recognition

This study investigated the effects of English as foreign language (EFL) proficiency on what the authors of this study called pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic recognition of EFL learners. To elicit the data, the study used two types of pragmatic measures: a pragmalinguistic recognition (PLR) test and a sociopragmatic recognition (SPR) test. Both tests were developed by the researchers of this study based on the distinction made by Leech (1983) between pragmalinguistics and sociopragmatics. Subsequent to the development of the tests, 80 Iranian EFL students were divided into two groups based on their EFL proficiency level: the low level group (n = 41) and the high level group (n = 39). Each participant group was tested on the two pragmatic measures. Pearson correlation results indicated construct differences between PLR and SPR of speech acts. Moreover, independent samples t-test results revealed that there were developmental differences in pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic recognition of speech acts by EFL learners. The findings offer insights to EFL teachers and testers regarding pragmatic instruction and assessment.

The present study seeks to argue the ethical values of the narrative strategies in The Ministry of Utmost Happiness, a post-postmodern novel by the Indian author Arundhati Roy. To carry out the research, the prominent features of James Phelan’s rhetorical theory of narrative and Charles Taylor’s ethical philosophy are examined. By applying such interdisciplinary approaches, the researchers investigate the characters' ethical positions in their quest for "authenticity" and "recognition" by focusing on the novel’s "ethics of the told" and "ethics of the telling." The study indicates the characters' attempt to reach full awareness of their in-depth inclinations and their quest to achieve an authentic self. Living in India's multicultural context, though suffering from non-/mis-recognition by others, Roy’s major characters can become authentic, free, and fulfilled through seeing the world and its people out of pure love for collective goodness. Eventually, highlighting the aesthetic strategies and authorial creativity provides a horizon to comprehend the different outlooks towards the ethical values and commitments that circulate freely within the novel's narrative world.

In this paper I return to the familiar territory of the Lord-Bondsman "dialectic" in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in order to raise the question of the relation of Hegel's use of the theme of recognition there to Fichte's. Fichte had introduced the notion of recognition in his Foundations of Natural Right , to "deduce" the social existence of humans within relations of mutual recognition as a necessary condition of their very self-consciousness. However, there it also functioned as part of a solution to a problem within the work on which the theory of rights was meant to be based, the earlier Foundation of the Complete Wissenschaftslehre of 1794-5. In Hegel's classic account in chapter 4 of the Phenomenology we find recognition offered as a solution to a problem within an account of "self-consciousness" that has a number of clearly Fichtean features. But I suggest that to the degree that the lord-bondsman episode there expresses any "theory of recognition", it is not Hegel’s own theory but rather his interpretation of Fichte's , a theory of which he is critical. Freed from this misleading assumption that the "lord-bondsman dialectic" represents something deep about Hegel's own philosophy, we might then be more able to get clearer about Hegel's actual views about recognition and the role it plays in his own philosophy.

While Hegel would agree with existentialist philosophers that anxiety testifies to an existential condition, applying to any human being as such, he believes that the experience of anxiety is shaped by social and cultural institutions and changes over history. The paper offers a reconstruction of Hegel’s account of the social conditions of anxiety. While my focus is the modern period, I use Hegel’s comments on death in previous epochs—and especially in ancient Greece—to bring out the peculiarity of modernity. In the first half of the paper, I discuss the nature and conditions of anxiety. In the second half, I trace Hegel’s critique of a common way to avoid—of flee from—anxiety in modernity, which results in social isolation, boredom, and emptiness. As long as the modern individual is only an economic actor in civil society, she is prone to anxiety. To confront her finitude, Hegel argues, she must endorse her political affiliation, namely, be an active and sacrificing citizen of the state.