حکیمه سقای بی ریا

As a theoretical treatise, the present article brings to light the applicability of constructivism to the study of think tanks as ideational agents actively participating in the construction of ideational structures that constitute American identity, interests, and policies. It is argued that when discussing think tanks’ production of expertise and policy advice on U.S. relations with the Muslim world, American exceptionalism and Orientalism operate as two interconnected ideational structures influencing the process. Based on a constructivist framework, an investigation into the role of think tanks in U.S. foreign policy should not begin at the final stage of policy formation; rather, it is necessary to look into how think tanks influence the process of policy making at the ideational level. As such, the characteristics of U.S. foreign policy toward the Muslim world will remain unchanged as long as there is an ideational commitment to the creed of American exceptionalism; that is to say, as long as American exceptionalism constitutes American identity, American interest, and thus American foreign policy behavior toward the Muslim world. Think tanks, as the special focal points at the intersection of the political realm, the academia, and the media, serve as the hubs of American exceptionalism and Orientalism. As long as this dual creed is continually reproduced in the think tank world, it is logical to conclude that no change is in sight with regard to U.S. foreign policy and American unilateral interventionism in the Muslim world. A break with American exceptionalism and Orientalism in the think tank world, in turn, would signal the beginning of a new era in the operation of American foreign policy.

In this historical analysis of US foreign policy toward Iran during the presidency of George W. Bush, the author aims to decipher the overarching policy approach guiding United States' Iran policy in the context of the main issues arising during this time period. George W. Bush started his presidency with the legacy of past presidents, viewing Iran as a threat to US interests and drawing from the policy tool box that had been developed during the previous four administrations. In this paper, the implementation of these different policy approaches will be discussed in the context of the events of September 11, the Afghanistan and the Iraq wars, and the nuclear issue. Engagement, containment, and covert and overt means of destabilizing the Islamic Republic of Iran will be discussed. The roots of many of the current issues in U.S. -Iran relations as well as the tactics used to tackle them could be traced to the period under study. In the years after the presidency of George W. Bush and despite the different tactics used, this mentality has led presidents as diverse as Obama and Trump to suffer from the same strategic mistake: an instrumental approach to Iran. The failure of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to withstand the transfer of power in the United States shows how the American practice of the weaponization of all available means to deal with Iran, including diplomacy and economic tools, is jeopardizing any real hope for a different direction in US-Iran relations.