Muslims

According to some researchers (Hopkins, 2004a; Hopkins & Smith, 2008), there is a perception among certain Muslims that anti-Muslim racism is higher in areas where there is a high density of Muslim residents, such as Glasgow. In contrast, other Muslims may feel that Islamophobia is higher in places with fewer numbers of Muslim residents. Through an investigation of Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia in major Scottish cities, this paper discusses the influence of the size of Muslim communities in experiencing Islamophobia[1]. It also examines the importance of other possible factors, such as socio-economic status and deprivation on Islamophobia. To this end, the experience and accounts of 33 Muslim participants in major Scottish cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Dundee) were documented and analyzed through qualitative methods. The findings of this paper suggest that Muslims’ individual and social aspects of life play a more important role on Islamophobia, as opposed to the size of their population in a certain area. More precisely, the analysis of Muslims who experienced Islamophobia suggests that Muslims’ identity and visibility, especially racial and religious signifiers such as skin color, beard or hijab, were crucial to their experiences of Islamophobia. [1]. This is compared, in another research (Author, 2015), to the experiences of 10 Muslim participants in small Scottish cities and towns (Falkirk, Dunfermline, East Kilbride and Stirling) where that the number of Muslims living in those areas is less than one percent of the local population (National Records of Scotland, 2013).

Existing evidence seems to indicate that Muslims in Scotland have constructed hyphenated or hybrid identities that draw on religion, ethnicity and nationality. However, minor attention has been given to the differences in importance, meanings, and strengths of these identities, or the significance of their identity markers. Ethnic minority people can be identified with both their ethnic groups and their country of residence; each identity can be either strong or weak, or identification with both can be high. The extent and degree of identification with specific identity markers (such as ethnicity, nationality or religion) can be varied and subjected to difference. This paper discusses the importance, meaning, and strength of these markers in Muslims’ identity negotiation in Scotland through an analysis of the importance of ethnicity, religion and nation. Drawing on a study based on twenty-seven semi-structured and qualitative interviews carried out in 2011 with second-generation[1] Muslims across Scotland’s major cities and small towns, this research suggests the importance of social imposition (labelling behaviour and mis-recognition), family education and cultural ties in varying the meanings and the strength of  second-generation Muslims’ national and ethnic identities in Scotland. In addition, this paper  highlights the significance of various levels of religiosity in differentiating the meanings and strength of participants’ religious identities. [1] In this paper, ‘first generations’ are those Muslims who were born outside the UK and immigrated to UK and the term ‘second generation’ refers to those Muslims who were born in the UK to non-native parents.

Since the 9/11 bombings in New York, and the 7/7 bombings in London, Muslims’ integration in the UK has been under intense scrutiny. Muslim integration, however, has long been a matter of debate in Britain, revolving around the maintenance of Muslims’ distinctive identity and practice. For instance, David Cameron (Cameron, 2011), Britain’s then Prime Minister, announced at the Munich Security Conference that “state multiculturalism” has encouraged “different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream”. In criticizing multiculturalism, most critics mainly refer to Muslims as being less integrated into wider society than people from other minority groups, and Muslims are shown to be disloyal. The complexity of Muslims’ integration and its dependency on different social, structural and cultural factors are, however, mostly less studied. This paper is designed to understand the social and cultural barriers to Muslim integration. In doing so, it aims to explore Muslims’ integrational strategies to deal with these barriers. Findings of this paper draw on research that involved 43 semi-structured interviews with Muslims across Scotland’s major cities and small towns.

The European countries have adopted a particular policy and manner to conflict with Muslims in their countries. These policies are classified into three behavioral patterns of British, German, and French. The British model is cultural pluralism, the German is Muslims’ integration in German society, and the French are melting melt pot. In their belief, Muslims must be dissolved in French culture and eliminated their religious identity. Other European countries follow one of these three models. The present study aimed to answer the following questions: ‘What effect have these strategies and patterns had on the living conditions of Muslims and the whole society of that country?’ ‘Were the approaches a plan or practical?’ ‘Which policies have been more successful quickly or strictly in confronting Islamic extremism (Takfiri terrorism) and Secular extremism (European terrorism)?’ ‘What was the practical result of these approaches in the Western European countries' social and security conditions?’

Charles Taliaferro’s “Philosophy of Mind and the Christian” begins with a loaded question: “Are we thoroughly physical beings, or do we contain some nonphysical part, something we may call a soul, spirit, or mind?” The question presents us with a false dilemma, for there is also the possibility that we are neither merely material beings nor do we contain a soul as a nonphysical part of us. Taliaferro follows this with a list of other questions pertaining to the philosophy of mind and asks whether Christians should give answers to these sorts of questions that differ from non-Christian colleagues. It seems odd to divide colleagues based on Christianity with regard to these questions, for it means that if the Christian colleagues do have a particular take on these issues, it will be different from that of non-Christian theistic colleagues. Perhaps, however, Taliaferro’s department consists only of Christians and atheists. In this case, however, Taliaferro seems to think that there will be a uniformity in Christian thought that seems somewhat doubtful.

Background: Research shows that there is a relationship between religion and spirituality with social behavior and mental health. Among the different religions, Muslims have the largest number in the world. Muslims pray five times a day. Aim: The purpose of this study was to review previous findings on the effect of Salat (Muslim prayer) on the mental and psychological health of people. Materials and Methods: More than 50 articles were reviewed and finally the most relevant articles were separated and analyzed. Results: The results indicate that there is a direct relationship between Salat and increasing the desire to live, hope, endurance of hardship, feeling happy and happiness, hope for recovery in patients. Also, prayer has an inverse relationship with anxiety and depression, despair, despair, dissatisfaction with life, discomfort with illness and problems. Conclusion: According to these findings, doctors and researchers in the health sector are expected to conduct new studies without religious and belief bias in order to understand and improve the mental and psychological conditions of patients, so that the mechanisms involved in these positive effects are revealed and possibly insight new in the process of improving people's mental and psychological conditions.

The investigation into the factors that led elites and experts to choose a different path for selecting a ruler after the demise of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH), disregarding his directives, and the subsequent compliance of the people with them, is the primary focus of this research. The present study aims to uncover the factors that shaped the transformations at the time of the passing of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH). Utilizing historical data and a descriptive-analytical method, it examines and evaluates the cultural life of Arabs in the context of selecting a tribal chief and their customs and traditions in this selection process. According to its findings, considering the large number of newly converted Muslims at the time of the Prophet's (PBUH) passing and the absence of a centralized inter-tribal government prior to his rule in Hijaz, the prevailing beliefs among Arabs in selecting a tribal chief-such as the disregard for the explicit instructions of the previous chief and the appointment of a ruler based on material criteria like physical appearance, age, etc.-are evident. Furthermore, if the Prophet (PBUH) issued a directive that did not align with the preferences of certain companions or was beyond their limited understanding, they would openly or covertly oppose it. The discourse of the elites and experts present at the Saqifah Bani Sa'ida in determining the successor to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) can be evaluated in this context.