



Transcendent Wisdom Patterns for Political Science ¹

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Abstract:

About whether Islamic philosophy can play a role in the production of humanities? There is a continuum of ideas that, on the one hand, are ideas that have neglected the role of Islamic philosophy in general. And on the other hand, there are ideas that incorporate the teachings of Islamic philosophy into paradigmatic elements for the production of a new type of human science. In the meantime, the ideas emphasize the distinctive features of transcendental wisdom, such as the doctrine of the originality of existence, the unity of existence, the imposition of existence and the essential movement among other branches of Islamic philosophy. But acknowledging the role of transcendental wisdom in directing humanities, it is clear that the teachings of transcendental wisdom do not directly relate to the humanities. The purpose of this paper is to show how the teachings of transcendental wisdom can influence the science of politics. The claim of this writing is that the teachings of transcendental wisdom constitute a series of philosophical models that, through the transposition of the teachings of transcendental wisdom and political science, make it possible for political science to benefit from transcendental wisdom. Examine the present claim through reference to the works of transcendental wisdom, and it becomes clear that the teachings of the transcendental wisdom create philosophical patterns that, in turn, are used as the philosophical foundations of political science. The most important result of this article is the possibility of establishing a science of politics based on the teachings of Transcendent Philosophy. The significance of this achievement for humanities can be used as a structural element in establishing a native paradigm in the humanities.

Keywords: Transcendent Philosophy, Philosophical Patterns, Political Science, Humanities, Native Paradigm, Existence, Existence

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Introduction

The philosophical patterns of political science are the logical models between transcendental wisdom and political knowledge, and with the help of transcendental wisdom, they try to guide politics. (Iman and Kalateh, 2013, 454)

"The entry of philosophical or ideological issues into the level of science requires the elaboration of a logical model for the scientific philosophical presuppositions of science. [...] A model that presupposes science and determines the identity of science [...] as a logical model for introducing the ontological, epistemological, cognitive, and ... sciences that are rooted in philosophy." (Iman and Kalateh, 2013, 453-454)

When this paper discusses the philosophical patterns of political science, This is the logical model that Iman and Kalateh Sadati speaks of; a pattern that includes the basic concepts of science required, such as "the nature of social reality, the nature of man and how to enter into reality and gain knowledge of it." (Iman and Kalateh, 2013, 452) This pattern is the place where the controversial abstract issues of the verdict and the theoretical foundations of science are to be considered in the context of the "theoretical philosophy" and "practical philosophy" for studying it in "Transcendental wisdom." In this way, the science of politics is directly related to the "patterns." Contrary to the many authors of the "civil philosophy", the author claims that philosophical "foundations" have an indirect influence on the science of politics. (Pezeshgi, 2016, 114)

The definition of the philosophical patterns of political science

Mohammad Taqi Imani writes about the role of philosophical patterns of science and its elements:

"Although scientific knowledge is the product of the scientific research process, and its technical and technical characteristics are presented as testamentary in empirical reality, this feature does not address all the questions raised in relation to the logical breakdown of scientific knowledge. The logic of every kind of scientific knowledge and ways to achieve the empirical reality and the accreditation of the discovered knowledge brings us to the bogus complex that we are in need of answering; questions like:

1. is it possible to obtain knowledge of reality (in the general sense) and to acquire scientific knowledge of reality (in a certain sense)? If yes;
2. What is the nature or attribute of this knowledge?
3. What is the nature of the reality we seek to learn from?

These questions address the rationale of scientific knowledge; an issue that cannot be answered just at the level of scientific knowledge. In scientific knowledge, the answer to these questions is assumed, and one who seeks to answer these questions must refer to the foundation upon which scientific knowledge is based. For example, if the mission of scientific knowledge is to be defined as empirical truth, and experience has been introduced with the authenticity of observation, measurement, and testing in relation to this knowledge, it is certain that for this kind of knowledge, the identity is already predetermined. Based on that, it introduces itself to its users. Before this knowledge is produced, the nature of this knowledge and its essence, the nature of what this knowledge refers to in order to gain knowledge, The nature of the path to which this knowledge is learned, as well as the nature of the elements that are present along the path and involved in the

validation of knowledge and ... are specified. The explanation of the coordinates of these cases does not take place in the field of science, because science itself is identified by these coordinates, or, in other words, the existence of each science depends on these cases. Science has an empirical reality, while these were embedded in science. These cases guide the science of how to enter the empirical reality. These cases form a set of guidance for science, in which the nature of reality and how it is acquired from it is determined, so that science does not go astray in recognizing reality and entering it credibly. More precisely, ontological topics, epistemology, methodology, and methodology have been presented before the logical and executive design of scientific processes and the consensus among the scholars has been addressed. So, before science goes to reality. The reality has been identified in another place, and the material has been presented in explaining the existential nature of reality (epistemology), how to produce credible and lasting knowledge of reality (methodology), and how to collect reliable and durable information from it. "(Iman, 2012, 44-45)

