محمد لگنهاوزن

Divine freedom is reviewed with respect to three important themes: fate, revisions in divine decisions, and divine obligations. A study of the first theme yields the conclusion that God is free because He has absolute power and authority. In addition, God is free in relation to human beings in the sense that He can do what they do not expect. This theme is found under the heading of decree and measure, qaḍāʾ and qadar. Theologians have also grappled with the problem that the divine decrees appear to change, and on the tablet containing the divine decrees, there can be changes and erasures. This leads to the second topic, badāʾ, the apparent revision of divine decisions, which the theologians treat as abrogations of commands. God can be understood to foster a relationship with us in which He will appear to us as free to respond to our changing conditions, especially prayer and repentance. Finally, the obligations God sets for Himself and reveals to us through scripture are considered. This indicates a kind of divine freedom that only has meaning in the loving relationship between God and His servants that is cultivated through divine revelation. It is then suggested that these various dimensions of divine freedom can best be understood through complementing philosophical and scriptural approaches to the issues and that the understanding of this kind of synthetic hermeneutics can be deepened through comparative theology.

In Reason and the Heart , William Wainwright defends a kind of religious evidentialism, one that takes int consideration the promptings of the heart, provided the heart is a virtuous one; and he claims that this view is able to avoid relativism. Here, Wainwright’s evidentialism is examined in relation to other views that have gone by that name. Wainwright’s position is briefly stated together with an expression of doubt about its ability to fend off relativism. Following this, an outline of the history of evidentialism is presented. It is concluded that Wainwright’s view is not really a form of evidentialism at all. Evidentialism may be weakened in two ways: (1) redefining “evidence” to include elements that are not recognized by objectifying inquiry; (2) allowing subjective factors, such as religious emotions, to govern the interpretation of the evidence. Wainwright describes his view as a form of evidentialism because it does not avail itself of (1); but it is only misleadingly called “evidentialism” because of (2). After making this case, several reasons are presented for rejecting evidentialism. It is argued that evidentialists focus attention of what the evidence is to determine whether beliefs are justified or rational, while how the evidence is treated is of no less importance when beliefs are supported by reasons. Furthermore, there are beliefs the justification of which is a practical matter of commitment to a more general framework rather than inference from some body of evidence. It is suggested that some religious beliefs may fall into this category.

SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES : Purpose in this paper is to examine the criticism, explore the main issues raised, show how these issues are related to contemporary philosophical discussions, and suggest how Sadra’s position might be defended. Two kinds of defense will be suggested: first, we can surmise from Sadra’s works how he might have responded to the criticism; second, we can consider how a position like Sadra’s could be defended in view of contemporary philosophy. METHOD AND FINDING : This research is a qualitative research with a critical analysis approach. One of the distinctive features of the philosophy of Mulla Sadra is his doctrine of the soul. He held that the soul evolves from the body. The human soul has its beginnings in material existence, but it evolves beyond the material and achieves eternal immateriality. CONCLUSION : The idea that the incorporeal soul as a seperable substance, might have begun its existence as a corporeal substance and then changed into an incorporeal substance has been criticized by Allamah Misbah. His criticism raises a number of issues in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and Islamic theology.

This article provides a brief background of how Comparative Theology is understood today, to point out features of how it is practiced that are responsive to issues peculiar to contemporary Catholicism, and to suggest how a version of CT might be developed that is more consistent with Islamic traditions of thought on related issues. In order to accomplish this last goal, a brief introduction to the traditional “Islamic sciences” is provided. It will be suggested that an Islamic Comparative Theology (ICT) can be understood as a multidisciplinary field that draws on several Islamic sciences, as well as research in religious studies. I argue in favor of a blurring of the distinction between Comparative Religion and Comparative Theology, and point out that relevant discussions are to be found across a variety of traditional Islamic sciences, but that it would be advantageous to collect these discussions together and to augment them with information gleaned from both secular and Islamic approaches to the teachings of Muslim thinkers about theological issues, broadly understood, in comparison with what is found in non-Islamic traditions in such a manner to enrich our own understandings of the issues and those with whom we engage in dialogue.

Charles Taliaferro’s “Philosophy of Mind and the Christian” begins with a loaded question: “Are we thoroughly physical beings, or do we contain some nonphysical part, something we may call a soul, spirit, or mind?” The question presents us with a false dilemma, for there is also the possibility that we are neither merely material beings nor do we contain a soul as a nonphysical part of us. Taliaferro follows this with a list of other questions pertaining to the philosophy of mind and asks whether Christians should give answers to these sorts of questions that differ from non-Christian colleagues. It seems odd to divide colleagues based on Christianity with regard to these questions, for it means that if the Christian colleagues do have a particular take on these issues, it will be different from that of non-Christian theistic colleagues. Perhaps, however, Taliaferro’s department consists only of Christians and atheists. In this case, however, Taliaferro seems to think that there will be a uniformity in Christian thought that seems somewhat doubtful.

The issue of religious diversity is explicitly addressed in a number of āyāt of the Qur’ān. One of the recurrent themes that is found in these passages is the resolution of religious differences. The theme of religious difference is treated with assertions that diversity arose out of an original unity. There may be partial resolutions to issues over which there is contention, but ultimate resolution of differences is only to be expected in the eschaton. The morale given in such passages is a counsel of patience. The implications of this message for an Islamic theology of religions areconsidered.