Kuhn

This paper advocates a realist position with respect to science and common sense. It considers the question of whether science provides knowledge of reality. It presents a positive response to that question. It rejects the anti-realist claim that we are unable to acquire knowledge of reality in favour of the realist view that science yields knowledge of the external world. But it remains to be specified just what world that is. Some argue that science leads to the rejection of our commonsense view of the world. If so, the world about which science informs us is not the world of common sense. Common sense is “stone-age metaphysics”. It is false theory inherited from our primitive ancestors that is to be eliminated in favour of science. Against such an elimination of common sense, it is argued that science both preserves and explains our commonsense experience of the world. Science may well lead to the overthrow of some of our most deeply held beliefs. But common sense reflects a more basic and durable level of experience. Commonsense beliefs are well-confirmed beliefs that are vindicated by their role in successful practical action each and every day. Common sense provides a firm basis on which to base a realist philosophy of science.

This study proposes an approach to physics education grounded in Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science, aiming to achieve a balanced integration between critique-oriented and framework-oriented pedagogical models. The paper begins by critically examining the prevailing emphasis on critical thinking in science education—particularly within physics—and seeks to deconstruct some of its underlying assumptions. Conversely, it explores the framework-oriented approach, often associated with traditional, transmission-focused models of teaching. Drawing on Kuhn’s conceptualization of paradigms and research traditions, the study develops an alternative framework that synthesizes the reflective rigor of critique-oriented education with the structural coherence of framework-oriented methods. Ultimately, the paper challenges certain idealized claims advocating for the complete elimination of preconceptions and paradigms, arguing that, from a philosophical standpoint, such claims are both impractical and inconsistent with the nature of scientific inquiry.