مهدی ذاکریان

Von dem Jahr 1928, das heißt von der Zeit der Anerkennung der Regierung von Ḥiǧāz durch Rezā Schah bis zu dem Jahr 1979, konnten die Meinungsverschiedenheiten über politische Themen, Identitätsfragen und Ölpreis zwischen dem Iran und Saudi Arabien zu keinen Spannungen und Feindseligkeiten in den Beziehungen zweier Länder führen. In den 60er und 70er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts haben gemeinsame Ziele wie der Kampf gegen Ausbreitung des Kommunismus und die Linksradikalen, den Arabischen Nationalismus (Nasser und Baths) sowie die Aufrechthaltung der Sicherheit und Ordnung am Persischen Golf und Nahen Osten dazu geführt, dass die Instandsetzung der Ausbesserung der politischen bzw. sicherheitspolitischen Kooperation zwischen dem Iran und Saudi Arabien als zwei regionale Mächte und Verbündete der Vereinigten Staaten in die Wege geleitet wurde. Beide Länder haben für sich in dieser Zeit ein islamisch gemäßigtes Verhalten im radikal panarabistischen Diskurs gewählt. So haben sie mit der gemeinsamen Zusammenarbeit allmählich den ägyptischen und irakischen Radikalismus in der Folge der arabisch- nationalistischen Ziele ausgeglichen. (Ahmadi 2007, 241-247)

This study intends to review Israel's efforts to increase political and economic relations with Arab countries. It is clear that most Arab countries did not have any ties with Israel since the 1980s, and only two Egyptian states had established political relations with Israel since the 1973 war. But over the past few years, and especially after the start of the third millennium, a new trend has been formed by the Israeli authorities, which is still ongoing. This exit-isolation process is aimed at establishing friendships with Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and other Arab league members. However, the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution and the initiation of a new ideology in the Middle East brought the new Israeli regional strategy closer to speed, and Iran gradually became the main enemy of the two sides’ in the third millen-nium. It seems that the Arab countries have forgotten their aspirations towards the Pal-estinian people and help Israel achieve its goals.

Two parallel but contradictory trends have come to characterize the early decades of the twenty-first century.  On the one hand, the traditional principles of international law highlighted in the UN Charter, such as the principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention, and the state officials’ immunity, have become considerably weaker norms.  The dimension of moral sovereignty of governments, by contrast, has gained much traction, as more and more states tend to prioritize the protection of internal jurisdiction over the promotion of human rights. However, at the same time, the notion of the responsibility to protect (R2P) and transitional justice in practice have cast their specter over countries’ internal developments, misconduct, and human rights violations, holding them accountable  to domestic and international laws. These conflicting trajectories have come to a head during and in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings.  Charged with human rights violations, the ruling elites of Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt faced trials—both locally and internationally by the International Criminal Court. The UN Security Council authorized applying R2P to protect Libyan people and International Criminal Court issued the arrest warrants against Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah Gaddafi. In Tunisia, an absentee trial for the deposed President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was held.  In Egypt, however, the trial of Hosni Mubarak and those associated with his regime bypassed the so-called transitional justice model, while following the all too familiar pathway to promoting stability under the guise of national reconciliation. This paper’s central thrust is that political interests of the new rulers of Egypt, most notably the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), the Muslim Brotherhood, and the military-backed interim government have turned the accepted and modern notion of transitional justice process on its head, while pursuing instead an authoritarian and managed judicial process in the name of state sovereignty and national stability.  

The history of international relations represents in vain, that the countries when faced with crises, have made many errors. Most of the decisions of countries have usually lead to huge disasters for the international community. This article utilizes the theory of the international community to acknowledge the dysfunctionality of states’ attention to spending for the wars, siege, and boycott, and torecognize JCPOA’s negotiations as a result of cooperation and power. Using force against Iraq and Afghanistan had no consequent but to help grow terrorism in the world. However, negotiations and granting a positive role to an international actor can help the state to cooperate with the international community. The result of this action would be a stable peace. The Vienna agreement, similar to the Vienna Congress, will start a new era in international relations. This is a new era will be based on dialogue, cooperation, respect and adhere to the principles of international law, and respecting the interests of great powers. The author believes thatthe international security and peace in the world would last, as long as international actors support the JCPOA. 

The 2016 elections in Iran, both for parliament and the Assembly of Experts, offer essential insights into the possible future direction of the country's foreign policy. Even though the results of elections in Iran have not usually been as desired, Iranian people have always valued the opportunity of voting in order to express their political views. During the 2016 elections, they had the choice of voting for either a radical or a moderate response to the country's wide range of internal and external challenges. Ultimately, Iranians shifted their votes towards the moderate party, which also indicates their satisfaction of the nuclear deal. As a result, almost all of the representatives who opposed the nuclear deal lost their seats in parliament. President Rouhani now has the political capital to push a course of greater socioeconomic reform and liberalization at home and engagement abroad. With a blend of descriptive and analytic approaches, this paper intends to provide a review on Iran’s 2016 elections, as well as to analyze the possible obstacles that might exist in the path of the Rouhani administration for Iran’s future foreign policy.