This long quotation, on one hand represents the special work of the model rule for political science and explaining its elements on the other. The controversial pattern also determines the nature and definition of "science". Based on what faith says, the main components of a rule pattern for political science include ontology, epistemology, anthropology, methodology, science, and methodology. But are there other elements in political science patterns apart from these?

Iman itself has put some other definitions and elements for the discussed patterns. For example, Newman quotes that the philosophical pattern of science as a system of thought consists of elements that identify fundamen-

tal questions, reveals puzzles, and identifies research techniques based on their basic presuppositions. (Iman, 2013, 452) But Kuhn introduces other elements for science patterns: symbolic generalizations, metaphysical elements, common values of the scientific community, and typical examples. (Kuhn, 2010, 227-228). Finally, Iman recognizes the elements of these patterns as: ontology, epistemology, methodology, and method. (Iman, 2012, 45) As can be seen, the elements in the patterns of speech on the one hand include some philosophical and verbal elements, on the other hand, include technical or scientific elements. This attribute makes faith the patterns of the "connection of philosophy and science" called. (Iman and Kalateh, 2013, 453). Indeed, the controversial patterns contain philosophical and verbal elements, but the level of abstraction is less than "philosophy" and "philosophy". (Iman and Kalateh, 2013, 454), because the elements of the verdict in these patterns also take into account social reality. The belief about this type of template writes that this template:

"While philosophy is trying to respond to ontological and epistemological issues in the domain of subjectivity and abstractions, the paradigm attempts to address the realm of social reality. That is why paradigms attempt to identify their epistemological and methodological approaches in addition to having ontological perspectives such as philosophy. Thus, paradigms try to spread their theoretical umbrella on science and methodology. However, philosophy is not interested in entering the realm of objective reality, but it tries to analyze reality at abstract levels."(Iman and Kalateh, 2013, 454)

This philosophy, though focused on "being" and "knowledge," opens up the perspectives of the discussed patterns. As with science, it maintains its boundary. Because

elements of these patterns attempt to provide an analysis of social reality with the help of "scientific theories". Therefore, the summary of the claim of Iman is that the patterns discussed are on the level between the abstract of the verdict and the empirical fact, which, on the one hand, relies on the doctrines of the law, and on the other hand defines the frameworks for the production of scientific theory. (Iman and Kalateh, 2013, 455) So the two points were revealed with what was said. First, the "science of politics" does not directly relate to "philosophy." It does so through specific patterns, and the second is that these patterns are between philosophy and science. (Iman and Kalateh, 2013, 454-455). Therefore, in order to inquire about these patterns in transcendental wisdom, it is necessary to focus on the sphere of the intersection of "theoretical philosophy" and "practical philosophy" in Islamic philosophy. Because the position of the discussed patterns is at the cross point of these two philosophies. Therefore, the following two points are discussed in the transcendental wisdom.

The difference between the position and the specific nature of the basis of the law and philosophical patterns in science

Given what has been said, the position of the "Transcendental Wisdom" and the philosophical patterns of politics on the one hand, and their differences on the other, are apparent. The explanations of faith clearly show that those transcendental wisdoms that are used as the foundations of political science can form part of the patterns that make it possible to guide and construct the science of politics. In other words, the above problems play a role in the production of political science, but their role in this process is mediated by the role that transcendental wisdom relates to political science through philosophical pat-

terns. Not paying attention to this point has led some writers of transcendental wisdom, such as "political philosophy," to fall into the "political philosophy" of using the "Transcendental Philosophy" issues. The author has already referred to some of these writings. In this series of writings, the authors have introduced issues of transcendental wisdom such as "authenticity of existence," "the network of existence," "the formation of existence," "the unity of existence," the simplicity of existence, "the goodness of existence," the truth of existence, "the unity of the actions," and "the evolutionary and theatrical monotheism" as the foundations of a verdict of issues such as "dignity", "deception", "justice", "freedom", "government", "authority" and "legitimacy". But as is the case with the doctrines of Theoretical Philosophy. From the issues of "theoretical philosophy" one cannot get questions about "practical philosophy" such as "political philosophy." And this problem cannot be solved by separating the transcendental wisdom as the foundations of the "political philosophy". (Pezeshgi, 2016, 115-116) This is true not only of "political philosophy" but also of other branches of transcendental wisdom, such as "the philosophy of political science." Similarly, the role of the "transcendentalist philosophy" as the basis of the science of politics is indirect and indirect, through the "patterns" that are constructive and guiding the science of politics. But further explanation of this requires the expression of the relation between "theoretical philosophy" and "practical philosophy" which is discussed in the discussion.

