مطالب

This paper introduces ‘translational narratology’ (TN) as an eclectic conceptual model for studying translated narrative texts. As a source-based theory, TN investigates the status of three planes of the original narratology in translation: ‘story’, ‘text’, and ‘narration’. In fact, as an eclectic model, TN aims to set a theoretical foundation for both the original narrative texts and their corresponding texts in translation. However, the process for the original writer and the translator is a little bit different: the writer usually begins with the elements of the ‘story’ plane, and then comes to the elements of ‘narration’ and ‘text’ planes, simultaneously; the translator, as a reader, begins with the ‘text/narration’, and then comes to the ‘story’ plane. The former is bottom-up; the latter is top-down. The translator may have nothing to do with the ‘story’ plane; however, he/she may deal with this plane in the process of reading, understanding, and, preferably, translating. Some theorists postulate that the original narrative models have made no room for the presence of the translator as the main agent of the translated narrative fiction. This paper sets the theoretical scene for the translator’s discursive presence in the translated narrative texts.

The present research argues that it seems not all writers and their works may fall into an omnipresent ideology trap as Althusser conceives it; or unlike what Althusser holds, not all fictional characters are ‘interpellated”. Therefore, this research gives focal attention to reconsidering Althusser notion of ideology and his Ideological State Apparatus, ISAs, especially the cultural ISA through a descriptive-analytical method. Reed’s novel, The Free-Lance Pallbearers (1967), enjoying circumstantial artistic, religious, ethnic, racial, and literary characters, presents protagonists who not only refute or subvert this domineering ideology but also reshape and redefine it, making it necessary to reconsider Althusserian definition of literature as a cultural ISA. The novel, parodying “the Afro-American tradition of first-person, confessional narratives” is read as a microcosm to repudiate Althusser’s macrocosmic notions of reality. All through, the findings indicate that through the course of the novel, Reed subverts the dominant cultural and ideological discourse of American society through questioning the White standards from language and notions of reality to the ruling system.

The main objective of this study is to examine different layers of power relations between characters of Persian novels as represented by Afsoone Sabz utilizing Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis framework (1996) which paves the way for decoding social structures that cause verbal abuse in Iran. To this end, Afsoone Sabz novel, written by Takin Hamzeloo, is chosen as the case study. It can be maintained that social structures like gender inequality, socioeconomic status differences, and class struggle determine verbal abuses in Persian. It is reasonable to argue that Hamzeloo uses her text to influence the audience (Iranians in general and Iranian women in particular) to be aware of social practices (gender inequality, socioeconomic status differences, class struggle and power relations) in an attempt to change, if not subvert, power relations (obtain gender equality and remove socio-economic inequality in Iran). The paper suggests that Hamzeloo uses othering strategy, as a powerful rhetorical tool, to portray the pessimistic outlook Iranian men hold about women through verbal abuse.

Although Dynamic Assessment (DA), rooted in Vygotsky’s (1978) Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) notion, has been extensively researched in teaching English as a foreign language, it has remained largely unexplored in teaching Arabic as a foreign language. To bridge this long-lasting gap, this study purports to investigate the effects of DA on improving Iranian Quran learners’ recitation performance. For this purpose, two intact grade 7 classes were selected at a public high school in Borujerd city, Iran, and were assigned randomly as DA group (n=21) and non-DA group (n=23). Later, they went through a pre-test, intervention (offered based on the principles and procedures of DA for the DA group and held in 15 sessions), immediate post-test, and delayed post-test. The collected data were analyzed through a one-way ANCOVA. Findings documented that the DA group outperformed the non-DA group on the immediate post-test. Additionally, the results evidenced that the DA group outweighed the control group on the delayed post-test. The study ends with proposing some implications in consistent with the tenets of Sociocultural theory.

