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In the Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant said that cognition (objective perception) is acquired in the unity of sensibility (the receptivity of the mind to receive empirical representations of things, which yields intuitions) and the understanding (in which concepts – general representations of things – arise), and is mediated by the imagination. Here, it is shown that numbers, either pure or denominate, are cognized in the synthesis of intuition and mathematical concept, and that the phenomenal world of the cognizer is shaped accordingly. Any number can be related to any other number through a general mathematical formula conceived by the cognizer for the purpose. The judgment of the cognizer is manifest in the specifics of the mathematical relationship established between the two numbers in cognition. If the cognized number is the numerical value of a physical constant then in the (consistent) phenomenal world it will always have been of the value found in cognition, which explains why the universe seems to be fine-tuned for life. If the cognized number is the numerical value of a physical variable, then the number will be subject to change in accordance with physical laws. Symmetry is a recurrent feature of the phenomenology. A mathematical formula conceived by the cognizer may also relate, one to one, the numerical values of quantities in one set with the numerical values of quantities of different dimensionality in another set, which suggests that physical laws are human inventions and that causality is a pure concept of the understanding.

Bell’s theorem is based on the assumptions of local causality and measurement independence. The last assumption is identified by many authors as linked to the freedom of choice hypothesis. In this sense the human free will ultimately can ensure the measurement independence assumption. The incomplete experimental conditions for supporting this assumption are known in the literature as “freedom-of-choice loophole” (FOCL). Although there is no consensus among the scientists that the measurement independence is linked to human choices, in a recent paper, published in a prestigious journal, signed by more than a hundred authors, this assumption was seriously taken for the first time in an experiment known as Big Bell Test (Abellán et al. 2018). Using photons, single atoms, atomic ensembles and superconducting devices, this experiment was performed in five continents, and involved twelve laboratories, adopting human choices to close the FOCL. Nevertheless, the possibility of human freedom of choice has been a matter of philosophical debate for more than 2000 years, and there is no consensus among philosophers on this topic. If human choice is not free, this solution would not be sufficient to close FOCL. Therefore, in order to support the basic assumption of this experiment, it is necessary to argue that human choice is indeed free. In this paper, we present a Kantian position on this topic and defend the view that this philosophical position is the best way to ensure that Big Bell Test can in fact close the loophole. 

At the Le Thor Seminar in 1969, Heidegger characterises his thinking as taking the form of what he calls a ‘topology of being’ (Topologie des Seins) and as thereby giving a key role to place (topos, Ort/Ortschaft). Much of my work over the last 25 years has been devoted to exploring how such a topology is indeed present in Heidegger’s thinking, both early and late, and so to showing how place figures in that thinking – to showing, in effect, how the questioning of being is also the thinking of place. The aim here is to provide a summary introduction to the topology that this exploration has aimed at uncovering, but to do so in a way that is focussed on the early work, especially Being and Time. To this end, the discussion proceeds through an explication of the topological elements that are present in the form of key terms and ideas such as facticity, questionability, being-in, existential spatiality, and there-being or Dasein. There is also a brief exploration of the way the term Dasein figures in German philosophical discourse prior to Heidegger in ways that are not only reflected in Heidegger’s early work, but also draw directly upon that term’s topological connotations.

Commentators oft cite the rather grand claim that for Hegel there was no concept of individual personality, subjectivity nor personal autonomy in Ancient Greece. Hegel’s claim is either taken as orthodox and making sense in the Hegelian historical system as a whole and so little discussed; or is flatly ignored as the worst kind of metaphysical obfuscation; a response a little too comfortable for liberal thinkers. Neither reaction is entirely satisfying. Not enough attention has been paid to it, especially for the vast majority of social and political thinkers who would find it at least contentious, so the present paper aims to assert its significance both for Hegelian politics as a whole and to pay enough attention to it in order to make it very difficult for those who find it a contentious statement to continue to ignore it. One wants to ask what it might mean for one’s self-understanding to be so radically different that, as a human being, I understand myself as first and foremost (and perhaps completely) not as a subjective individual. It is conceptually very difficult to be a self-conscious individual -- in even a minimal sense -- without some idea of being an atomic, individual unit. It is the claim of the following argument that a full understanding of this distinction, between ancient and modern self-understandings, would lead to a revision of Hegel’s liberal credentials, though not entirely for liberal reasons.