Theoretical Philosophy as the Source of Philosophical Patterns

As discussed in the first chapter of the present article, there are two completely different ideas about the relation between "theo-

retical philosophy" and "practical philosophy". The first idea of those thinkers is Socrates, on the basis of which "knowledge" and "virtue" are one and these two concepts have logical relations with each other.

Therefore, there is a necessary link between knowledge of a subject and action according to it. While, according to another idea, there is no relationship between the two and knowledge of a subject does not require action on the basis of it, and it is not so that "knowledge" leads to "virtue" itself. (Fanaii Ashkevari, 2011, 10) Among the two ideas above, most Muslim wise men have accepted the second idea and believe that it is impossible to extrapolate from the "theoretical philosophy" the issues of "practical philosophy." (Javadi Amoli, 2008: pp. 119-120). Therefore, the clarification of the relationship between these two forms of philosophy can be a good guide to examining the role of the Transcendental Philosophy in establishing the "political science". Javadi Amoli regards the teachings of "theoretical philosophy" as providing the "foundations" of practical philosophy. This work of "theoretical philosophy" comes from its position in relation to "practical philosophy." Because not only the issues of practical philosophy are not consistent equal with the practical philosophy, but the issues of theoretical philosophy within themselves. For example, some of the issues of very large theoretical philosophy (such as verbiage issues) and some of the other are "divisible" issues (like medical science). For the purposes of dividing issues, propositions such as the proposition that "you are either mentally or externally, or cause or effect" (Javad Amoli, 2008: 118-119). Accordingly, from the philosophical point of view of "philosophy", "theoretical philosophy" will have the status of superiority to "practical philosophy." And the result of this knowledge excel-

lence is to provide the foundation of "practical philosophy," including political science, "theoretical philosophy", and in particular "special philosophy". Javadi writes in this regard:

"Because this [practical philosophy] is the descendant of theoretical philosophy, and it [theoretical philosophy] descends the same [practical philosophy], it must necessarily be inferior. That is, this upper [theoretical philosophy] must provide all the underlying principles [of the practical philosophy], and there is no other way out of it."
(Javadi Amoli, 2008, 121)

In this way, one of the subjects of theoretical philosophy in relation to the practical philosophy is that the problems of the first philosophy are used as the foundation of the second philosophy.

Theoretical philosophy, in addition to being the foundation of practical philosophy, is also the constructor of practical issues of philosophy. Another result of the superiority of theoretical philosophy on the practical philosophy is that philosophy first creates the subject, problem, and space of the subject, problem, and space of the second philosophy. Javadi explains this work as follows:

"Mediation in the presentation of traditions and social rules is the source of differences and differences that arise between different laws. Because the laws that the intellect recognizes or approves is in accordance with the knowledge that it possesses of man and the world. In other words, cosmology, the principle and the legislative subordinate to it, the originality of the universe is to legislate another expression of the confusion of practical philosophy with theoretical philosophy.

The practical philosophy is either to perceive the practical reason or to theoretical rationalism on theoretical philosophy.

Of course, it does not mean that, in the order of several introductions of the issues and theorems of theoretical philosophy about different entities, one is to arrive at a problem related to practical philosophy. Such a claim has not been made by any wise or philosopher so far, so far today, a person who claims to have a contrary discovery.

Instead, it means that in the worldviews of theoretical philosophy, the examples of the general theorems of practical philosophy are provided. After providing these examples and according to them, the rulings related to the practical philosophy that are in the field of obedience and despicable and in the limits of must and should be issued. "(Javadi Amoli, 2011, 385-386)

In this sense, the logical form of a basic ruling argument in the realm of "practical philosophy" consists of two logical analogies that are interconnected. The first analogy of this argument is a deductive verdict of "theoretical reason", both of which are prepositions of the propositions of "theoretical philosophy." As an example, this analogy can be cited as follows: justice is wrong (first introduction), and every innocent thing deserves to be done (second introduction) as a result of justice deserved to be done. The result of this analogy is itself the introduction to the second analogy, namely: Democracy is a fair way of governing (first introduction) and justice deserves to be done (second introduction), then democracy deserves to be dismantled. As can be seen, one of the preamble of the second analogy is a partial proposition (democracy is a just rule), and when, in a comparison with a general proposition, the final result of the argument is a partial proposition (the democracy it deserves to be dis-

posed of). . With the explanation given by Javadi Amoli, extraction of the theory of "social transformation" from the theory of the "motion of Johari" is a lacking scientific endeavor.

