philosophy of science

Reflections on the contrast between the titles of Popper’s Objective Knowledge and Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge led Haack to explore how Polanyi’s ideas might be used to correct some of the distortions caused by Popper’s refusal to allow any role in epistemology to the knowing subject, and thus to throw light on such questions as the relations between the knower and the known, between epistemology and psychology and sociology of knowledge, and between subjectivity and objectivity.

This study proposes an approach to physics education grounded in Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science, aiming to achieve a balanced integration between critique-oriented and framework-oriented pedagogical models. The paper begins by critically examining the prevailing emphasis on critical thinking in science education—particularly within physics—and seeks to deconstruct some of its underlying assumptions. Conversely, it explores the framework-oriented approach, often associated with traditional, transmission-focused models of teaching. Drawing on Kuhn’s conceptualization of paradigms and research traditions, the study develops an alternative framework that synthesizes the reflective rigor of critique-oriented education with the structural coherence of framework-oriented methods. Ultimately, the paper challenges certain idealized claims advocating for the complete elimination of preconceptions and paradigms, arguing that, from a philosophical standpoint, such claims are both impractical and inconsistent with the nature of scientific inquiry.

Clinical reasoning lies at the heart of medical practice, yet its teaching remains one of the most conceptually complex challenges in medical education. Contemporary approaches, largely informed by cognitive science, have illuminated the mental mechanisms underlying diagnosis but have simultaneously reduced reasoning to an individual, decontextualized act of information processing. This reduction has led to a subtle yet pervasive dehumanization of clinical reasoning, obscuring its social, embodied, and interpretive dimensions. This paper argues that a comprehensive understanding of clinical reasoning requires a philosophical reframing that integrates insights from the philosophy of science, medicine, and technology, i.e. TRI-P model. In this sense, Medicine is best understood as a scientific practice realized through the mediation of technology, yet always oriented toward its ultimate telos: the care and healing of the patient. Through this synthesis, the study shows that reasoning in medicine is not a neutral cognitive operation but an interpretive, dialogical, and technologically mediated form of human understanding. Accordingly, a rehumanized pedagogy—grounded in epistemic pluralism, dialogical humanism, and critical technological literacy—is essential for cultivating responsible clinical judgment. From this perspective, clinical reasoning cannot be captured by cognitive models alone but must be reframed as phronesis: a form of practical wisdom enacted in moral and interpretive contexts. Drawing on Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy and Kenneth Sharpe’s conception of phronetic practice, the paper situates clinical reasoning as an embodied, dialogical, and ethically responsive activity. It concludes that medical education should nurture reflective judgment and moral discernment rather than mere analytical accuracy.

Kant’s philosophy of science has been applied to quantum physics since the time when Niels Bohr formulated his interpretation of quantum physics. In recent years various Kantian interpretations of quantum physics have been put forward. One aspect that still needs further exploration is what a Kantian approach to the epistemic status of quantum entities would entail. In this paper a new kind of judgment consistent with Kant’s system, called a transcendental judgment, able to account for the real existence of quantum entities in the pre-measurement phase is discussed. The advantage of this kind of judgment is that it allows for a fine-tuning of the Kantian system to account for the discovery of quantum entities that are known to exist but whose existence can epistemologically not be accounted for in traditional Kantian philosophy. With this new kind of judgment, a wider range of possible judgments becomes available which can determine the epistemological status of concepts/ideas/theories quite carefully, discriminating between different kinds of knowledge claims.