پژوهش های فلسفی-کلامی

An agent’s efforts of will have long been at the center of Robert Kane’s influential account of libertarian free will. For several decades it has been a crucial part of his theory that there is a symmetry to these efforts. That is, Kane has long maintained that an agent engaged in an undetermined choice makes a simultaneous and sustained effort to choose and to choose otherwise. In a recent paper, Kane abandons this symmetry. I outline and evaluate this change in Kane’s theory. I begin by explaining how Kane’s theory has changed from a symmetric to an asymmetric account of undetermined free choices. I then explore the philosophical benefits of adopting an asymmetric account by considering its implications for the explanatory luck objection, the phenomenological objection, and the objection that engaging in dual efforts of will involves an unacceptable form of irrationality. Finally, I argue that despite these benefits, Kane’s asymmetric model opens the door to a more pervasive worry about luck and it gives up something most libertarians want: the unconditional ability to choose otherwise. Given these points, I conclude the cost of abandoning the symmetric account of efforts of will is excessively high.

“You are not machines! You are not cattle! You are men!” (The Great Dictator, Charlie Chaplin) Contemporary discussions on freedom have recently drawn attention to the implications of the mind-body relation. Historically, the notion of freedom has centered on various naturalistic options, compatibilism, and weaker notions of libertarian freedom. This leaves strong agent-causal libertarianism as a minority position. Entering these discussions, we seek to establish the relation between a particular mind-body view and strong agent-causal libertarianism. We make two claims upon characterizing strong agent-causal libertarianism. First, we argue that strong agent-causal libertarianism requires some version of substance dualism (or immaterialist agency). Second, we argue that strong agent-causal libertarianism probably requires something like classical or Cartesian substance dualism. Drawing from the philosopher John Foster in The Immaterial Self, we show that the central defining feature of the sort of libertarian agency under investigation is ‘intrinsic autonomy’. While we recognize that Cartesianism is unpopular in contemporary discussions, we agree with Foster that it is probably what is entailed if we are going to ground something like a strong agent-causal libertarianism. The substance needed to explain this robust form of freedom begins to look like something not of this world and more like the substance described early on by Rene Descartes.

Abrahamic faiths, which are among the divine revelations, consider science to be the knowledge of the universe and humans. The proper understanding of science is the study of the natural world through the lens of religious metaphysics which takes into account all relevant factors from a religious viewpoint.This study aims to survey the effect of religious worldview on the metaphysical principles that govern science, and deals with the following questions:1) What effect do religious metaphysical foundations have on the interpretation of scientific theories? 2) How scientific work, in the light of the divine worldview, ensures the material and spiritual needs of mankind? 3) Is experimental science influenced by religious and philosophical values and insights? 4) Are various human and natural sciences far from value judgments?In this paper, we use the fact that all scientific theories are based on some metaphysical assumptions that are not taken from these sciences but are rooted in philosophies or religions and provide a worldview for the scientist. Furthermore, these worldviews affect scientists’ motivations and their choices of theories.We argue that the worldview of monotheistic religions puts the totality of scientific issues in the context of religious metaphysics.

This article examines the theory of mind proposed by the esteemed Islamic philosopher, Mulla Sadra Shirazi, through a phenomenological lens. We specifically focus on how Mulla Sadra’s framework addresses the question of the individual human mind and its intricate relationship with the body. While Mulla Sadra presents concepts that resonate with some of Husserl’s ‘monadological-phenomenological’ reflections, we argue that strict adherence to phenomenological methodology precludes acceptance of the metaphysical implications he draws concerning the individual mind’s connection to the totality of existence, including a presumed divine reality. Nonetheless, our comparative analysis with Mulla Sadra’s thought illuminates key aspects of Husserlian monadology and highlights the limitations of a rigorously phenomenological approach to purely metaphysical inquiries.

The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is a relatively young field that explores the intersection between science and religion. Some argue that CSR, by employing purely explanatory methods and presupposing methodological naturalism, has secularized and materialized religion. Others believe that explanatory methods are not the sole approach in CSR, and the use of other methods is permissible. This article aims to show how CSR has influenced the entire realm of philosophy of religion and the nature of this impact. It examines various perspectives on the extent of CSR’s influence on the philosophy of religion, particularly analyzing its effect on the proofs of natural theology. The second part demonstrates that contrary to the dominant literature, the impact of CSR can extend beyond merely strengthening or weakening theological arguments and can be used to argue for the reform of religious beliefs. This argument is pursued from four different perspectives: first, the concept of God, arguing that weakening classic proofs does not imply weakening belief in God; second, the methodology of studying religion, advocating for methodological pluralism; third, the topic of revelation and the role of humans in religion, suggesting that a behavioral shift desirable in economics is also preferable in the study of religion; and fourth, the issue of religious pluralism and interfaith relations, arguing against the exclusivity produced by textualism and foundationalism in epistemology.