What has been said so far has been to explain the impact of "theoretical philosophy" on "practical philosophy." But, as in the explanations of faith, it has come from philosophical models; the teachings of experimental sciences also affect the elements of these patterns, which have not been neglected by the classical logicians. For example, Bahmanyar explores the relationship between different sciences in relation to each other (based on the idea of the thematic distinction of the sciences) and explains what lesser knowledge has affected over-the-know knowledge. (Pezeshgi, 2005: 49-50). After clarifying this issue in the next step, it is necessary to discuss the structure of these patterns and its constituent elements in order to proceed with the research process of this article.

The structure of philosophical patterns

Thomas Cohen calls them "disciplinary matrices" (as they refer to as logical patterns of a science) as the thinkers who underlie the discussion of such patterns. (Cohen, 2010: 222-223) and determines four structural elements for these patterns: symbolic generalizations, particular models, values, and examples. Cohen's terms are symbolic expressions that are accepted and used by members of a scientific community. These expressions are expressed as symbolic formulas such as $f = ma$ or short words. In other words, this part of the framework of the special field is the same scientific law that is discovered in science. (Cohen, 2010: 223) Specific patterns in this structure include metaphysical and exploratory patterns that members of a scientific community adhere to (Cohen, 2010: 225). In fact,

what is described in this article as the model of the decree and the subject of the present paper is the same metaphysical patterns referred to by Cohen. In his view, four important pieces of these patterns for a science are: Preparing and presenting analysts and metaphors, preferred or allowed to members of the scientific community, determining explanations and puzzle-solutions, determining the list of unsolved puzzles, and evaluating the importance of each of them. (Cohen, 2010: 225) Thus, in the case of Cohen's science admission, it is possible to expect these four works from the philosophical patterns of "transcendental wisdom" for "science of politics." But the common values among members of a scientific community are the third element of the structural framework of the field of expertise that Cohen introduces to us. We can refer to values such as the selection of simpler theories in explaining scientific problems or the choice of theories that are aesthetically superior, the values that empirical scientists are committed to. (Cohen, 2010: 227-228), and finally the fourth and last structural element of Cohen is "typical examples." Examples of these puzzles are solutions that are taught to students in a field of science in laboratories or classrooms to familiarize them with the way their future science works (Cohen, 2010: 228)

The philosophical patterns mentioned in the second element of the framework structure of the Cohen special field are what are considered by the author in this chapter as philosophical patterns. As can be seen, Cohen did not discuss the patterns in detail. Hence, the author uses the teachings of "faith" to discuss more explicitly these patterns. According to the teachings of "faith" (as already stated in this chapter), the philosophical patterns of a science can be classified into three categories of ontology (includ-

ing anthropology), epistemological and methodological issues, and methods of research techniques. (Iman, 2012: 45). Obviously, in the present essay, the first three categories are considered, and the techniques of the research method are taken out of the circle of the review of this writing.

Although a logical scientific model (the framework of the specialized field) uses philosophical foundations for the establishment and direction of science, it does not apply all philosophical issues as its philosophical basis. In fact, the criterion used here to select philosophical issues as the basis of a criterion is the relationship between the philosophical problems with science. In this way, besides defining the basics of ontology, epistemology and methodology of the sub-queries of each one can also be determined. According to the definition of "faith," the purpose of the ontological foundations of a logical model of science is to answer the question that a philosophical device believes in what is there. If, on the basis of epistemology, we ask questions about the sciences that are valid and, ultimately, if we are to ask how to produce a valid and lasting science, we have discussed the methodological foundations of the logical model (Iman, 2012: 55). In this essay, the writer deals with three fundamental questions of political science from the perspective of transcendental wisdom based on what has been said: the state and its functions from the perspective of the transcendental wisdom.

