درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

Dari apparently began to spread in Greater Khorasan only in the aftermath of the Arab invasions of Iran. As the official language of the Sasanian court, it would experience a substantial proliferation following the shift in power from Ctesiphon and Fars to eastern Iran, particularly Khorasan, which appeared as a safe haven for the king and the prominent court families during the first two decades of the invasions. The question then arises as to the relation between the spread of Dari in Khorasan and the resettlement of western and southern Iranian populations in the eastern part of the collapsing empire. Our inquiry into the Sasanian-Islamic transition in quest of the fire temples that persisted in the early Islamic centuries led to the conclusion in view of the fluctuating numbers of coeval sites that the earlier harsh attacks had apparently forced inhabitants of southern Iran in particular Fars and Ctesiphon to take refuge in Khorasan, the land of Adur Burzen-Mihr Fire. In their new home, these refugees would adopt two different modes of subsistence, thereby settlement, systems: sedentary rural life, and nomadic lifestyle involving periodic moves within a certain area. This dichotomous approach would guarantee their survival. Among the manifold results of the late Sasanian peace treaties between the dehgâns and the Arabs was the preservation of Iranian culture and language in Khorasan, where it contributed to several advances. Several years of efforts by Iranian immigrants to revive architectural and poetic styles in Khorasan proved that they were triumphant in the cultural battleground despite of losing the actual battle.

This article presents documents on the aftermath of a diplomatic affair from 1705, which was engineered by Safavid Iran’s grand vizier Muhammad Mumin Shamlu and which was the last of his undertakings to reorient relations with the Ottoman Empire. It was a part of his policy played out as several faits This article presents documents on the aftermath of a diplomatic affair from 1705, which was engineered by Safavid Iran’s grand vizier Muhammad Mumin Shamlu and which was the last of his undertakings to reorient relations with the Ottoman Empire. It was a part of his policy played out as several faits accomplis unfolding at the same time and aiming to embitter Ottoman-Safavid relations, which had reached a formal alliance over the last decade. Starting out under the guise of a religious gift-giving, this initiative from the Iranian capital Isfahan to Prophet Muhammad’s shrine in Ottoman-controlled Medina first slighted the Ottomans’ lordship rights in the Hejaz and therefore became blocked by the Ottoman authorities in Medina as well as the digninaties in Constantinople. But soon, it grew into a subject of diplomatic correspondenceand thenbecame entangled in a robbery reaching out to Mecca and Baghdad, whose prosecution spread further to Constantinople, Cairo, Damascus, and the eastern Mediterranean waters. Even after the affair was put to rest, Ottoman-Safavid dealings did not heal from the harm done by Muhammad Mumin Shamlu’s succesive thrusts to undermine the cooperation of the 1690s.The peace outlived Beygdilli-Shamlu’s term as grand vizier, but he succeeded in downgrading it from an official brotherhood to a bare state of nonaggression. accomplis unfolding at the same time and aiming to embitter Ottoman- Safavid relations, which had reached a formal alliance over the last decade. Starting out under the guise of a religious gift-giving, this initiative from the Iranian capital Isfahan to Prophet Muhammad’s shrine in Ottoman-controlled Medina first slighted the Ottomans’ lordship rights in the Hejaz and therefore became blocked by the Ottoman authorities in Medina as well as the digninaties in Constantinople. But soon, it grew into a subject of diplomatic correspondenceand thenbecame entangled in a robbery reaching out to Mecca and Baghdad, whose prosecution spread further to Constantinople, Cairo, Damascus, and the eastern Mediterranean waters. Even after the affair was put to rest, Ottoman-Safavid dealings did not heal from the harm done by Muhammad Mumin Shamlu’s succesive thrusts to undermine the cooperation of the 1690s.The peace outlived Beygdilli-Shamlu’s term as grand vizier, but he succeeded in downgrading it from an official brotherhood to a bare state of nonaggression.