mental existence

Mullā Sadrā interprets “correspondence” in the correspondence theory of truth as the identity of quiddity (ʿayniyyat-e māhūwī) between mental existence (wujūd-i dhihnī) and external existence (wujūd-i khārijī) of a known object. However, this view conflicts with his principle of the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd), which posits that mental and external existences occupy distinct existential ranks, making identical quiddities impossible. To resolve this, Sadrā proposes the theory of correspondence of existential realms (tatābuq-i ʿawālim-i wujūdī), arguing that the quiddity of external existence is identical to that of mental existence, and their correspondence arises from the identity of their higher and specific existences. This article argues that while Sadrā clearly explains the identity of quiddity, his theory of existential correspondence fails to resolve the inconsistency. For true knowledge of an external object, the mental form must distinguish it from other objects in a conditioned (bi sharṭ-i lā) manner, not merely through indeterminate, unconditioned (lā bi sharṭ) knowledge of its qualities. Thus, knowing an object’s qualities abstractly does not equate to knowing the object itself, as distinguishing it requires specific, conditioned knowledge, undermining Sadrā’s resolution of the conflict between his theories.

Intentionality, as a fundamental concept in the philosophy of mind, is essential to understanding how mental states are directed toward objects, concepts, or states of affairs. This article examines the theory of intentionality presented by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi, with a focus on his Islamic philosophical framework. The research begins by defining the problem of intentionality, which concerns the nature, possibility, and content determination of mental states. We highlight how Tabatabaʾi’s grounding of intentionality in mental existence and immaterial knowledge provides a distinct perspective compared to contemporary naturalistic approaches. The study employs a qualitative, analytical, and comparative methodology, examining primary texts from Islamic philosophy, including works by Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi, alongside modern Western discussions on intentionality. Through this critical lens, we identify Tabatabaʾi’s key contributions: the essential revelatory character of knowledge, the abstraction process in content determination, and the inseparable connection between mental existence and intentionality. The research findings reveal that while Tabatabaʾi’s model offers a metaphysically robust explanation of intentionality, it encounters significant challenges when evaluated in the context of contemporary cognitive science. Critiques include the lack of empirical testability, potential conceptual ambiguity for modern scholars unfamiliar with Islamic metaphysics, and the absence of a clear mechanistic explanation that aligns with materialist paradigms. Nevertheless, the article underscores the innovative nature of Tabatabaʾi’s approach in bridging classical Islamic thought with modern philosophical discourse. It also suggests potential interdisciplinary dialogues, especially with phenomenological perspectives that similarly emphasize the inherent directedness of consciousness. The findings contribute to a broader understanding of intentionality and open new avenues for future research on the integration of metaphysical and empirical frameworks in the philosophy of mind.