Government, from the point of view of the doctrines of the authenticity of existence

Morteza Motahari writes: "Perceived credit is born" the principle of an attempt to live "and is subject to the" principle of conformity to needs. "And, like many physical and emotional emotions, takes an evolutionary path and "uplift" (Tabatabaei, 2006: 149). This

reminds us of the direct relationship between "credit perceptions" and "human needs." In other words, it says that the "need" forces humans to make "credibility". Elsewhere during the definition of "rule" He says:

"These kinds of issues [what and what form of government are] really" credit affairs. "Because the government finally comes back to a credit, it's a contract (credit means that we consider it to be "credible" to ourselves). These credit affairs have to be obtained more than they need. What does this need to lead to government credibility? What does a government have to do in the social life of mankind? "(Motahari, 2017: 12)

In this regard, as in the previous section, he acknowledged the existence of a direct relationship between "credit affairs" and "human needs" and considers the definition of "government" as a matter of credit in the recognition of human need. In fact, the definition of government (in the meta-language of the Transcendent Wisdom) will be based on the determination of which need or human existential needs are eliminated by a credit called "government." The needs that are not met by other social credits

Motahari calls the four essential requirements that make the establishment and credibility of the "government" necessary: the first of these needs is the need for society to be administered to a guardian (whether from an individual or an individual). On the basis of this need, the government is the same, and it requires the right of the self and the sovereignty of the ruler. (Motahari, 2017: 12) Mohammad Hossein Tabatabaei writes in reference to this need:

"As it gives contemporary insight into the way human societies, even progressive societies today, as well as the historical history of relatively close periods of human life and other historical means of the long and long periods of collective life of the first human being. According to the recruiting and instinct of recruiting, those who were the strongest in the primitive societies, especially those with more physical ability and volitional capability, as they used other coniferous, vegetative and animal creatures, also found other people hired them and imposed their will on them. It means that its active existence is bigger and wider, and it has been found among dispersed individuals that the ratio of mental to tone, or, in a simpler and perhaps more ancient, head-to-body ratio "(Tabatabaei, 2006, 220)

According to Tabatabaei's words, the need for stewardship has to be fixed and has a history dating to the social life of mankind. The work of the government, from the perspective of the fundamentalism of the originality of the existence (as Tabatabaei explicitly states), is to widen and broaden the "active" existence of the ruling dynasty through the unification of the dispersed social groups. In other words, a person with the credibility of the government tries to compensate for his existential constraints through the inclusion of other people and thereby gaining greater benefit.

The second major human need for the government in Motahari's mind is the need for a device or person who can enforce the law in society. (Motahari, 2017, 13-14) The

necessity of the law is that social life is voluntary and comes from two credentials of "society" and "social justice". (Tabatabaei, 2006, 209) But since every voluntary act of a person comes with "credibility" (Tabatabaei, 2006, 181), then after feeling the need for the "community" and "social justice", there is no need to identify the subject and the course of people. The sense of this need is rooted in the validity of the "civil law" in the community, which leads to the emergence of the "law" and its mechanisms of formulation. But legislation alone is not enough. Because the observance of justice and the maintenance of the foundations of the community are not realized solely by the existence of the "law", but here, after the sense of the need for the law, there is a need for another requirement for the "executor" of the law in question to be discussed. (Motahari, 2017, 13) it's the recent feeling that gives rise to a new meaning named "rule".

The need for society to "manage" is the third reason for the need for government, in Motahari's point of view. (Motahari, 2017, 15-16) Social life is essentially based on the "social order". Because if the credibility of the "community" is for the development of "being" of man. (Tabatabaei, 2006, 220) In that case, it is necessary to preserve it and establish social justice in the establishment of the "order" in it. But the creation of a mechanism for dividing social work from it creates a sense of need for "community management". Therefore, social management from the perspective of transcendental wisdom is the design and implementation of a mechanism that allows human existential development in the form of a community based on social justice.

The last need for leads to the credibility of the government in Motahari's view is "guiding society." According to Motahari, guid-

ance is to delegate responsibility for the cultural issues of a society to the state. This is the expression of the issue of education and social socialization that is directed by the state. Although Motahari considers the need for socialization and education to be a long-standing need in human societies, the transfer of responsibility to this duty to the state is considered to be specific to the modern and complex societies of today. (Motahari, 2017: 16-17)

In summary, Motahari's view is that the four needs of (governance, law enforcement, governance, and socialization) are the requirements that make government necessary for human social life. But some of Motahari's claims have been painted. For example, Mahdi Haeri Yazdi has wisdom and government with various meanings, which determines each of these meanings in a literal way depending on the text and article. In his view, the government does not mean reigning but is derived from "wisdom" in the meaning of the country's strategy, and writes:

