مطالب

In some point of view, neither Michel Foucault nor Ibn Khaldun are considered philosophers in the conventional classifications, but both are very  important in intellectual and, of course, in philosophical contexts, especially for those who are interested in the deep study of human life from the perspective of political thought.The main concern of two thinkers, one in the 14 th century, the other in the 20th century, is the issue  of power, although neither of them provided a precise definition of it. In this article, an attempt has been made to show the place of power and domination in the political thought of both thinkers by examining the thoughts of two thinkers. And in search of an answer to this question, how did Asabiyyah and industry of religion in Ibn Khaldun's thought and social control through self-technology and discipline in Foucault's thought lead to the expansion of the domination of power? This article is written by analytically comparing the opinions of two thinkers based on Ibn Khaldun's most important book called Muqaddimah and Foucault's late works

Postmodernism represents skepticism toward metanarratives and universal ideologies that dominated the modernist era. The study focuses on three key postmodernist concepts - alternative assessment, process syllabi, and self-directed learning. Alternative assessment emphasizes evaluating the learning process over summative testing. Process syllabi focus on the learning experience rather than rigid outcomes. Self-directed learning enables student responsibility in setting learning goals and processes. This paper examined the effects of postmodernist educational concepts on improving Iranian EFL learners’ autonomy. A quasi-experimental pre-test/post-test design was utilized with 60 intermediate level Iranian EFL students divided into an experimental and control group (n=30 each). The experimental group received instruction utilizing the three postmodernist concepts over 14 weeks, while the control group received traditional modernist instruction. Autonomy was measured using a validated questionnaire before and after the intervention. The results showed the experimental group demonstrated significant increases in autonomy compared to the control group. Paired sample t-tests revealed significant differences between pre-test and post-test autonomy for the experimental group across all three postmodern concepts - alternative assessment, process syllabi, and self-directed learning. This suggests postmodernist concepts that decentralize instruction and emphasize student process over outcomes can enhance Iranian EFL learners’ self-direction and responsibility for language acquisition. The study implies EFL syllabus designers and instruction should transition to postmodern models centered on individualized assessment, flexible syllabi, and student-guided learning to boost autonomy. Further research can expand sample sizes and explore additional postmodernist concepts across diverse demographics.

The problem of personal identity among others may stem from the following question—what does be the person that you are, from one day to the next, necessarily consist of? The diachronic problem of personal identity raises question on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the person over time. The synchronic problem is grounded in the question of what features or traits characterize a given person at one time. To answer these questions, John Locke discarded the soul and the body as necessary and sufficient substances for personal identity over time. He accepted consciousness as the only criterion for personal identity; the only thing capable of remaining the same and preserving personal identity through change. Though Locke’s argument is somewhat clear and coherent but what remains vague and incoherent is embedded in the question—what exactly is consciousness? How and why should it be the basis or criterion for the determination of personal identity? Using the method of critical analysis, I argue that Locke’s choice of consciousness as the determinant of personal identity, though quite novel, is incoherent and vague. Secondly, Locke had already presumed and anticipated clearly though fallaciously the very thing he wishes to substantiate. I therefore conclude that Locke’s argument is just another way of trying to escape but inadvertently prolonging the difficulty of apparently articulating a distinction between the psychological approach and physiological approach to the problem of personal identity. However, in my submission, I propose the concept of the “other” as alternative approach— a sort of an extrinsic-intrinsic approach to the problem of personal identity.

Dēnkard  (Acts of the religion), written in Pahlavi, is a summary of 10th-century knowledge of the Mazdean religion and is described by Jean de Menasce on the title page of his translation as a ‘Mazdean encyclopedia.’ The  Dēnkard  VI (Book VI of the  Dēnkard ) is representative of late antique and early medieval Zoroastrian ethical ideas. This article analyzes Book VI of the  Dēnkard  based on modern moral philosophy and introduces it as a candidate for early consequentialism and capitalism. The first generation of Iranian studies scholars in the late 19 th  and early 20 th  centuries such as Buch, Darmesteter, and Menant were aware of these concepts and even explained some of them, but the next generation did not take them seriously. This article also analyzes paymān (the ‘right measure’), that is the ancient Iranian ‘golden mean,’ in Book VI of the  Dēnkard  and shows the similarities and differences between  paymān  and the Aristotelian ‘golden mean.’ Probably, due to the biblical tradition in the interpretation of ancient religious texts or the anti-utilitarianism and anti-capitalism atmosphere in the second half of the 20 th  century, many scholars like Shaked inclined to the view that  paymān  is the main ethical principle of the  Dēnkard  VI and neglected its consequentialist and capitalist concepts. 

