مطالب

The relation of causal necessity with free will has been a source of great debate in the history of philosophy and theology. However, in recent years, it has also been discussed in the science of Usul al-Fiqh. After explaining the compatibility of causal necessity with free will, Ākhūnd Khurāsānī speaks of the 'shattering of his pen.' Two interpretations have been given for this statement. Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī considers the theory of compatibility that Khurāsānī presented as being correct. However, he interprets the 'shattering of the pen' to be a reference to another matter, i.e., the problem of the recompense of an agent in the case where causal necessity is accepted. His explanation of the aforementioned compatibility and the permissibility of the recompense of sinners has been evaluated in this article. On the contrary, Muḥaqqiq Na'ini considers the 'shattering of the pen' to be a reference to the problem of the conflict between causal necessity and free will. He says that aside from the popular preliminaries of free will, such as knowledge and intention (which are the products of causal necessity), there is a need for something that he calls 'talab'-a noetic action that stems from the governance of the soul. He considers this talab to fall outside the scope of causal necessity. This paper seeks to examine the views of these two illustrious students of Ākhūnd Khurāsānī so that the various Usuli dimensions of this discussion can be clarified.

Whether we are free agents or not and to what extent depends on factors such as the necessary conditions for free will and our definition of human agency and identity. The present article, apart from possible alternatives and the causality of the agent regarding his actions, addresses the element of inclination as a necessary condition for free will. Therefore, an analysis of these conditions determines that even though in some circumstances the range of alternatives the agent can choose is very limited or the agent chooses an action without having the inclination to choose it; however, this does not make the agent forced; rather, free will has levels and every individual possesses a certain extent of it in different conditions. Just the fact that the ultimate choice is made by the agent himself and has voluntarily performed the act himself ultimately is sufficient for being free. As a result, even though the influence of external factors on human actions cannot be disregarded; however, because the action is ultimately not outside his control, accordingly, there is neither such a thing as a compelled agent and nor are our actions left to luck. The character of the agent that is voluntarily formed through our actions plays a determinant role in our choices and actions due to the epistemic and motivational components they possess.

The conflict between the Akhbārīs and Uṣūlīs dates from the time of Mawlá Muḥammad Amīn Astarābādī (d. 1033/1624). However, limited usage of the two terms can be traced back to before that period. Kitāb al-Naqḍ , written by ʿAbd al-Jalīl Qazwīnī Rāzī (d. 560/1165), is one of the few Imāmī sources that contains a group of references to a similar conflict between the Shiʿa Uṣūlīyyah and Shiʿa Akhbārīyyah. The former term, in particular, repeatedly appears in the book. The aim of this paper, adopting a conceptual approach to history, would be to demonstrate that the Akhbārī/Uṣūlī terms in medieval Iran do not refer to a legal concept, nor to the dispute between the moderate/extremist Shiʿis in that context. Despite the first impression which the term conveys, it will be suggested that the term “uṣūlīyyah” does not have its roots in uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal methodology), but rather, refers to some specific rational uṣūl (principles) usually applied to uṣūl al-ʿaqāʾid (Islamic theological principles). That is, “uṣūlīyyah,” according to Qazwīnī, refers to those whose religious knowledge has been based on rational principles. However, the Akhbārī-Uṣūlī terminology introduced by Qazwīnī cannot be paired with the historical Shiʿi schools and figures of his period. If we consider the social and political pressures under which Iranian Imāmīs were living, it will appear that employment of such terms has had a strategic purpose. In this case, calling most of his contemporaries “uṣūlīs,” and attributing controversial Shiʿi beliefs to the Akhbārīs, Qazwīnī has attempted to exonerate Imāmīs from their accusations, and to improve their social position.