determinism

In each one of the well-known Abrahamic religions, notably Islam, Christianity and Judaism, there are two important doctrines which seem to be inconsistent, but nonetheless some religious philosophers like Plantinga try to show that there is no conflict between them. The first doctrine is that God is Omniscient and He has foreknowledge of all that will happen in the future and thus all human actions are determined in His knowledge. The second doctrine is that human beings have free will and they are responsible for all of their voluntary actions. The problem is that if all future actions of a person are determined in divine knowledge, it is impossible for him to change his future and so he is not free. This article will assess some of the solutions given to the problem and it will focus on Plantinga's solution to the problem and then it will unravel some defects of his solution. At the end of this article, a new solution to the problem will be given, in which the free will of human being is confirmed while the nature of divine knowledge is regarded ambiguous to the extent that its changeability or unchangeability is left unknown.

Questions about the metaphysics of causation may be usefully divided into questions about the objects that are causally related, and questions about the causal relations themselves. For instance, is causation merely a physical concept? What is the connection between causation and probability? According to Wesley Salmon, an analysis of causation in terms of physical and causal relations of propensity is possible. But he replaces the notion of necessity with what he calls propensity. This approach to causality is consistent with a probabilistic approach. Another approach would be to reduce such relations to the physical causation. These questions should be resolved. As it turns out, in order to resolve these fundamental and metaphysical disputes, we can turn to a concept of causation that has been discussed within the Islamic philosophy. This approach treats causality as a rational and philosophical notion, and, in contrast to the probabilistic approach, it retains the necessity of causal relations.

When studying Henri Bergson's works, one can understand that as he proceeds from theoretical philosophy to applied philosophy, he criticizes deterministic view in favor of freedom and establishes foundations of this attitude. He is of the view that by obtaining true knowledge, we would achieve practical purposes including dynamic religion, open society and, more importantly, freedom. Bergson establishes his epistemological and metaphysical foundations in a way that he provides an appropriate base for the realization of freedom in open society. This study attempts to interpret Bergson's idea about freedom in light of his dualistic system, and by referring to the place of freedom within the dualistic system, it also attempts to explain Bergson's conception of freedom and show how and why freedom would be realized. Furthermore, this paper seeks to show that freedom would be realized by disregarding the wrong parts of Bergson's dualism in relation to dynamic religion, with the help of intuitive knowledge which takes duration into account and in an open society, while closed society, static religion and the epistemological attitude which rely on intelligence and have a spatial approach to time would hinder the occurrence of freedom. Thus the cognitive basis of conceiving free will is considered in the light of a dualistic approach in which the positive side (life) realizes the freedom, while the negative side (matter) causes determinism.

For a half - century, I have been developing a view of free will that is incompatible with determinism and, in the process, attempting to answer the Intelligibility Question about such a free will: Can one make sense of an incompatibilist or libertarian free will without reducing it to mere chance, or mystery, and can such a free will be reconciled with modern views of the cosmos and human beings? In this paper, I discuss recent refinements to my earlier writings on such a view, refinements developed in recent years in response to the large critical literature on my views in the past several decades. My view has usually been designated an event-causal (EC) view of libertarian free will and distinguished from non-causal (NC) and agent-causal (AC) libertarian views. But I was never happy with this designation of my view as “event-causal” and did not use it myself in earlier writings. In this paper, I explain why I now reject it altogether. I have come to believe that to avoid numerous misunderstandings in current debates about free will, we must distinguish four different kinds of libertarian theories, not merely three: in addition to non-causal (NC), agent-causal (AC), and event-causal (EC) theories, we need to add a fourth kind, which might be called an agent-causal/event-causal (AC/EC) theory. My view has always been of this fourth kind. It represents what I call in the title of this paper the “fourth way forward” for making sense of an incompatibilist free will.

My objective in this article is to question whether the problem of free will can, within our current conceptual system, be framed coherently. It is already widely recognized that a mental faculty, the will, needed to initiate action, no longer fits with current thought. However, we can still ask whether human decisions and actions are determined by something other than the agent. So the important question is whether we still have a cogent concept of determinism . The two prevalent alternatives are a closed set of deterministic laws of nature, and a simple distillation of the principle of sufficient reason: all events must have a cause. I first provide examples showing that philosophical concepts come and go as categorial frameworks change. The modern concept of deterministic laws of nature was developed during the latter half of the modern period and is now being called seriously into question. G. W. Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason could only be justified in theological terms, which most contemporary Western scholars reject. I end with an inadequate account of a dawning worldview based on complex adaptive systems theory, in which most human actions are best described in terms of non-necessitating propensities .