"This is the difference between the meanings of the ruling and the government, which is said to sometimes mean commanding and issuing orders from the superior to a lower and lower position, which he must obey without blaming and any freedom and independence, even freedom of thought and belief in him. And he is like objects with out mind of the holy shrine, which is used to perform the commandments of his ruler and ruler. It turns out that this government is very different from a wisdom-dominated government, meaning a thoughtful and just approach, and an intimate sense of the internal and external affairs of citizens of a political-geographical range are very different." (Haeri Yazdi, 1995: 57)

In this sense, the government as one of the branches of practical wisdom means the

thoughtful direction of affairs and the affirmation of the facts of the objects. The emphasis here is that the government does not include sovereignty and rule. He writes:

"The word of government that has been used in politics and governance and is in line with civil politics, comes from wisdom and wisdom, and never means any other command or other meanings. Civil policy and religion, which means the rule of law, is a kind of genuine type of wisdom, and wisdom means knowledge and decree, and it is not so wrong as to state that it means ruling and exercising power. "Haeri Yazdi, 1995:66)

Therefore, contrary to Motahari, the government does not accept the rule of government, and instead believes that the government means a thoughtful administration based on the acknowledgment of the facts of the objects. It may be possible (from a phrasal point of view) and on behalf of Hariri that one of the requirements which necessitates the credibility of the state for the social life of man is the need for a thoughtful thinking of social life based on the facts of existence. What has been said so far has been the expression of an acrimonious statement, but in examining his claim, although Mahdi Haeri, in the passages quoted in it, does not receive the meaning of governance from the credibility of the state, and these terms conflict with other phrases. But, as Abdullah Nasri writes, "if we do not accept for the right reasons that the government means rule and power, at least the implicit implication must be that the government does not have meaning without power and power" (Nasri, 2014: 549). Therefore, the relationship between governance and government cannot be ruled out in general.

There are also painters whether it is the responsibility of society to direct the government. ***

The nature and purpose of practical science

Hossein Bashiriyeh summarizes the nature and purpose of political science based on political wisdom:

"The fundamental thought in the long-term political wisdom was that politics is a practical action in which tools are used to achieve goals and ends, and the knowledge of politics is also knowledge of such a profession. In contrast to natural knowledge about things that can be recognized but cannot be changed, political knowledge, as well as other practical knowledge, namely, ethics and economics, and home design, are knowledge of things that can be recognized and can be changed. The ability to change things affects the imagination of the existence of goals and ends that can or must be achieved, and tools must be used to achieve them these goals are the same in ethics, economics and politics. But at different levels, that is, at the level of life of individuals and families or in public life; as the lives of individuals and households are part of public life, then knowledge of the knowledge policy is more comprehensive and superior. Hence, one of the important features of the long-standing political wisdom is the close connection between morality and politics, as one can

say that the policy is the same ethos at the collective level, and ethics is also politics at the individual level, because both are common in the common ends. The ultimate goal and purpose in both reaching a situation is that in the long-term political wisdom it is called happiness or well-being and it is achieved through the establishment of justice or moderation. Political life must be organized on the basis of this ultimate goal, and political knowledge is also the recognition of the way of organizing political life according to that ultimate goal or purpose. The criterion of measuring various political systems is the extent to which the goal is achieved. Hence, the fundamental question in the long-term political wisdom was how to define and determine the best political system and how to achieve it. Accordingly, the knowledge of politics in the long-term political wisdom does not simply mean describing and explaining the phenomena of politics and existing systems. But also serves as other practical knowledge such as ethical, religious, and social education. Because the issues under study are not only recognizable but also embracing change. The knowledge of politics should have served the purpose of politics, namely to achieve a moderate and just situation. In the language of ancient poets, knowledge of politics does not deal solely with

the material and material causes of state and government (leaders and groups, and the objective structure and forms of government), but because of its ultimate purpose, that is, the ultimate goal or happiness, and the means of achieving it. It is also interested and, hence, is essentially practical and prescriptive. For this reason, politics more than anything else involves reasoning about ways to achieve goals that are based on rational reasoning about the possibility of human well-being. "(Bashiriyeh, 2017: 20-21)

