نوع مالکیت، ارزش گذاری بیش از واقع و اقلام تعهدی اختیاری (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
کیفیت گزارشات مالی و سودهای گزارش شده از اهمیت بسزایی برای سرمایه گذاران، قانون گذاران، محققان و غیره برخوردار است. مدیران شرکت ها از انواع روش های مدیریت سود به منظور افزایش قیمت سهام و حفظ ارزش زیاد سهام استفاده می کنند که درواقع آن را می توان به انگیزه های مدیریت سود نسبت داد. به طور کلی، برخی از مدیران از انگیزه های کافی در راستای ارزش گذار بیش از واقع سهام شرکت برخوردارند. در این راستا، یکی از روش های اعمال پذیر به منظور جلوگیری از کاهش ارزش سهام، استفاده از اقلام تعهدی اختیاری است. در این رابطه، هزینه های نمایندگی به عنوان یکی از عوامل تعیین کننده اقلام تعهدی در شرکت ها مطرح بوده و ساختار مالکیت نیز بر سطوحِ هزینه های نمایندگی تأثیرگذار است. بر این اساس، در پژوهش حاضر، به بررسی تأثیر ساختار مالکیت بر میزان اقلام تعهدی اختیاری در شرکت های با ارزش گذار بالا پرداخته شده است. بدین منظور، داده های 160 شرکت بورسی طی سال های 1389 تا 1398، گردآوری شدند و به منظور آزمون فرضیه ها از رگرسیون چندگانه در حالت ترکیبی / تلفیقی در نرم افزار ایویوز 9 استفاده شد. نتایج پژوهش نشان دادند بین ارزش گذار بالای شرکت و میزان اقلام تعهدی اختیاری، رابطه مستقیم وجود دارد. همچنین، نتایج نشان دادند میزان اقلام تعهدی اختیاری در دوره های آغازینِ ارزش گذار بالا، افزایش و در دوره های بعدی کاهش می یابد. افزون بر این، مدیران شرکت های دولتی از انگیزه لازم برای استفاده از اقلام تعهدی اختیاری در راستای ارزش گذار بالای شرکت برخوردار نیستند. به طور خلاصه، نتایج این پژوهش، در زمینه درک تأثیر ساختار مالکیت بر نحوه رفتار گزارشگری مدیران در بازار سرمایه ایران کمک می کند.High Valuation, Discretionary Accruals, Governmental Ownership, Listed Companies
The quality of financial reports and reported profits is very important for investors, legislators, researchers, etc. On the other hand, company managers use a variety of profit management methods to increase the stock price and maintain a high stock value. In general, some managers have enough incentives for a high valuation of the company's shares. In this way, one of the methods that can be applied to prevent the decrease in stock prices is the use of discretionary accruals. In this regard, agency costs are considered one of the determining factors of accruals in companies, and the ownership structure affects the levels of agency costs, also. Based on this, in current research, the effect of the ownership structure on the magnitude of discretionary accruals in companies with high valuations has been investigated. For this purpose, the data of 160 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the years 2010 to 2019 have been collected. The research results show that there is a direct relationship between the high valuation of the company and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Also, the results show that the magnitude of discretionary accruals increases in the initial periods of high valuation and decreases in the following periods. In addition, managers of state-owned companies do not have the necessary motivation to use discretionary accruals in line with the company's high valuation. In short, the results of this research help to understand the effect of the ownership structure on the reporting behavior of managers in the Iranian capital market. Introduction The quality of financial reports and reported profits is very important for investors, legislators, and researchers. The type of ownership and management resulting from it can also affect the quality of information and financial performance of companies. Company managers use a variety of profit management methods to increase the stock price and maintain its high value. This issue continues until the company's stock price exceeds its economic value, which is called high stock valuation. In fact, highly valued companies lack the ability to achieve the expected level of performance commensurate with the stock price. For this purpose, the managers of such companies turn to profit management by using bold accounting procedures to cover this weak performance. In this regard, one of the usual profit management tools is the use of discretionary accruals. Therefore, it is expected that the magnitude of discretionary accruals in companies with high stock valuation is more than in other companies. Also, in this context, Badercher concluded that the level of abnormal (optional) accruals changes with the increase of the high valuation period. In particular, to keep the stock price (value) high, managers tend to use abnormal (discretionary) accruals before using real abnormal transactions (or in other words, real profit management). Based on this, the first and second hypotheses have been formulated as follows: First hypothesis: the level of discretionary accruals of companies with high valuation is higher than other companies. Second hypothesis: in companies with a high valuation, as the valuation period lengthens (from one period to three periods), the magnitude of accruals increases at first and then decreases. On the other hand, in relation to how state ownership affects the relationship between permanent (sustainable) high valuation and the magnitude of accruals, managers of state-owned companies compared to managers of private companies, have a less