Nash equilibrium

In this paper, with help of the concept of hyper-rationality, we model the interaction between two investment companies by an important game as trickery game that has special equilibrium which called hyper-equilibrium. In trickery game, one company can choose cooperation with another company until the last moment and finally changes his action to non-cooperation which incur more loss to an opponent. Indeed, the hyper-equilibrium is the point in which only one player can displace equilibrium to another point by changing his action which causes profit or loss to other players so they cannot change their action. Our findings indicate that the kind of behaviour interactive, environmental conditions, and valuation system are based on hostility causes an equilibrium point to incur the maximum loss to an opponent.

Social media websites like Twitter and Facebook have become a treasure trove of data. Even today, people have not been able to fully comprehend the consequences, both positive and negative, of being on these websites. We have modeled the risks associated with such websites as a function of the population, i.e., the number of accounts present, along the lines of the tragedy of commons. We have tracked the variations between the average Strogartz Watts local clustering coefficient, the variance of Strogartz Watts local clustering coefficient and the global clustering coefficient as the number of accounts in a database increases. Regarding the average local and global clustering coefficient, researchers observed an initial phase of rapid increase followed by a phase of a continuous relatively smaller increase in their values. The variance of the average local clustering coefficient shows an initial phase of significant variation followed by a phase of continuous reduction in its value. Thus, the increase in the population size increases the transitivity of the network, increasing the risk associated with data being leaked via the website. The purpose of this research study is to simulate the social media connections and identify the application of the concept of ‘tragedy of commons’ in the social media domain. The researchers have also tried to look at insights obtained from simulations from a network theory perspective. The scope of this research study is to look at the way the connections are made on social media depending on the common interests of the people who use social media platforms. Using network theory, the researchers have tried to find out the connections structures. The researchers have used a simulation approach using a program that was written in C language on a UNIX system. Additional accounts to a hypothetical database were simulated using this program.

The present study aims to analyze the long-term impact of tariff reductions to be mandated in the event of accession of Iran to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the industrial sector using the Recursive Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (RDCGE) model. For this purpose, the model was calibrated for the 2011 social accounting matrix of Iran. In the baseline scenario, it was assumed that the Iranian economy will experience annual growth of 2% without accession to the WTO, which is the same rate as the population growth. In the alternative scenario, the tariff reduction simulation was performed based on the average tariff commitments of 22 developing countries acceded to the WTO. Based on the results, industrial production and exports will shrink by 3.4 and 3.5%, respectively, over the 30 years after joining the WTO, leading to an 81% gap between the production levels in the alternative and baseline scenarios at the end of this period. JEL Classification: I38, C68, F13.

In our country, a large number of university graduates are unable to leverage their higher education and enter the workforce. It is evident that at present, there is no coherent qualitative and quantitative linkage between the educational system and the labor market, leading to resource wastage. Furthermore, there exists a fundamental ambiguity regarding the rationale for the significant upward trend in higher education within the country compared to global and regional trends. In this article, game theory and static games with complete information have been employed to model the interaction between the Azad university and students. To this end, the strategies of the university and students have been examined within four distinct scenarios, and their outcomes have been analyzed to ascertain the equilibrium in the aforementioned games. The results demonstrate that, for students, the strategy of pursuing studies in a field with available job opportunities that align with the student's preferences dominates over other strategies (irrespective of the choices made by other players) in all games. As for the Azad university, the strategy of offering a field with existing job prospects or establishing new ones supersedes alternative strategies, and the absence of such fields is pervasive within the university. Ultimately, it is recommended that the Azad university continues its approach if there are fields with available job opportunities, and if there are no practical fields that correspond to the region, necessary policies should be implemented to create these opportunities.