Two distinct teleological perspectives emerge from the ancient Greek tradition. 1) Platonic teleology, which represents teleology as the result of intentional agency and is the origin of the idea of design; and 2) Aristotelian teleology, which introduces teleology as the resultof natural and intrinsic causes. The preceding framework for understanding nature was superseded by the advent of the modern era and the establishment of the scientific method. Nevertheless, despite the prevailing skepticism regarding the possibility and utility of teleology in the modern era, it is asserted that several prominent scientists of the modern era are staunch defenders of teleology (design). However, with Darwin’s proposal of the theory of evolution, the path to the destruction of teleology was initiated. This article examines the interconnection between Darwin’s theory of evolution (then Neo-Darwinism) and teleology, focusing on how this theory effectively undermines the teleological perspective. However, it seems that recent findings in the field of biology challenge this dominant view and open the way for the revival of teleology.

How does unconscious matter become conscious? How does our physical part, which lacks consciousness, have such a subjective quality? This is the explanatory gap in the problem of consciousness or the hard problem of consciousness which comes from a physicalist (eliminativist physicalism) point of view. From the opposite point of view, that is, dualism, the mind-body problem has led to the problem of consciousness and the explanation of how our unconscious physical (matter) part (substance) is related to our conscious mental part (substance). If the problem of consciousness is the result of such views (eliminativism and dualism), is it possible to adopt a different perspective so that the problem does not arise at all? Or find a solution for it (maximum answer) or at least determine the right way to solve the problem (minimum answer)? The current research goes into this issue by adopting subjectivism and holism to make its subjective holism theory. Therefore, it gives a positive (maximum and minimum) answer to the above questions.

According to the orthodox view in Aristotelian tradition concerning the division of knowledge (ʿilm), some knowledge in the form of conception (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdīq) is attainable (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī). The attainable knowledge is divided into primitive and theoretical. Regarding primitive knowledge, concerning “the conception”, knowing the language and noticing the word is enough to understand it without asking anyone,and concerning “the assent”, the assertion of which its ingredients are already knownis primitive and hence non-acquisitive if the knower immediately and without any investigation finds its truth-value. On the other hand, acquisitive knowledge is the knowledge about which the above conditions are not enough and the thinker should make some effort to obtain it, hence it is theoretical. However, according to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, a famous Muslim philosopher, logician, and theologian, all “concepts” and all “assents”, are non-acquisitive although they may be divided into primitive and theoretical. His view leads to the conclusion that all sciences are non-acquisitive, that is, mankind does not have the power to acquire them, which is a counterintuitive view. Ṭūsī is the most famous critic of Rāzī. In this paper, first, I have examined Rāzī’s views and arguments and Ṭūsī’s criticisms. Secondly, I have suggested that Rāzī’s view is rooted in his theological viewpoint, which is coherent with Ashʿarite doctrine.

Epistemologists have widely accepted that truth, justification, and belief are necessary conditions for knowledge. This article challenges the necessity of the two components, “belief” and “justification”, in the definition of knowledge. It argues that belief is distinct from knowledge; belief is an act of will, whereas knowledge is acquired automatically. One may possess knowledge without being actively willing to believe it, and conversely, one may will to believe something without actually knowing it. Additionally, justification should be seen as a method of validating knowledge, not a fundamental part of its definition. Therefore, knowledge without justification remains knowledge, even though its truth cannot be proven. Building on this perspective, the proposed definition of knowledge shifts to “awareness or recognition of facts.” According to this definition, the Gettier problem and the lottery paradox find alternative solutions.

This paper explores the metaphysical concepts of divine “love” (ʿeshq), “attraction” (jadhbe), and “selflessness” (bīkhodī) in the seminal Iranian Shīʿī Muslim thinker Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī’s poetry. It seeks to comprehensively understand these themes in the context of self-transcendence and divine unity. This research emerges from the gap in existing literature, which mainly explores Fayḍ Kāshānī’s philosophical, theological, or ḥadīth works, while the scrutiny of his poetry largely stays within its literary attributes, overlooking the philosophical and mystical themes embedded within. The paper’s thesis posits that according to Fayḍ Kāshānī, the spiritual journey commences with reason, progressing to constant divine contemplation. This combination of philosophy and spirituality nurtures muḥabbat—an initial stage of divine love—which, when discovered, evokes a more intense love: “divine attraction” in the seeker’s heart, leading to selflessness and divine unity. This paper employs the hermeneutic method and analytical examination to scrutinize Fayḍ Kāshānī’s poetry within the context of his treatises. It follows an “intracultural” interpretation to explore Fayḍ Kāshānī’s thought within Persian intellectual tradition and uses an “intercultural” interpretation to contextualize the findings within Islamic, Christian, and ancient Greek metaphysics. The methodology includes a “horizontal interpretation” of Quranic and ḥadīth references in Fayḍ Kāshānī’s works and a “vertical interpretation” of unveiling deeper meanings of Fayḍ Kāshānī’s thoughts within the broader mystical traditions. The research accentuates how Persian metaphysical poetry, like Fayḍ Kāshānī’s, offers an evocative platform to articulate and traverse the mystic’s inner landscapes, contributing to Islamic Studies and Islamic Metaphysics and inviting scholars to explore this fertile domain.