مطالب

The a priori is the basic characteristic ofKant's theory of knowledge. Formaliz/ng the a priori, Kant appears to distinguish the a priorifrom the postriori and qffirms its purity. He insists that the a priori is prior to the a postriori and stqys independent!Jfrom it. The overall objectiue of this paper is, boueier; to present and to support this idea that the a priori, even prior, can be defined l?J its relation to experience; ifthe a priori is prior to the a postriori, and ifits validity is not depended on the a postriori, it is still not ivithout mry relation with it. The main thesis I u;iflfoll01v here is that the a postriori could be called the root of the a priori: the a priori has its principle in the a postriorijust because it is given to it. The a priori is given in the experience. Instead of conceiving the a priori as a formal or logical cond Ition of ol?Jectiviry, it uould be considered as immanent in the objea and apprehended during the very act of experience, although known implicit!J before experience occurs. If the a priori is indeed given in experience, we are not constrained to restrict it to the formal conditions of oijectiviry. However, before proceeding to substantiate this thesis, I 1vill reiien. Kant's analysis of the a priori quick/y. Then, I willpresent the main thesis and its proof to deformalize the a priori and implant it in the a postriori domain.

The paper deals with Kant's conception of moral judgment. I start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of Kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giving oneself the moral law (Korsgaard). According to this view, the logical inescapability of choosing alivqys already places us within the normative realm. I argue that there is a further function suppressed by this view, which can be termed as approval. This takes us to the further acknowledgement that the core of Kant's practical rationality, that is, the moral question itself, is not simply one of moral knowledge [Wissen], but a broader one of cognition in general [Erkenntnis].

I can predict from the aspects and signs of our times that the human race 1vill... progressivefy improve without af!)l more total reversals.... The profit which will accrue to the human race as it works its wqy fonvard will not be an ever increasing quantity ofmorality in its attitudes. Instead the legality of its attitudes willproduce an increasing number of actions governed 0 duty, tuha tever the particular motives behind these mqy be.... Violence will gradualfy become less on the part of those in pouer and obedience tou/ards the la1vs 1vill increase... and this 1vi!I ultimatefy extend to the external relations between the various peoples, until a cosmopolitan society is created. Such developments do not mean , however, that the basic moral capacity ofmankind will increase in the slightest, for this would require a kind ofnew creation or supernatural influence. For we must not expect too much of human beings in their progressive improvements. " (Reiss, 19 70, 18 7)