monetary incentive to keep the stock price (value) high and also there has been less supervision of the CEOs in public companies. Therefore, despite the low motivation of the managers of public companies to act on profit management, weaker monitoring of such managers may increase their motivation and ability to manage profits. Based on this, the third hypothesis is as follows: The third hypothesis: the type of ownership has a significant effect on the relationship between high valuation and discretionary accruals. Conducting this research helps to understand the effect of ownership structure on the reporting behavior of managers in Iran`s capital market and also the results of this research also help to understand the role of political background in the quality of financial reporting of companies. Research Method The research is practical in terms of purpose and descriptive-correlative in terms of method. which has been done using the data of the financial statements of the companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. For this purpose, the data of 160 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2019 have been collected. To estimate discretionary accruals based on the performance index model of Kothari et al., the model proposed by Dicho and Dicho and modified by McNichols has been used also. In this research, if the abnormal return of the company last year is among the top decile of the sample, the number 1 is assigned to the variable HV, and otherwise it is assigned the number 0, and the P/E ratio is also used to identify overvalued companies. To test the first hypothesis of the research, a regression model was used according to the following relationship: To test the second hypothesis, the following experimental model has been used: To test the third hypothesis, the following experimental model has been used: Findings and Suggestions The results of the first hypothesis showed that the effect of different high valuation criteria on different indicators of discretionary accruals was positive and significant. The results of the second hypothesis showed that among the different periods of high valuation (from one to three periods), the effect of different criteria of high valuation in one and two periods on various indicators of discretionary accruals was positive and significant. This is despite the fact that the effect of different criteria of high valuation in three periods on various indices of discretionary accruals (except for the effect of high valuation in three periods based on the abnormal return criterion on the magnitude of discretionary accruals based on the Dicho and Dicho indices) was insignificant. Is. The results related to the weakening of the effect of the high valuation of the company (with the lengthening of the high valuation period) on the magnitude of discretionary accruals confirm that with the lengthening of the high valuation period, the cost and difficulty of managing accruals also increases. The results of the third hypothesis showed that among the different indicators of discretionary accruals as well as various criteria of high valuation, only the interactive effect of high valuation according to the criterion of abnormal return in the type of ownership on discretionary accruals according to the model of Kothari et al. was negative and significant. This is despite the fact that in relation to other regression models, the relationship between high valuation and discretionary accruals was independent of the type of ownership. Based on this, it can be concluded that the effect of ownership type on the relationship between high valuation and discretionary accruals was significant only according to Kothari et al.'s discretionary accruals model and high valuation of abnormal returns. The negative and significant effect of the interactive effect of high valuation according to the abnormal return criterion in the type of ownership on discretionary accruals according to the model of Kothari et al. is in line with this view that managers of public companies have fewer shares and stock options than managers of private companies and have less monetary incentive to generate abnormal stock returns as well as the level of discretionary accruals (earnings management). It is suggested that the users of the information of listed companies and especially financial analysts and potential shareholders in evaluating the quality of profit and potential performance of the mentioned companies (companies with high valuation) and also for future investment in the mentioned companies, due to the high risk of investing in such companies, be more careful. Considering the negative and significant effect of the interactive effect of high valuation according to the abnormal return criterion in the type of ownership on discretionary accruals according to Kothari et al.'s model, it seems that managers of public companies have a less monetary incentive to create abnormal returns as well as the level of discretionary accruals (earnings management). So; It is suggested that the companies that are responsible for ranking companies should consider their type of ownership.
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