One of the most important topics of contemporary cognitive sciences is how "we know other minds" in other words, "social cognition". Cognitive sciences, chiefly with an analytical philosophy approach, have raised the issue of other minds and social cognition under the title of "theory of mind". "Theory of mind" is an important social-cognitive skill that covers the ability to think about mental states of oneself and others. In this paper and through library reference, we will describe and explain the theories proposed under this title, i.e. "theory of the theory of mind" and "simulation of the theory of mind" and their branches. Then through an analytical method, we will study their claims.
Findings of the research are that the two mentioned theories, with all their branches, have taken a useful step in the field of artificial intelligence and computer sciences; nonetheless, they are facing a series of sub-structural and super-structural problems to be repaired and corrected merely with a profound and correct philosophical view.
Failing to pay attention to the "direct and present perception of internal states in the very individual in TT", "the challenge of justification in the explicit version of simulation" and "the immateriality of the category of knowledge and perception in the implicit version of simulation" are among the sub-structural problems of the aforementioned approaches.