Strategic autonomy

The present study seeks to answer the question, of why the EU despite its political will to expand relations with Iran and its efforts, in particular, to maintain the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) within the framework of the designed mechanisms, failed to exercise its strategic independence and fulfill its obligations within JCPOA? The findings show that the lack of European strategic independence is due to its transatlantic dependence on three levels: Institutional security deficit, Asymmetric interdependence in the economic sphere, and the preferences of European transnational corporations concerning US markets. At the level of the institutional security deficit, Given the United States security umbrella and the lack of military-defense independence, the European Union is forced to adjust its approaches to US interests and goals. At the economic level, the interdependence of economic, trade, and highly intertwined transatlantic investment interactions and the asymmetry of this relationship (US strategic economic superiority) has severely limited the possibility of EU economic action independence. The methodology of this research is descriptive-analytical and the method of data collection in the library. In this regard, books, articles, documents, Internet resources, and comments of relevant officials have been used to collect data.

One of the most critical issues in Iran's foreign policy is European countries' foreign policy toward the Iran-US crisis. The hostage crisis in Tehran on November 4, 1979 (Aban 13, 1358 SH) was the first Iran-US crisis to affect Iran's relations with Western countries. This study aims to investigate the following question: "What were the French policies toward the hostage crisis, and how were they formed?" To answer this question, the “strategic autonomy” framework was utilized to comprehend France's foreign policy. This research employs a "historical case study" methodology, which critically analyzes historical documents, such as press documents, official reactions, and diplomatic documents. The findings of this study indicate that the French foreign policy of this period can be analyzed using the concept of "strategic autonomy." In its relations with Iran, France adopted the policy of "independently regulating relations with a third country," "independence in foreign policy decision-making," and "ensuring the well-being of citizens," whereas in its relations with the US, it followed the policy of non-interference in the US's reciprocal crisis with the third party and maintaining economic interests.

This article analyzes the transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East during the turbulent years initiated with the Arab Spring. In due course, Turkish policy considerably shifted from proactive engagement with the region in the early 2000s to a bid to leading regional transformation, particularly in the initial years of the Arab Spring. However, the reversal of the Arab Spring increasingly presented a blowback for Türkiye’s regional engagements. The ensuing regional insecurity resulted in a realist turn in Turkish foreign policy, with frequent resort to military instruments and coercive diplomacy. Eventually, regional policies of Türkiye corresponded to the search for de-escalation and normalization within the emerging Middle Eastern order since 2020. The article argues that changing regional dynamics corresponding with domestic conditions influenced and shaped Türkiye’s policies towards the Middle East. Recently, under the impact of the regional-systemic pressures coupled with changing domestic conditions, recalibrating its regional engagement, Türkiye has prioritized the normalization agenda. It argues that while normalization agenda will remain an important objective for Türkiye’s regional policies, it will evolve in a partial manner, and case-by-case, conditional on the unfolding regional order and Ankara’s strategic priorities.