The principle of alternate possibilities ( PAP ) says that you are morally praiseworthy or blameworthy for something you do only if you could have done otherwise. Frankfurt examples are putative counterexamples to PAP. These examples feature a failsafe mechanism that ensures that some agent cannot refrain from doing what she does without intervening in how she conducts herself, thereby supposedly sustaining the upshot that she is responsible for her behavior despite not being able to do otherwise. I introduce a Frankfurt example in which the agent who could not have done otherwise is God. Paying attention to the freedom requirements of moral obligation, the example is commissioned, first, to assess whether various states of affairs that are unavoidable for God can be obligatory for God and for which God can be praiseworthy. The example is, next, used to unearth problems with conventional Frankfurt examples that feature human agents. I argue that conceptual connections between responsibility and obligation cast suspicion on these examples. Pertinent lessons that the divine Frankfurt example helps to reveal motivate the view that divine foreknowledge and determinism, assuming that both preclude freedom to do otherwise, may well imperil obligation and responsibility.

One of the most important and most discussed problems of traditional and contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of science is the problem of causality. The problem has generated a lot of controversies and debates from scholars. One clear point amidst these discussions on the causality problem is that the last has neither been written nor heard. It remains an open-ended issue for philosophical consideration. The causation problem itself is not just a problem but a cluster of problems with puzzling questions such as; how do causes bring about their effects? Our concern in this paper is not to examine all the problems that are embedded in the relationship between cause and effect, but to focus on the metaphysical problem of how cause, conceived as a separate event is related or connected to the effect. Several theories have been postulated by Western scholars like Aristotle, Spinoza, Hume, Hempel, Russell, Kant, Mill, among others to explain the kind of causal connection obtainable between causes and effects. Some of these theories of causation are traditional view or common sense view, Humean, and the host of others. It is a fact that some of these theories have failed in proffering a philosophical solution to the traditional causation problem. In an attempt to further reflect on the traditional causation problem, this paper undertakes an exposition of the nature of causality, determinism, freedom and predestination in traditional African thought with the aim of proffering better explanation towards resolving the traditional causation problem.

The present article seeks to read Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles and Sadeq Chubak’s Puppetry (Kheymeh-Shab-Bazi in Persian) in order to demonstrate their similar treatment of both ‘the natural’ and the fate of human beings when positioned in contrast with the natural. Hardy and Chubak, despite belonging to distinctive contexts, were both under the influence of the premises of Naturalism. The present paper aims to explore these two works of fiction in order to compare the way both authors employed the Naturalist literary trend in their style of writing, characterization, and perspective. Both authors employed an objective viewpoint, pretty similar to how scientists approach their object of study; they kept their distance from their narrations, with no particular effort to interfere in or to comment on the occurrences of such narrations. This research focuses on how, through utilizing Naturalistic principles, they endeavored to expose the quivering position of human beings when exposed to the powerful impacts of the natural. The study focuses on their similar approaches towards apparently dissimilar issues which, despite the considerable discrepancy concerning the socio-cultural contexts of their works, lurked below the surface of the fiction they produced.  

The main aim of this article, which is to express the essence of duʼa, starts with a question: what is duʼa, and doesn't it constitute a gap in the system of causality and rational structure of the creation of the world? A definition of the essence of duʼa and its dynamics is given through the presentation of the essential basis of the creation of the world according to some Quranic verses, as well as Islamic speculative Gnosticism according to which the world is based on desire and demand (talab). On this basis, the ontological status of duʼa and the fact that it does not contradict God's wisdom is underlined. The second part of the study is based on an interpretation of a Quranic verse according to which the reality of duʼa is made possible only thanks to God and through His creation of an innate divine human nature, which naturally searches its God and addresses its demands to Him. From this point of view, the special status of man in respect to all the other creatures who, through his supplications, is responsible of defining his ontological status in this world and the hereafter, is also presented