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۶۹

چکیده

بازار بورس که بیشتر ویترین اقتصادی ایران شناخته می شود، باید نماد شفافیت، اعتماد و کارایی باشد؛ بااین حال در سال های اخیر، ادراک کنشگران از فساد در این بازار به طور چشمگیری افزایش یافته است. این مطالعه کیفی با هدف بررسی ادراک کنشگران از فساد در بورس تهران صورت گرفت. داده ها ازطریق نمونه گیری هدفمند و مصاحبه های نیمه ساختاریافته با 28 نفر از کنشگران فعال، سرمایه گذاران و کارشناسان بورس تهران، جمع آوری و با شیوه تحلیل تماتیک، تحلیل شدند. در این تحقیق سه مقوله اصلی شامل بازار آنومیک (رانت اطلاعاتی، قانون شکنی، تبانی، دستکاری بازار، ظاهرسازی گمراه کننده)، فساد نهادی (ضعف ساختاری-نظارتی، سوء استفاده و تعارض منافع) و فساد مافیایی (فساد آشکار، فساد پیش رونده) استخراج شد. تحقیق حاضر نشان داد که کنشگران، بازار را همچون ویترینی شکسته و ناکارآمد می دانند که به سبب انواع فساد، تنها برخی افراد شانس موفقیت دارند؛ بنابراین، سیاست گذاری های مناسب برای کاهش و کنترل این فساد تأثیر بسزایی بر ارتقای بازنمایی بازار به عنوان نمادی از اقتصاد ایران خواهد داشت.

Broken Showcase: Activists' Perceptions of Corruption in the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE)

Introduction The Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE), once celebrated as a hallmark of Iran's economic modernization and a crucial capital market, has recently become emblematic of growing distrust and perceived systemic corruption. While state media previously hailed the TSE as the "showcase of the Iranian economy", many stakeholders now refer to it as a "broken showcase", highlighting its issues with opacity, manipulation, and insider control. This study sought to fill a significant gap in the sociological understanding of financial corruption by examining how key market participants perceived and interpreted corruption within the Iranian stock market. The primary objective was to uncover the social and institutional mechanisms that contributed to the prevalent perception of corruption in the TSE.     Materials & Methods This study employed a qualitative methodology, utilizing thematic analysis to explore how market participants understood and articulated corruption. Data were collected through 28 in-depth semi-structured interviews with a purposive and snowball sample of investors, analysts, brokers, and financial experts, all of whom possessed at least 5 years of experience in the TSE. Data analysis was conducted using MAXQDA software following Braun and Clarke’s 6-step thematic analysis framework. To enhance the validity of the findings, the study incorporated triangulation, member checking, memo writing, and peer debriefing.The theoretical framework was grounded in 4 key perspectives:North’s Institutional Theory (1990): Emphasizing the role of formal and informal institutions in facilitating or hindering corruptionBecker’s Rational Choice Theory (1968): Explaining corrupt behavior as the result of a cost-benefit analysisParsons’ Social Systems Theory (1951): Linking corruption to a breakdown in normative integration and role performancePutnam’s Social Capital Theory (1993): Connecting declining trust to the rise in perceived corruption  Discussion of Results & Conclusion Three major themes emerged from the data:a) Anomic Market ConditionsParticipants reported experiences of widespread rule-breaking, price manipulation, media misrepresentation, and insider trading. Many described the TSE as a "rigged game" or "casino" where outcomes were dictated not by skill or analysis, but by proximity to power and access to privileged information. This erosion of equal opportunity in information access had led to significant frustration among retail investors. b) Institutional CorruptionRespondents highlighted the failure of regulatory bodies, such as the Securities and Exchange Organization (SEO), to prevent or address corruption. Structural weaknesses, lack of transparency, and conflicts of interest were identified as systemic issues. Supervisory institutions were often perceived not as neutral overseers, but as entities captured by political or economic elites.c) Mafia-Style CorruptionMany participants characterized corruption as organized and hierarchical rather than incidental. This included allegations of collusion among large shareholders, brokers, and regulators with outcomes often pre-arranged behind the scenes. Terms like “mafiosi”, “corrupt networks”, and “engineered losses” were frequently mentioned.These perceptions reflected a broader erosion of social and institutional trust. For many investors, especially those, who had suffered significant losses during the 2020 market crash, the stock exchange had ceased to be a viable or safe investment option. Instead, it was seen as a domain that perpetuated inequality and injustice.This study concluded that perceived corruption in the TSE could not be reduced to isolated incidents; it was deeply embedded in a broader institutional and cultural context. Rebuilding trust in the Iranian capital market required systemic reforms, including independence of oversight bodies, enhancement of transparency mechanisms, enforcement of accountability, and cultivation of ethical norms. Without addressing these foundational issues, the TSE will continue to exist as a space of exclusion and resentment rather than a catalyst for national economic development.

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