We are... So, to reframe the inquiry: who are we on a metaphysical level? Which aspects of ourselves are the most universally representative of who we are? How do we fare in the face of the passage of time? For decades, philosophers have debated the concept of diachronic personal identity, which focuses on the question of what keeps us alive. An intricate debate has developed between those who hold the body view (animalism) and those who hold the psychological view (memory) on the question of who we are. The two groups will eventually become so firmly set in their views that they will be unable to compromise. Hylomorphic animalism, or the view that humans are rational animals, living bodies made of prime matter and a rational soul, is an alternative answer to this divisive question that I propose in this study, following in the footsteps of Aristotle and Aquinas. We only survive if matter and rational souls do.

Many people in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic monotheistic traditions testify to their experience of being commanded by God to do something or to be a certain way. Is this kind of testimony from experience credible in some cases, and, if so, on what ground? The main thesis of this article is that it is credible in some cases and a suitable ground is available in the morally purifying experience of the human conscience. The article looks to the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament, and the Qur’an for relevant testimony to the importance of righteous divine commanding experienced by humans. The relevant commands are not abstract or merely theoretical but grounded in human moral experience and potentially motivating for righteous action. The article doubts that God would be God if there were no divine commanding given directly to receptive people in their moral experience. It contends that God would not be a morally righteous guide of the divine kind needed for the worthiness of worship by humans in the absence of God’s commanding people directly in their experience.

John Lemos defends an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will that is a variant of event-causal libertarian views. Many argue that these views are susceptible to the luck problem: an agent’s directly free choices are too luck infected for the agent to be morally responsible for them. The weightings model supposedly escapes this problem largely because in this model an agent’s reasons for choices do not come with pre-established values. Rather, an agent performs intentional acts of weighting that contribute to the value she assigns to her reasons. Decisions that are consequences of weightings are, thus, under the agent’s control and not subject to luck. In a recent paper, I argued that despite its weighting component, Lemos’s model succumbs to the luck problem. Lemos rejoins that my criticisms are based on misunderstandings and confusions. I deflect the charge of misperception and explain why the weightings model remains susceptible to the luck problem.

In this article, we inquire into the concept of meaning in pedagogy through Heidegger’s philosophy. Since metaphysical systems reduce the Being of humans, due to the dominance of subjectivist and worldlessness views, they tend to suffer from the crisis of nihilism, which has made its way into various ontological sciences, especially pedagogy. In this article, we tackle the elements that culminated in such meaninglessness in pedagogy in terms of dualism, worldlessness, absence of existentials, and finally the posteriority of Eros and Pathos to Logos. Now, since the philosophies of Nietzsche and Heidegger extensively deal with the issue of meaning, and in particular, Heidegger in Being and Time grapples with the concept of the meaning of Being by analyzing existentials , here we decided to discuss meaning by drawing on the existentials of understanding and attunement , and from this perspective, we look for a way out of the crisis of nihilism in pedagogy. Discussion of the meaning of being-in-the-world and the prior precedence of Eros over cognition and Logos is also helpful for overcoming the crisis of nihilism in pedagogy. That is, if pathos, eros, and the existentials of understanding and attunement are taken seriously in pedagogy, then pedagogical meaninglessness might be resisted by appealing to worldlessness and subjectivism. In fact, the revolution that sparked in Heidegger’s philosophy, in which pathos was deemed prior to logos and the question of meaning was rendered possible by turning to existentials, opened the way for a pedagogy based on existentials.

A double ambiguity has been charged against Rawls’s difference principle (DP). Is it Maximin, Leximin, or something else? Usually, following A. Sen, scholars identify DP with the so-called Leximin. One argues here that one has to distinguish 1° the Leximin, 2° the Maximin (as rule of justice formally analogous to the maximin rule of decision), represented by the figure in L of the perfectly substitutable goods, and 3° the genuine DP. When the augmentation of inequality benefits the worse off, only Pareto-strong improvements are permitted. Leximin would also permit Pareto-weak improvements too (after the first maximum D), where only the richest improves: from (2, 3) to (2, 5), say. This is forbidden by DP. With two classes, unlike Maximin, DP has no curve of indifference and is always decisive, as Leximin is. For undecisive Rules of Justice, which admit indifferent curves, I propose to add a lexically secondary rule, to break ties. That move is able to clarify the links and the differences between on the one hand Maximin alone, with its typical indifference curves in L, and on the other hand, the DP properly understood and the Leximin, which both have no indifferent curves. With two classes of persons (best off/worse off), DP appears more egalitarian than Leximin, because it's secondary rule is MinIn (Minimization of Inequality). But the intuition behind the distinction is that it cannot possible “fair” that only the best off improves in a productive social cooperation.