This article clears a path for employing the affirmative way of interpreting Kant's general theory of religion as a guidepost for twenty-first century religious practitioners. Before attempting such an employment, I correct several misconceptions regarding the affirmative way of interpreting Kant's theory that, if adopted as mainstream, would risk weakening its universal applicability. With this purpose in mind, I consider and respond to a misplaced criticism of my interpretation of Kant's theory of grace, advanced by Douglas McGaughey in 2013. I then assess the current state of a debate that has arisen between several key affirmative interpreters, concerning Kant's reference to the two "experiments" that guide the argument in his Religion. I give special attention to Lawrence Pasternack's 2017 attempt to "dismantle" this whole line of interpretation as one that "may very well not be worth our time." After identifying several serious flaws in Pasternack's argument, I conclude by backing a better alternative developed by Brandon Love. By clearing away two very different sorts of potential roadblocks that could stand in the way of a reader of Kant gaining a fair understanding of the affirmative approach to interpreting his theory of religion, these arguments prepare the way for a concluding attempt to catch a glimpse of how Kant's theory of religious judgment (especially his four guidelines for designing the constitution of a church), if adopted widely by practitioners of various historical religions, could benefit the fractured world we find ourselves in, a quarter of the way through the twenty-first century.

Practical reason is the use of reason to decide how to act and perform in a social reality. When someone deliberates about what to do, one puts all the reasons for the action, and then all the reasons against the action will determine the outcome of the action. In that situation, we can describe that practical action with reason because we will determine reason with the weight of different reasons not on the weighing reasons. In this paper, we analyze that reasons have weight against the theory that weights of reasons have no role in a theory of reasoning, and defend that reasons have weight with the evidence of practical reasons. The aim of this paper is to argue that weight of reasons has a role in the process of reasoning. In every situation of life, we can use have reason and weight of reason according to the practical situation of life.

Kant is usually considered a cold moralist who does not give any importance to feeling and emotions. In this paper I show that Kant has a place for love although he uses this word in different meanings through his work. I will analyze the use and meaning of five different uses of the term love: self-love, practical love, love as affect, love as passion, and sexual love. I show that Kant has a place for love in his theory, in a plurality of shades and meanings, going from the practical love to romantic love. Some of their expressions are meaningful for the moral life, such as practical love, some are not. Kant portrait romantic love as a silly affect, sometimes as a dangerous passion who can even call for medication. And about sex, he claims that it is nothing but the use of the other as a means, which may obtain a higher juridical status if this use is reciprocal, in the case of marriage.

This paper corrects a historical injustice that has been perpetrated against Kant for some time now. Mostly on good grounds, Kantian ethics has been accused of neglecting the role played by the emotions in moral deliberation and in morally informed action. However, the contemporary moral philosophers who have put forth such a claim tend to bypass textual sources, on the one hand, and to downplay the role played by the anthropological writings on Kant’s practical philosophy as a whole, on the other. Relying on highly relevant pre-critical texts in which Kant sketches future argumentative patterns and discusses the role of a negative emotion like shame on the improvement of the human species, I address a mistaken conclusion about Kantian ethics as a whole that is common in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. I also raise paradoxical conclusions that follow from Kant’s argument, once its implicit premises have been brought to light. I conclude that Kant did indeed think seriously about a so-called ‘shame-instinct’, however much his central ideas diverge from contemporary readings of the emotion, and fall short of fulfilling the ultimate target one can assume his insights would be drawing at