عارف بیژن

This study examines Russia’s strategic culture in West Asia and its implications for bilateral relations with Iran from the post-Soviet period (1991) to recent developments in 2025. Employing a qualitative framework rooted in strategic culture analysis, the research demonstrates that Russia’s approach toward Iran is shaped by pragmatic opportunism, historical experience, and a desire to maintain regional influence without overcommitting militarily. Findings reveal that Moscow engages with Tehran episodically, balancing cooperation against shared threats with strategic caution to preserve flexibility in relations with other regional actors, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Brief episodes such as the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, the Syrian crisis, and the ongoing war in Ukraine illustrate how Russia mediates, condemns actions diplomatically, and selectively coordinates with Iran without offering binding security guarantees. The study identifies a persistent divergence in perceptions: Russia often views Iran as a secondary, conditional partner, whereas Tehran expects collaboration on an equal footing. Despite these differences, mutual interests in regional stability, energy cooperation, and strategic depth create occasions for tactical alignment, particularly under external pressures. Overall, the results demonstrate that the Russia–Iran relationship is conditional, adaptive, and strategically ambiguous, with cooperation shaped less by ideological convergence and more by pragmatic calculations. By situating these interactions within the framework of strategic culture, the study provides a nuanced understanding of the limits and possibilities of Russia–Iran engagement in West Asia, highlighting how historical legacies, geopolitical constraints, and contemporary crises collectively define a partnership that is influential yet inherently fragile.

The South Caucasus region is experiencing crises that have continued for many years. Russia's war with Georgia in 2008 and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) changed the security order in the South Caucasus. Russia has interests as a global player in the South Caucasus region and Kremlin considers it's near abroad as its backyard and exclusive sphere of influence. This article uses a descriptive-analytical method as well as the theory of regional security of Barry Buzan to answer the question of what is Russia's security strategy towards the South Caucasus region. The main hypothesis emphasizes that Russia's strategy in the South Caucasus region is to prevent securitization of the region against its economic and political interests, as well as prevent the influence and presence of NATO, in the region. The results show that in tensions with Georgia, Russia seeks to prevent Western interference and urges them to recognize the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. On the other hand, Russia's foreign policy in the face of the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis is to maintain a balance between the two parties involved, Armenia and Azerbaijan, to cooperate with both countries, and to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by a political solution, not a military one. The purpose of this article is to examine Russia's security strategy in the South Caucasus, with a particular focus on Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis from the beginning of the crisis until 2020. And then it offers specific reasons for the confrontation between Russia and the West, as well as Iran's role in regional security issues.