with the data of 123 companies in the period of 2012-2021 using multiple regression models, showed that while there is the effect of compensation stickiness, the Institutional Investors’ Distraction increases the intensity of compensation stickiness and by increasing the management overconfidence, the positive effect of Institutional Investors’ Distraction on the stickiness of the compensation stickiness increases. That is, the institutional shareholders inattention and management overconfidence causes a decrease in the proportionality of the paid compensation with the performance and an increase in the opportunistic behavior of the management.IntroductionInattention or lack of attention of institutional shareholders as a weakness of the supervisory mechanism and management overconfidence as a behavioral factor of management can reduce the effectiveness of incentive programs to maximize the value of the company and the efficiency of contracts. Based on the influence mechanism, institutional investors' distraction affects board compensation stickiness through three pathways: external governance, stock price information content, and management professional anxiety. So that the positive effect of deviating the attention of institutional investors by labeling the remuneration of the board of directors is more obvious in non-governmental companies. Compared to previous studies, the innovation of this article is that it primarily strengthens the research perspective of institutional investors, which is different from the current institutional investor's supervisory role. Secondly, it expands the influencing factors of compensation stickiness and introduces attention based on corporate governance inside and outside the company, which is checked to complement the interests of the stakeholders. In the third degree, agency theory, information asymmetry theory and behavioral finance theory are combined to confirm the influence path of institutional investors' distraction and the stickiness of managers' compensation in conditions of management overconfidence, which leads to the integration of different theoretical branches in the research. In addition, it provides new thinking for the financial supervision of listed companies and shareholders, improving the quality of listed companies and improving the operational mechanism of the capital market. Although the attention deviation of institutional investors has adverse effects, however, in the shadow of the lack of attention of institutional owners, the managers of listed companies may be overconfident, maintain optimistic expectations and believe that the benefits of Maintaining the business scale and continuous operations through their own leadership will be more than the risk caused by institutions, so the motivation for opportunistic behavior increases. Both the exploitation hypothesis and the strong motivation hypothesis imply that boards of directors with overconfidence receive more compensation (compensation stickiness effect), there are two key differences between these two hypotheses: The first is that the compensation contract will be incentive weak for overconfident boards under the exploitation hypothesis. The second difference is related to the effect of increasing the bargaining position of the board of directors. The exploitation hypothesis predicts an increase in the intensity of service compensation options. By increasing the bargaining power of the board of directors, compensation bonuses are demanded, which increases the stickiness of the compensation. Based on this, the aim of this research is to investigate the effect of the institutional shareholder's attention deviation on the stickiness of directors'compensation with an emphasis on the overconfidence of the management of the companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange. Methods & MaterialTo test the hypotheses of the research, multiple regression models were used with the data of 123 companies in the time interval of 2012-2021. FindingThe results of the hypothesis test showed that while there is the effect of compensation stickiness, the Institutional Investors’ Distraction increases the intensity of compensation stickiness and by increasing the management overconfidence, the positive effect of Institutional Investors’ Distraction on the stickiness of the compensation stickiness increases. That is, the institutional shareholders inattention and management overconfidence causes a decrease in the proportionality of the paid compensation with the performance and an increase in the opportunistic behavior of the management. Conclusion & ResultsBy diverting the attention of institutional shareholders from the performance of some companies and the unequal distribution of attention, in addition to themselves, they cause a decrease in the supervision of other supervisory mechanisms on the company. Institutional shareholders have the role of guide and reference for many shareholders and stakeholders of the company. Considering management's risk aversion and the tendency to show the company's performance too positively, these factors cause increases the manager's motivation to store and accumulate negative news and reduce voluntary disclosure of information. Finally reduce transparency, management's resistance to reducing rewards, and the opportunity for management's self-interested behavior and so rewarding disproportionate to actual performance increases reward stickiness. Also, despite the deviation of institutional shareholders attention as observers of management performance, management overconfidence prevents the board of directors compensation from reducing when the accounting performance decreases, and as a result, it increases the stickiness effect of the compensation. Its reasons can be explained as follows: maintaining optimistic expectations, expecting negative results to be temporary, the perception of performance above the industry average, taking advantage of the behavioral effect of assigning good results to oneself in terms of the psychological effect of overconfidence, the tendency to invest too much in high-risk projects and the expectation of getting more rewards, the involvement of bargaining power in the approval of the bonus plan based on the exploitation hypothesis. Key words: Institutional Investors’ Distraction, management overconfidence, opportunistic stickiness, agency theory. * Corresponding author
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