existence

La parution du premier roman de J.M.G. Le Clézio, <em>Le Procès-verbal</em>, en 1963, synchronise avec l’épanouissement de la littérature postmoderne où la dimension ontologique devient prépondérante. Ce roman de Le Clézio fait écho à ce contexte littéraire, en incarnant cette particularité à travers le processus cognitif de son protagoniste cherchant à trouver sa position propre dans le monde. Dans cet article, afin de savoir comment le personnage leclézien vit l’existence dans le sens philosophique du terme, nous tenterons d’explorer la portée ontologique de cet ouvrage. Pour ce faire, dans un premier temps, nous considérerons le protagoniste dans son faisceau de relations avec le monde, ce qui nous amènera à étudier ses interactions d’ordre intellectuel, émotionnel et social avec ce dernier. Cet examen nous révèlerait les moyens de connaissance de l’être adoptés par le personnage. Dans un second temps, nous nous pencherons de plus près sur les modalités de la prise de conscience ontologique du protagoniste. Cette étude nous permettrait de mieux connaître la perception de l’auteur de l’être humain et de son statut dans le monde.

About whether Islamic philosophy can play a role in the production of humanities? There is a continuum of ideas that, on the one hand, are ideas that have neglected the role of Islamic philosophy in general. And on the other hand, there are ideas that incor-porate the teachings of Islamic philosophy into paradigmatic elements for the produc-tion of a new type of human science. In the meantime, the ideas emphasize the distinc-tive features of transcendental wisdom, such as the doctrine of the originality of exis-tence, the unity of existence, the imposition of existence and the essential movement among other branches of Islamic philosophy. But acknowledging the role of transcen-dental wisdom in directing humanities, it is clear that the teachings of transcendental wisdom do not directly relate to the humanities. The purpose of this paper is to show how the teachings of transcendental wisdom can influence the science of politics. The claim of this writing is that the teachings of transcendental wisdom constitute a series of philosophical models that, through the transposition of the teachings of transcendental wisdom and political science, make it possible for political science to benefit from tran-scendental wisdom. Examine the present claim through reference to the works of tran-scendental wisdom, and it becomes clear that the teachings of the transcendental wis-dom create philosophical patterns that, in turn, are used as the philosophical foundations of political science. The most important result of this article is the possibility of estab-lishing a science of politics based on the teachings of Transcendent Philosophy. The significance of this achievement for humanities can be used as a structural element in establishing a native paradigm in the humanities.

The notion of "H11ma11 Rights" encompass the two notions of "man" and "right" and the relationship between them. This relationship, boiueoer; pertains to much of theoretical as well as philosophical elaboration. Looking critical!J al the prevailing conception of this relationship, name!J that ofpossessive individualism, this paper points to a different conception for such relationsbip. Using the two metaphors of "Red Reason" and "Green Rights", a theo!y qf "human rights" is elaborated according to an i!lmninationist (Eshraghi) conception of "man" and an emancipatory conception qf 111ight".

Recognizing the link between “Cognition" and "Architectural Creation” indicates that there is a relation between subject and object. Correct understanding of this relationship helps artistic creativity, especially in the architecture, to take steps towards proving truth that have caused works to be continued over the past times. Knowledge and cognitions in architecture are categories that today theory of which have been neglected to be explained. Failure to comply with epistemology1, i.e. incorrect epistemology, has resulted to subjective ideas which are emerged in the framework of ideologies expressed in architecture, as a form inconsistent with national and Islamic identity. So that once more, the ideas resulting from perception of the created works, with replacement of concepts and ideas instead of principles and truth of work, tend to reject previous cognition and suggest new cognition-based theories which not only will not lead to integration in works creation but it will be one step away from reality. This process continues until now, due to lack of understanding about the origins of the crisis, the trend is adopted as an individualistic process and art knowledge is juxtaposed with artistic taste. This study is an attempt to review and recognize the role of knowledge in the past process of Islamic architecture in Iran with an analytical- interpretation approach in order to show the role of knowledge in the circle of creation and understanding of architecture as causes of inefficient contemporary theories put forward in this area, by exploring a philosophy of cognition.

The idea of “ creatio ex nihilo ” entered the arena of natural science with the advent of modern cosmology in the mid-twentieth century. This idea, that is, the creation of the universe out of nothing, seems to be a consequence of the widely accepted Big Bang Theory which implies the temporal finitude of the world. In order to avoid the theological and metaphysical implications of such an idea, some scenarios and scientific models have been proposed. According to one of the scenarios, the creation ex nihilo of the world is a causal physical phenomenon, and, hence, can be explained scientifically by appealing to the laws of nature.In this essay, I aim to discuss and criticize this idea.To fulfill this aim, in the introduction some achievements of modern cosmology will be very briefly introduced. In the next three sections, the notions of existence and nothingness, creation,scientific explanation, and singularity will be explored.It will be shown that what philosophers mean by these notions isradically different fromthe naïve ideas of some scientists. Hence, applying these notions to physical models of the origin of the universe is completely misleading.This work concludes that no scientific explanation appealing to the laws of nature can possibly explainthe creation of the universe out of nothing.

With a rational reflection on possible beings, Farabi presents an analysis of the relationship between existence and essence, which requires a new philosophical system distinct from Greek philosophy. In his view, all possible beings are composed of two metaphysical aspects, i.e. existence and essence. By distinguishing constituents (muqawwamāt) from accidental things (‘araḍiyyāt) and using terms such as ‘āriḍ and lāzim, Farabi explores the structure of possible beings. In possible beings, existence is not the same or a part of essence; rather, it is an accident of essence, and since any accidental thing is subject to causality (mu‘allal), thus the possible things require something out of themselves for their existence. The main point is that the container of this distinction is not merely the world of the mind or the objective world; rather, it is the product of rational analysis. In other words, the distinction of existence and essence is neither a mental distinction nor a physical one; rather, it is a rational distinction which is called, in today’s metaphysics, metaphysical distinction. In metaphysical distinction, the existence and essence of the possible beings are two ontological principles and two metaphysical modes of the being that compose its identity. The metaphysical distinction designs the foundation of the non-Greek philosophical system based on which one can explain, from the theological viewpoint, proving the existence of the Necessary Being, the evolution of the ultimate causality, natural agency with the agentive causality and divine agency; from the cosmological viewpoint, proving the essential contingency of the universe and the philosophical explanation of the creation; from the ontological viewpoint, dividing beings into necessary and possible, and explaining the structure of possible beings; and from the epistemological viewpoint, evolution in dividing knowledge. This article is an applied study that attempts, by relying on the descriptive-analytical method with an exploration of the metaphysical distinction between existence and essence, to deal with applying that distinction in Farabi’s philosophical system and its products and results.

Continuing the path of Neo-Platonic philosophers and Farabi, while accepting the framework of the Greek thought in reaching the truth of the beings in the universe through the rational knowledge in the framework of Aristotelian logics, Avicenna has attempted to present a certain interpretation of some fundamental concepts of the Greek thought and offer a metaphysics with quite rational and argumentative results as well as a rational interpretation for some of the principal concepts of the Quranic thought in the Islamic world, a metaphysics that can be called the essential Greek-Islamic rational system. The present article attempts to use an analytical-explanatory method to prove that, firstly, Avicenna accepts the Greek rational thinking method in reaching the truth of the beings, calling it the certitude wisdom and knowledge. And – in line with Aristotle – he introduces the man’s sensory faculty as the starting point for the path of acquiring certitude knowledge, through which he reaches the rational knowledge of the beings. Secondly, it states the most important axes of Avicenna’s philosophy in his legal reasoning reading of principles of Aristotelian thought.