ارزیابی رابطه شدت رقابت سهامداران با بازدهی و ارزش شرکتهای فعال بورسی: شواهدی از سنگربندی مدیریتی یا همگرایی منافع (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
هدف محوری این تحقیق بررسی شواهدی از دو فرضیه سنگربندی مدیریتی یا همگرایی منافع در ارزیابی ارتباط شدت رقابت سهامداران بر بازدهی و ارزش شرکت های فعال بورسی ایران است. پژوهش حاضر ازنظر هدف کاربردی، از منظر روش پس رویدادی و از نوع توصیفی است و در دسته تحلیل مدل های رگرسیون غیرخطی آستانه ای قرار می گیرد. نمونه آماری مشتمل بر 127 شرکت فعال تولیدی، شرکت های بورس اوراق بهادار تهران است که در بازه های زمانی 1400-1391 در بورس فعالیت مستمر داشته اند. نتایج پژوهش ضمن تأیید وجود رابطه غیرخطی آستانه ای بین شدت رقابت سهامداران با بازدهی و ارزش شرکت بیان می کند در هر دو فرضیه، با تغییر سهم مالکان دولتی فرضیه همگرایی منافع برسنگربندی مدیریتی غالب است؛ به عبارت دیگر، سهامدارن عمده تلاش کرده اند ازطریق کنترل و نظارت در جهت کاهش تضاد نمایندگی و همسویی منافعشان با مدیران و سهامداران جزء برآیند تا بتوانند نسبت به افزایش ارزش و بازدهی شرکت اقدام کنند. در سطوح تمرکز بالای سهامداران، سهامداران با تسلط بر بازار امکان بهره مندی از نرخ های ارز تعرفه ای، خوراک ارزان قیمت و حمایت های دولتی برایشان فراهم می شود؛ ازاین رو، اینگونه سهامداران با قرارگرفتن در حاشیه امن، تهدیدی از سوی رقبا احساس نمی کنند و می توانند منابع خود را در فعالیت های سودآور با بازدهی و ارزش بالا استفاده کنند. این مطالعه با آزمون همزمان دو فرضیه سنگربندی مدیریتی و همگرایی منافع می تواند گام مؤثری در توسعه ادبیات نظری در حوزه ساختار مالکیت و عملکرد شرکت باشد. برخلاف مطالعات قبلی، استفاده از این رویکرد زمینه پیشرفت تعیین سطح آستانه ساختار مالکیت و مقایسه وضعیت متغیرها در سطوح قبل و بعد از سطح آستانه به منظورتصمیم گیری صحیح صاحب نظران، برنامه ریزان مالی و سهامدارن برای افزایش سرمایه گذاری در فعالیت های سودآور با بازدهی و ارزش بالا فراهم می شود.Evaluation of the Relationship between Shareholder Competition Intensity and Performance and Value of Active Stock Exchange Companies: Evidence from Managerial Entrenchment or Convergence of Interests
The primary purpose of this study was to examine the evidence of managerial entrenchment or convergence of interest’s hypothesis in evaluating the relationship between the shareholder competition’s intensity on the return and value of Iranian stock exchange companies. This research is applied, a post-event method and descriptive type; it is included in the category of threshold nonlinear regression models. In this article, the data of 127 production companies active in the stock exchange market over the period of 2012-2021 were used.The results confirm the existence of a threshold non-linear relationship between the intensity of shareholder competition and the performance of the company; In other words, if the share of state owners increases, the hypothesis of convergence of interests prevails in the managerial entrenchment. This means that the major shareholders try to reduce agency conflict through control and supervision and align their interests with the managers and minority stockholders to increase the company’s value and return.Conclusion: At high levels of concentration, shareholders by dominating the market are able to benefit from tariff exchange rates, cheap feed, and government support; therefore, these stockholders being in the safe margin, do not feel threatened by competitors and can use their resources in profitable activities with high return and value
Introduction
The value of the company is one of the reliable indicators of the development of societies and organizations, as well as the vital key to the realization of development goals in individual and social dimensions (Karimi & Parhizgar, 2007). Organizations, in their pursuit of realizing this value and meeting shareholder expectations, exhibit more responsible behavior. Organizations must operate in a manner aligned with the values of shareholders and stakeholders. Entities failing to align themselves with this fundamental principle are unlikely to succeed pragmatically and are unable to uphold or enhance their standing in society. Consequently, their viability is endangered by substantial risks (Agustina& Sudibyo, 2022).
