مطالب

International Human rights, especially women rights, in today's world is one of the main challenges of the Islamic world with International Law. In fact, one of the great allegation against Islam is about the violation of women rights in Islamic law. This is while in Islam, Human – even man or woman- is considered equal by specification of the verses of the Qur'an like” Surely the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous among you” (al-hujurat/13). Islam however also recognizes that such equality does not mean that men and women are the same. It notes their different physical and emotional strengths and in view of this sets out their key roles in life. In this framework, the purpose of this article is to assess the misinterpretations of international women rights about some Islamic views toward women rights. This article’s objective is to highlight connections between the basic tenets of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the nature of Islam-based reservations. Also, it assess the question of the compatibility of the Sharia with modern international human rights law. Because it is a subject of enormous complexity and variation, detailed examination is restricted to two highly contentious subjects of Islamic family law – polygamy and the Divorce within Islam. The results show that the dispute between Islam and the West over human rights is not a conflict in dialectics but of perspectives, So that Islamic doctrines are compatible with modem norms regarding human rights. Likewise, the divergence between these two worlds are not fundamental clash, but actually the disagreement can be viewed as a cultural dialogue.

The idea of “ creatio ex nihilo ” entered the arena of natural science with the advent of modern cosmology in the mid-twentieth century. This idea, that is, the creation of the universe out of nothing, seems to be a consequence of the widely accepted Big Bang Theory which implies the temporal finitude of the world. In order to avoid the theological and metaphysical implications of such an idea, some scenarios and scientific models have been proposed. According to one of the scenarios, the creation ex nihilo of the world is a causal physical phenomenon, and, hence, can be explained scientifically by appealing to the laws of nature.In this essay, I aim to discuss and criticize this idea.To fulfill this aim, in the introduction some achievements of modern cosmology will be very briefly introduced. In the next three sections, the notions of existence and nothingness, creation,scientific explanation, and singularity will be explored.It will be shown that what philosophers mean by these notions isradically different fromthe naïve ideas of some scientists. Hence, applying these notions to physical models of the origin of the universe is completely misleading.This work concludes that no scientific explanation appealing to the laws of nature can possibly explainthe creation of the universe out of nothing.

Theological Voluntarism is the view according to which certain moral properties or statuses have to be explained in terms of God’s commands, will, or other voluntary states of God. In his God and Moral Law, Mark Murphy criticizes theological voluntarism in general and Adams’ divine command theory of the nature of moral obligations in particular. Furthermore, he puts forward the first sketches for a theory of moral obligation that is not voluntaristic. In this paper I will first introduce Murphy’s proposed theory and will show that it is implausible. Then, drawing on Adams’ views of the nature of goodness and virtue, articulated in Finite and Infinite Goods and A theory of Virtue, I will try to put forward the first sketches of a viable theory of moral obligations that does not appeal to divine commands in explaining moral obligations and explains them in terms of goodness/badness. An important feature of morality that voluntarists appeal to for motivating their view and criticizing views that explain obligations in terms of goodness is the existence of supererogatory actions, i.e., actions that are good but not required. I will focus on this feature of morality and try to show how a theory of moral obligation that explains the obligations in terms of goodness can accommodate this feature.