Contrary to what has been stated in most accounts that Hume intends to make arguments against the existence of God, he aims to attack the claim that religious propositions can be argued; not completely reject these propositions. He considers these propositions epistemologically outside of human knowledge but ontologically accepts the existence of God. With such a view, we can dismiss atheistic-agnostic interpretations and relate him to a kind of mysticism. The key to deciding whether or not Hume is a mystic is to determine what criteria we have to consider someone a mystic. Two very influential components here are (1) the belief in the existence of God;  (2) the belief that the existence of God is far from our usual reasoning (antirational or irrational).And the second component is enough to call someone like Wittgenstein a fideist. We claim that there is clear evidence of these components in Hume’s works; therefore, what reason do we have to remove Hume from the circle of fideism and mysticism? In this study, after an introduction to the concept and types of fideism, we show that Hume , based on his works, surpasses skepticism and manifests a special kind of fideism.While there is an emphasis on the mystery of the proposition that God exists, he combines Christian faith, in aform that is inseparable from illogical and mysterious propositions such as the incarnation of God. Thus, Hume can be called a Christian mystic.

The idea of “ creatio ex nihilo ” entered the arena of natural science with the advent of modern cosmology in the mid-twentieth century. This idea, that is, the creation of the universe out of nothing, seems to be a consequence of the widely accepted Big Bang Theory which implies the temporal finitude of the world. In order to avoid the theological and metaphysical implications of such an idea, some scenarios and scientific models have been proposed. According to one of the scenarios, the creation ex nihilo of the world is a causal physical phenomenon, and, hence, can be explained scientifically by appealing to the laws of nature.In this essay, I aim to discuss and criticize this idea.To fulfill this aim, in the introduction some achievements of modern cosmology will be very briefly introduced. In the next three sections, the notions of existence and nothingness, creation,scientific explanation, and singularity will be explored.It will be shown that what philosophers mean by these notions isradically different fromthe naïve ideas of some scientists. Hence, applying these notions to physical models of the origin of the universe is completely misleading.This work concludes that no scientific explanation appealing to the laws of nature can possibly explainthe creation of the universe out of nothing.

Theological Voluntarism is the view according to which certain moral properties or statuses have to be explained in terms of God’s commands, will, or other voluntary states of God. In his God and Moral Law, Mark Murphy criticizes theological voluntarism in general and Adams’ divine command theory of the nature of moral obligations in particular. Furthermore, he puts forward the first sketches for a theory of moral obligation that is not voluntaristic. In this paper I will first introduce Murphy’s proposed theory and will show that it is implausible. Then, drawing on Adams’ views of the nature of goodness and virtue, articulated in Finite and Infinite Goods and A theory of Virtue, I will try to put forward the first sketches of a viable theory of moral obligations that does not appeal to divine commands in explaining moral obligations and explains them in terms of goodness/badness. An important feature of morality that voluntarists appeal to for motivating their view and criticizing views that explain obligations in terms of goodness is the existence of supererogatory actions, i.e., actions that are good but not required. I will focus on this feature of morality and try to show how a theory of moral obligation that explains the obligations in terms of goodness can accommodate this feature.

The nature and existence of time is a major issue in Islamic philosophy. Avicenna is a philosopher who presented various discussions of the problem in different works, trying to explain the problem of time and its relation with other things such as motion and distance ( masāfat ). In his major philosophical books, Remarks and Admonitions(al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt) , The Book of Healing (al-Shifāʾ) , and The Book of Salvation(al-Najāt) , Avicenna examines and explains the nature and manner of existence of time, but he does not isolate the theological consequences of his account. An account of such consequences can reveal his view of the matter. In fact, it is essential to see how definitions of time would affect views of theological problems, as it can clarify the intellectual-philosophical system of philosophers. In this article, I draw on the analytic-descriptive method to offer an accurate picture of the nature and existence of time in Avicenna’s view, and then explicate the consequences of that definition for theological problems. I argue that Avicenna’s account of time has four consequences: (1) time’s pre-eternity is evidence of God’s pre-eternity, (2) time’s post-eternity is evidence of the post-eternity of the necessary existence, (3) the relation between God and time is possible only through the existence of intermediaries, and (4) the essential incipience of time implies the eternality of God’s grace.