From a theoretical standpoint, the escalation of competition and competitiveness implies that a company cannot adopt a production method through controlling prices and matching them with the final cost to offer a higher quality product at a lower price than the competitors, thus gaining market share. Consequently, the competition intensity among shareholders is regarded as a facet of concentration, influencing shareholders' capacity to dictate prices and sales volume, and set prices above the final cost to maximize profits in the capital market. This stands out as one of the pivotal mechanisms in corporate governance. Aligned with the structuralist school or the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm, under the Production-Structure-Performance framework, it can exert dominance over a company's operational and strategic decisions, shaping the trajectory of corporate performance, including enhancements in efficiency and corporate value (Syverson, 2019). Although numerous studies affirm the correlation between these two variables, the relationships are intricate and ambiguous, taking on positive, negative, or inverse U-shaped forms. Interpretation of these relationships can be facilitated through agency theory, the convergence of interests' hypothesis, and managerial entrenchment. In the initial perspective, Jensen and Meckling (1976) assert that ownership concentration and increased shareholder competition have a positive impact on corporate performance. They argue that heightened competition among shareholders, facilitated by internal and external mechanisms, mitigates agency problems and conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. This argument is based on the premise that managers tend to allocate company resources to pursue their interests, potentially conflicting with the interests of external shareholders. However, the increase in managerial ownership aligns their interests more closely with those of external shareholders, potentially resolving conflicts between managers and shareholders. Consequently, managerial ownership is considered a contributing factor to addressing agency problems and improving corporate performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In a contrasting perspective, Fama and Jensen (1983) redirect their attention to the implications of agency problems arising from shareholder concentration and control. They argue that this concentration enables controlling shareholders to pursue their interests at the expense of the firm's activities. Essentially, their research illustrates that managers holding sufficient shares to gain control of the board can exploit the company's wealth. Through managerial entrenchment, they transform into significant shareholders, capable of extracting additional benefits for themselves, even if it involves making negative net present value investments in valuable projects (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Fama (1980) contends that the separation of ownership and control, fostered by competition among companies, enhances the monitoring of individuals and organizations. He argues that in a dispersed ownership structure, shareholders find themselves in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis managers. Consequently, managers can expropriate the company's wealth and, by allocating more benefits to themselves, deprive shareholders of the firm's interests due to cost considerations. In simpler terms, shareholders in public companies are so widely scattered that they lack the power and motivation required to reform and constrain the actions taken by managers (Fama, 1983).
As a result, in line with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, the separation of ownership from control suggests that the performance of majority shareholders with a larger stake surpasses that of a company with less ownership among shareholders. Nevertheless, conflicting evidence regarding the separation of ownership and control, along with the positive or negative impacts of ownership structure on the company's value and profitability, has given rise to a third perspective. This perspective observes a U-shaped relationship between ownership structure and company performance by combining the two hypotheses of convergence of interests and managerial entrenchment. In simpler terms, when ownership concentration is low, all shareholders make efforts to monitor managers to maximize the company's value. However, when ownership concentration is sufficiently high, shareholders tend to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders, striving to augment their wealth and profits. Consequently, the profitability and performance of expropriated shareholders decrease.
Now, with a review of the theoretical literature, research hypotheses can be formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between the intensity of competition among shareholders and the value of active manufacturing companies in the stock market is nonlinear; however, a diminishing relationship or the managerial entrenchment hypothesis is confirmed.
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between the intensity of competition among shareholders and the returns of manufacturing companies in the stock market is nonlinear; however, an increasing relationship or the convergence of interest's hypothesis is confirmed.
Methods & Materials
The present research is of applied type and employs a quasi-experimental design, relying on post-event or archival descriptive data. It falls into the category of analyzing non-linear threshold regression models. The theoretical and empirical foundations of the study are formulated using a literature review method, and the required data for calculating study variables are extracted from various databases. Archival data from the Rahavard Novin database were utilized for calculating variables requiring financial statements and market items.
The selected population of the study includes financial information for all companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2021. Based on the following conditions, the sample member companies have been excluded from the statistical population:
Excluding companies classified as banks and financial institutions (investment companies, financial intermediaries, holding companies, and leasing companies) since their financial disclosure and corporate strategic structures differ.
The fiscal year of the companies ends at the end of each year.
Companies should not have changed their fiscal year during the years 2012 to 2021.
They should have been listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange until the end of the fiscal year 2011.
They should not have been delisted from the Tehran Stock Exchange during the specified period.
Applying these conditions reduced the available statistical population to 127 active companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange, which were ultimately selected as the sample.
Findings
The research findings confirm a non-linear threshold relationship between the intensity of shareholder competition and the efficiency and value of the company. In both hypotheses, as the ownership share of government shareholders varies, both convergence and managerial entrenchment hypotheses are apparent. However, the convergence of interests theory prevails over managerial entrenchment. Essentially, majority shareholders have strived to alleviate agency conflicts through control and oversight, aligning their interests with those of managers and shareholders, aiming to enhance the value and performance of the company.
Conclusion & Results
At elevated levels of shareholder concentration, achieving market dominance provides shareholders with advantages such as preferential tariff rates, access to cost-effective currency supplies, and government support. Residing in a secure position, these shareholders perceive no threat from competitors, enabling them to efficiently deploy resources in lucrative activities that yield high performance and value. Simultaneously examining the managerial entrenchment and convergence of interests' hypotheses, this study significantly advances the theoretical literature on ownership structure and company performance. Unlike previous studies, this approach establishes a foundation for identifying the threshold level of ownership structure and comparing variable statuses before and after reaching this threshold. This facilitates precise decision-making for professionals, financial planners, and shareholders seeking to enhance investments in profitable activities with high efficiency and value.
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