تحلیلی بر آثار ساختار شبکه روابط هیئت مدیره در تعیین کارایی سرمایه گذاری در نیروی کار: نقش نظارتی مالکان نهادی (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
هدف : هدف این پژوهش، بررسی آثار ساختار شبکه روابط هیئت مدیره در تعیین کارایی سرمایه گذاری در نیروی کار شرکت هاست. علاوه بر این، از آنجا که نقش نظارتی مالکان نهادی باعث کاهش مشکلات نمایندگی در تصمیم های نیروی کار می شود، نقش این متغیر نیز در این روابط مطالعه شد. روش : این پژوهش، دارای رویکرد کمی و به لحاظ اجرا از نوع پس رویدادی و مبتنی بر تکنیک های گرافیکی براساس نظریه گراف است. پژوهش براساس داده های مربوط به 117 شرکت فعال در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران در سال های بین 1388 تا 1398 و به کمک رویکرد تحلیل شبکه های اجتماعی و تحلیل رگرسیون آزمون های پژوهش انجام شده است. یافته ها : شواهد به دست آمده حاکی از آن است که شاخص های درجه (آثار منفی) و نزدیکی (آثار مثبت) از ساختار شبکه روابط هیئت مدیره، بر کارایی سرمایه گذاری در نیروی کار (هم بیش سرمایه گذاری و هم کم سرمایه گذاری) اثرگذار است. نظارت مالکان نهادی، قدرت اثرگذاری مثبت بر کارایی سرمایه گذاری در نیروی کار دارد و شدت رابطه بین شاخص درجه و کارایی سرمایه گذاری در نیروی کار به سطح این متغیر بستگی دارد. افزون بر این، ارتباط منفی بین شاخص بینابینی و بیش سرمایه گذاری در نیروی کار نیز بستگی به سطح نظارت مالکان نهادی دارد.An Analysis of the Effects of Board Relations Network Structure in Determining Labor Investment Efficiency: The Monitoring Role of Institutional Owners
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the effects of board relations network structure on labor investment efficiency. Besides, the role of institutional owners in these relationships was studied. This paper had a quantitative approach based on graphic techniques. The sample included 117 companies in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) from 2009 to 2020. The social network analysis and regression analysis approaches were used to conduct the research tests. Evidence showed that the indicators of the degree (negative effect) and closeness (positive effect) of board relations network structure affect labor investment efficiency. In addition, monitoring of institutional owners can have a positive effect on labor investment efficiency. The intensity of the relationship between the degree index and labor investment efficiency depends on the level of this variable. Moreover, the negative relationship between over-investment in labor and the betweenness index depends on the level of institutional owner monitoring. Introduction One of the main issues that has received a lot of attention in recent years is investment decisions in labor. Labor investment inefficiency can occur through over-(under-) investment. Both over-investment and under-investment in labor can cause distortions in labor investment. In this regard, one of the phenomena that have attracted the attention of many researchers in recent years is the network of board member relationships and the position of companies in this network due to the boards’ role in key decisions, such as hiring and firing employees. However, in the previous studies, factors, such as conditional conservatism, financial reporting quality, and accounting information comparability, have been regarded as the influential and determining factors of labor investment efficiency. However, among them, the important issue of board network is ignored. Accordingly, the purpose of this study was to examine the effects of board’s structure relations network in determining labor investment efficiency. In addition, the monitoring role of institutional owners was examined since it reduced the agency problems in labor decisions. Method and Data This study was arranged in two phases: In the first phase, the relationship between the companies was examined based on the shareholders, who appointed the board members. This phase was performed via network analysis method by using PreMap software version 1, UCINET version 6, and NetDraw. In the second phase, it was examined whether the position and situation in the relationship network affected investment efficiency in the labor. This phase was performed through regression analysis by using Eviews software version 9. The sample included all the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) from 2009 to 2017 and had the following criteria: first, their fiscal year ending in Esfand (final month based on the Iranian calendar) was taken into account and second, they had to be uncategorized as banks and financial institutions. Third, they had not to have a long trading interval (more than 3 months). Based on the above-mentioned criteria, 117 companies (819 year-company) were selected for research analysis. The independent variables of this research were the company’s position in the board’s relations network (Board_net) and Institutional Ownership Change (IOC). Labor investment efficiency (| Ab_Net_Hiring |) was the dependent variable of this research. It should be noted that the research tests were performed with the help of social network analysis approach and regression analysis. Findings Evidence showed that the effects of the boards’ relations network on the labor investment efficiency were different according to the various indicators. To be more precise, the degree index had negative effects; the betweenness index had no significant effects; and the closeness index had positive effects on the labor investment efficiency. Evidence from further studies at the level of over-investment and under-investment groups in labor showed the same results. Furthermore, institutional owners' monitoring had no effects on the labor investment (both over-investment and under-investment) efficiency in the companies. However, if the firm's fixed effects were controlled, this variable (institutional owner’s monitoring) could have a positive effect on the labor investment efficiency. Besides, the research results revealed that the relationship between the indicators of the board’s relations network structure and labor investment efficiency was not related to the level of institutional owner’s monitoring. To be more precise, in both groups of the strong and weak institutional owners’ monitoring, there were a negative and positive relationship between the indicators of degree and closeness and the labor investment efficiency, respectively. However, the Paternoster test showed that the intensity of the degree index impact on the labor investment efficiency could be greater in the group of companies with strong institutional ownership monitoring. Conclusion and discussion The findings showed the network of board members' relationships could be introduced as an indicator of labor investment efficiency. In general, the results of this article should be considered by shareholders in selecting board members in order to increase the company’s value by improving labor investment efficiency. This evidence can be very important for employment regulators; for example, the organization in charge of legislation in the field of labor can use the results of the present study to pass laws and impose mandatory restrictions on the selection of board members of various companies and change labor investment efficiency.
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