religious belief

Much recent discussion of the epistemology of religious belief has focused on justification of belief in the existence of God. Religious belief, however, includes much more than belief in God. In this paper, it is argued that the justification of belief in God is best seen in the context of other interrelated religious beliefs and practices. Philosophers of religion argue about whether religious belief requires evidence and on the sorts of arguments that have been presented. In this paper, a dialectical approach to the justification of religious belief is suggested that draws upon Hegel, Peirce, and W. E. Hocking. Rational reflection on the nature of experience that provides the solution to the problems of skepticism and solipsism in the Hegelian tradition, a tradition self-consciously developed by both Peirce and Hocking. If reason itself is only manifest in social exchanges, then the rationality of religious belief cannot be a private affair restricted to the subject of experience; rather it is the process of communicative interactions in accord with the overlapping norms of those who participate in them. Finally, some implications of this approach for the problem of religious diversity are sketched.

In Reason and the Heart , William Wainwright defends a kind of religious evidentialism, one that takes int consideration the promptings of the heart, provided the heart is a virtuous one; and he claims that this view is able to avoid relativism. Here, Wainwright’s evidentialism is examined in relation to other views that have gone by that name. Wainwright’s position is briefly stated together with an expression of doubt about its ability to fend off relativism. Following this, an outline of the history of evidentialism is presented. It is concluded that Wainwright’s view is not really a form of evidentialism at all. Evidentialism may be weakened in two ways: (1) redefining “evidence” to include elements that are not recognized by objectifying inquiry; (2) allowing subjective factors, such as religious emotions, to govern the interpretation of the evidence. Wainwright describes his view as a form of evidentialism because it does not avail itself of (1); but it is only misleadingly called “evidentialism” because of (2). After making this case, several reasons are presented for rejecting evidentialism. It is argued that evidentialists focus attention of what the evidence is to determine whether beliefs are justified or rational, while how the evidence is treated is of no less importance when beliefs are supported by reasons. Furthermore, there are beliefs the justification of which is a practical matter of commitment to a more general framework rather than inference from some body of evidence. It is suggested that some religious beliefs may fall into this category.

The rationality of religious belief systems indicates longitudinal relationships, so that each benefit from pertained rationality based on ontological place within the web of religious knowledge. Therefore, it can be possible to consider three layers of religious beliefs i.e. fundamental, middle, and marginal. Here fundamental beliefs are the most rational, followed by middle and finally marginal. Concerning Islamic and Christian traditions, there can be two beliefs, believing in one God and the hereafter, that are considered fundamental ones. There are also middle beliefs between the two mainstream religions that are about divine attributes, the relationship between God and human beings, and so on so forth. Finally, the level of marginal beliefs of two are about the sacredness of places, times, events, things, persons, situations etc. This research wants to show that although all religious beliefs have been expanded and changed under the influence of epistemic and non-epistemic factors, t fundamental beliefs have been more stable, immutable, universal, and compatible. Middle beliefs of Islam and Christianity, are generally based on believers’ plural understandings of religious texts and under aforementioned factors. Thus, in order to study the rationality of religions and their traditions, it is necessary to pay closer attention to how and under what conditions (epistemic and non-epistemic) their web of beliefs are formed and shaped.