In this long quotation, Bashiriyeh has stated the fundamental principles of political science. First, science is a practical knowledge. The practicality of politics makes it politically positive. Because, from the perspective of positivists (including behaviorism, social Darwinism, functionalism, and empiricism), political science is the science of describing, analyzing and explaining phenomena, behaviors, and political actions. In which political phenomena are like natural phenomena of objective affairs that can be examined through observation and experience in the study of natural sciences. Also, the practicality of the knowledge of politics means that this knowledge cannot, from the perspective of Islamic wisdom, be able to unambiguously explain political behaviors and phenomena and extract the general rules governing them. Because science is the practical act of knowledge which ultimately must lead to a political behavior or position. Hence, ethical interests, prejudices and prescriptive implications for direct decisions and subsequent practical actions have a direct impact. (Bashiriyeh, 2017:61-62) The second fundamental principle of the science of practic-

al politics is that, because of its practical nature, this knowledge is always judged by the practical effect of its research results. Hence, this science is contrary to positive politics, which are basically assumptions about the relationships between affairs and political phenomena that are tested and based on facts and experimental data and ultimately accepted or rejected. Therefore, contrary to positive science, emphasis is placed not on the method but on the outcome of the research. In the science of positive politics, since the relation of research to life is not considered, the scientific accuracy and accuracy of the research propositions are the main goal of political science (regardless of its usefulness for political life). (Bashiriyeh, 2017: 63-64) But the third fundamental principle of the science of practical politics (which can be seen from the perspective of the transcendentalist wisdom) is the attention to the ultimate cause. Basically, paying attention to the ultimate cause and the longitudinal relationship between phenomena leads to the doctrines of authenticity, unity, malaise, movement, purposefulness and ... of "being". And so in practical science, there should always be a set of ends such as "prosperity" and "well-being". In this statement, this science seeks to rationalize human political life. While the science of politics and its various branches have focused their attention on the aspect of the science of politics and not of politics itself, they have focused on rationalizing political science rather than rationalizing political life. Because in policy science, politics is considered as a dependent variable, which is attempted to be explained by independent social, economic, and cultural variables. (Bashiriyeh, 2017:66-67)

Methodology of Practical Politics Science

Modern science is considered to be a knowledge lacking any moral, normative, scientific, prescriptive and educational concern (Ba-

shiriyeh, 2017: 62). The subject of "policy-making" is out of the center of political science and has nothing to do with the science of modern politics, and methodologically "Politics was a positive science focused on discovering causal relationships and the correlation between political and social phenomena through the supply of presumptions and the application of quantitative and empirical research methods. Some of the new political scholars named this attitude as "political behaviorism" and considered it as part of the general or "revolution" of ethics in modern social sciences." (Bashiriyeh, 2017:63)

Based on this new understanding of policy science, the purpose of this science is only to explain the political behavior of individuals, which, unlike practical science, lacks any behavioral behavior and behavioral prescriptions for modifying the status quo. The application of quantitative and empirical methods leads to the fact that modern political science only puts forward hypotheses about phenomena that can be tested on the basis of experimental data. (Bashiriyeh, 2017: 63)

Practical science criticizes a positive attitude toward political science from various aspects. Examples include the expulsion of value judgments, moral issues, practical devices based on them, and deductive and rational arguments from the political science circle. Also, the science of modern politics has been to reduce political knowledge to theories that are capable of proving or abandoning, and as a result, the goal of modern political science has turned into an examination of the correct in other words, methodologically, modern political science has neglected the results of political research by focusing on the "scientific method" and emphasizing the importance of the method of the nature of the nature of the political research. This, in turn, has led to the discontinuation of

political research into real life. The meaning of this speech from the point of view of the transcendent wisdom of the Transcendent and the question of the originality of the existence is that the science of politics has become a credit that does not allow any existential explanation. Ness of the propositions in progress. The significance of modern science has created a single method among the scientific community and the possibility of creating a consensus between them. In this regard, Hossein Bashiriyeh writes: "From the standpoint of positive science, the accumulation of empirical knowledge about human beings and society and politics is considered essential by virtue of data collection and observation and testing by itself and regardless of its potential benefits." Bashiriyeh, 2017: 64-65) from the perspective of transcendental wisdom, the meaning of Bashiriyeh's words is that the political credentials from the science of modern politics do not pay attention to human needs and existential qualities. In this way, essentially, the credits that need to be created to meet human existential needs have now lost their cause, and therefore they cannot even "explain" their politically motivated issues. Because the science of modern politics deals only with the rationale of its own method of research and this does not relate to the rationalization of political life. (Bashiriyeh, 2017: 64-65) But contrary to this, science of practical politics, with the focus on the practical result of research and the measurement of the value of political science, results in less realistic and practical results in less political life than in an identical way and the possibility of consensus among scientists of political science. But this same characteristic causes each scientist to have a specific method of thinking and methodology and to see a wide variety of methods for practical politics. (Bashiriyeh, 2017: 65-66)

