Game theory

In this paper, with help of the concept of hyper-rationality, we model the interaction between two investment companies by an important game as trickery game that has special equilibrium which called hyper-equilibrium. In trickery game, one company can choose cooperation with another company until the last moment and finally changes his action to non-cooperation which incur more loss to an opponent. Indeed, the hyper-equilibrium is the point in which only one player can displace equilibrium to another point by changing his action which causes profit or loss to other players so they cannot change their action. Our findings indicate that the kind of behaviour interactive, environmental conditions, and valuation system are based on hostility causes an equilibrium point to incur the maximum loss to an opponent.

Most of the time, Groups/Communities are involved in negotiations and disputations due to their various interests. They are always trying to pursuit their aspiration to embrace changes and influence on events. Although sometimes these groups are not completely opposed to each other and their intention is just to get the desired results, almost always their conditions are in contrast with each other. These conflicts prevent negotiators from approaching desired acceptable solutions. For improving the negotiations, resolving the conflicts and reaching satisfactory decisions, Drama theory is applied. This theory is based on game theory. In this paper, Iran Nuclear talks with 5+1 Group will be discussed as an applicable case for drama theory.

The Central Bank of Iran banned online currency trading through Forex brokers in November 2016. However, some Iranian speculators still trade in the online Forex market. Is this prohibition on Forex trading reasonable? According to reports, the majority of Forex day traders fail and leave the market within six months to a year. Some scholars attribute this failure to the changeable characteristics of the losing traders, including low startup capital, failure to manage risk, lack of discipline, and impatience. The purpose of this study was to explore why the majority of traders fail and to investigate the relationship between the Forex market features and the risk of failure. We developed a previous model to address this issue. Given the Forex market is a zero-sum game; the break-even point of the representative player was formulated. The model and simulation results indicated that the expected likelihood of loss is directly related to market features such as leverage, volatility, and the frequency of trading. The minimum rate of expected return, high volatile days, and spread were the other factors affecting the risk of loss. In conclusion, the study confirms the extremely high level of risk in Forex trading, which is inappropriate for the majority of individual investors. Moreover, policymakers need to consider the high risk of loss in this market, and some appropriate regulations seem reasonable on the Forex trading.

Since two decades ago, the Iranian nuclear issue became a full-scale international conflict. Iran's main preference is to guarantee its national security. In fact, the lack of a strategy for Iran and the channels of intense conflict around it, the scarcity of conflict management strategies and mechanisms, are forcing Iran to pursue a nuclear program. Furthermore, some severe institutional and structural confinements and limitations on Iran and the immediate need to recover its vulnerable economy have forced Iran to subsidize its fortified attitudes and behave like a rational actor in the international atmosphere. But the United States’ preference is to stabilize the regional equation with regard to support of its strategic resources and allies in the Middle East. The lack of similar understandings and different levels of calculation between Tehran and Washington over nuclear politics led to long-lasting conflict. While Iran justifies its political logic with normative paradigm and consistency with international regimes, Washington’s political calculations are standing forsecurity, threat and deterrence approaches. Moreover, whereas Iran explains its nuclear activities at the regional and transregional levels, the US analyzes it at the international level disordering the global status quo. In this paper, the game theory models will be used to understand the past and current relationship between US-Iran. Furthermore, the possibility of an equilibrium movement regarding the Iranian nuclear problem will be discussed. This analysis will focus on the preferences and interests of each state, which mainly determine the foreign policy-making process. 

Modern organizations’ strategy is reducing inventory, production cycle time, transportation cost, quality cost, while increasing competitiveness to maximize its benefits. Supply chain management, as part of an organization’s strategy, involves several stakeholders with different interests, each controlling part of the chain and pursuing different goals. This paper presents a comprehensive multi-level model of a supply chain consisting of several simultaneous stakeholders in a systematic way. The developed model first, consider the various transportation factors, such as distribution of goods for various members of the supply chain to achieves the lowest transportation cost at different levels, for both transporting parts and products. The model also provides lowest costs of purchase and production by considering the costs of maintenance, supply shortages and shortage, for all the involved parties. In addition, a competition in the context of a game to select the optimal situation between the stakeholders of the supply chain has been considered to make the best decision in terms of a participatory game by considering different scenarios. Through applying the principles of the game theory, various scenarios were developed to optimize the benefits of parties and to achieve the optimal design. The results of a numerical example showed that the answer provided by the game theory for the value of the objective function was less than the answers of the transport problem, despite the deficit penalty. Therefore, it can be concluded that game theory can achieve a better answer by considering the conditions of alliance between participants in a collaborative game.

In our country, a large number of university graduates are unable to leverage their higher education and enter the workforce. It is evident that at present, there is no coherent qualitative and quantitative linkage between the educational system and the labor market, leading to resource wastage. Furthermore, there exists a fundamental ambiguity regarding the rationale for the significant upward trend in higher education within the country compared to global and regional trends. In this article, game theory and static games with complete information have been employed to model the interaction between the Azad university and students. To this end, the strategies of the university and students have been examined within four distinct scenarios, and their outcomes have been analyzed to ascertain the equilibrium in the aforementioned games. The results demonstrate that, for students, the strategy of pursuing studies in a field with available job opportunities that align with the student's preferences dominates over other strategies (irrespective of the choices made by other players) in all games. As for the Azad university, the strategy of offering a field with existing job prospects or establishing new ones supersedes alternative strategies, and the absence of such fields is pervasive within the university. Ultimately, it is recommended that the Azad university continues its approach if there are fields with available job opportunities, and if there are no practical fields that correspond to the region, necessary policies should be implemented to create these opportunities.