The existential originality denies this methodological claim to modern political science, which seeks to discover causal relations and the correlation between political and social phenomena, and in this case, it is more successful than other attitudes toward political science, including practical science. To criticize the claim of modern political science, it is necessary to explain, as a prelude, that it is a source of being based on an ontological supposition of the universe. Mehdi Haeri points to this in his "Pyramid of the Behavior" theory and says:

"From the universe of nature to the universe beyond nature, the whole universe, it is all an expression, and the radiance and manifestation of the original source of existence. In our universe, the pyramidal universe is at the top of the universe. And from top to bottom is all a fact and a personal identity that is so irradiated and widespread, and this expansion are the expansion of the one that appears in every step and in a certain way. This pyramid represents all possible existences; except for its head, there is no point at all in the points of the pyramid. Everything below the verge of the rule exists, which means poverty is possible.

Therefore, in all parts of the pyramid, from the vertex to the rule, apart from being, it is continuously nothing else. In this way, the whole pyramid is no truer than the real doubt. And it is that "existence, or it is possible or obligatory," and apart from the top, is the entire pyramid, may be a possibility of poverty, and the same is a direct and inseparable relationship with the head of the cone. As we can see, we have a series of

lines of breadth. The lengths of the pyramid lines are inseparable and directly reach the top of the pyramid. "(Haeri Yazdi, 2006: 198-199)

Because on this basis, ontological supposition of the causal relationship is only possible between the existence of the ages. As well as all phenomena of the universe, except the head of the pyramid (which are inherent in nature), they have the potential to exist, so it is impossible to establish a causal relationship between the political and social phenomena. Based on Mehdi Haeri's logic in the theory of the pyramid, we can draw the relation between political and social phenomena as transversal lines in the body of the pyramid and show the absence of a causal relationship between political and social phenomena based on the parallel lines on the pyramid of existence. Which never disconnect each other and thus cannot establish a causal relationship with each other? Mahdi Haeri points out this: "In cross-sections, if we compare the line with a different line and examine the relationship between them, these lines are contrasted. Because their determination is different from each other. These are transversal and cannot be related to longitudinal communication and cause and effect. "(Hariri Yazdi, 2017:210) Therefore, from the perspective of the fundamentalists of the originality of existence, there can be no causal relationship between political and social phenomena. Because political and social phenomena are determined by the type of credibility and need that they resolve, and as the aura explicitly states, the determination of any phenomenon differs from the determination of another phenomenon. And there is no connection between them (as it exists between the source and the phenomena).

Conclusion

In the present article, the author's attempt was primarily to develop philosophical patterns that govern the role of guidance, specialization, determination of issues, solutions, and the language of the metaphorical language of a science. Subsequently, it was explained that the transcendent wise men, by exploring the relation between "theoretical wisdom" and "practical wisdom", explain how the ontological, epistemological, and methodological teachings of the "theoretical wisdom" can be made through the creation of hypotheses and issues of one science communicates with the teachings of "practical wisdom." The continuation of this chapter's chapter has examined the claim of the present article through introducing some of the most general philosophical patterns derived from the teachings of the Transcendental Wisdom. According to this statement, the teachings of transcendental wisdom are used by contemporary sublime wise men to present ontological, epistemological, sociological, cognitive, and cognitive science assumptions of the humanities. Since essentially all the philosophical patterns derived from the teachings of transcendental wisdom cannot be enumerated in the humanities, so here are some of the philosophical patterns that can be used in public science studying politics.

Among the philosophical patterns of transcendental wisdom in politics, this wisdom explains the nature of "government" and needs, which inevitably establishes this reality. In the following, the transcendental theology spoke about the nature of the science of practical politics and its difference with the sciences of positive politics. And ultimately, the methodology of practical science was explained. It was argued that it is more important than political science to learn how to manage political affairs and to train public

skill in gaining public awareness of political science and the ability to explain scientific evidence of political reality. The present study shows that contemporary transcendental scholars (Such as Muhammad Hussein Tabatabaei, Morteza Motahari, Mehdi Haeri Yazdi, Mohammad Taghi Mesbah and Abdollah Javadi Amoli, who were considered in this chapter) have tried to philosophically seek a native solution for social or political issues or some aspects of this kind of issues. Although attempts to find native solutions for political issues are at the onset of their paths, the solutions presented require frequent quizzes, adjustments and rebuilds.

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