مطالب

The coronavirus pandemic has had some unexpected benign effects (including a large drop in air pollution and levels of nitrogen oxides in UK and elsewhere, and a smaller drop in global carbon emissions), which raises the problem of how to sustain and build on these unexpected gains. These gains could easily be lost when economies and road transport return to something like their previous condition. But if governments and industries are inspired to reduce automobile emissions to match the levels of the spring of 2020, gains such as these could become recurrent, and many more lives could be saved. Further, if (with greater effort) carbon emissions could remain reduced, then future generations could be saved from sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and even from the spread of tropical diseases. Such a prevention of disease would be an ironic but welcome gain from a pandemic.

The main challenge of present paper is analytical comparing the “Criterion of Valid Cognition” from viewpoints of Epicureanism and Charvaka (Lokayata) philosophy, the largest exponent of Indian materialism,. The new findings of the research show that the whole construction of ontology, ethics, and infidelity of Charvaka is logically based on its epistemology. In this philosophy, any intangible existence is denied, and the only knowledgeable subject-matter is assumed to be the material world. So here firstly, the acquisition of the truth is possible solely by sensory instruments, and secondly, every ‘should’ and ‘should not’ that it is in contrary to the principle of material pleasure is negated. It can be said that the Charvaka’s philosophers consider Cognition as the ‘true and perceptible belief, but not reasonable one’, and they intensely questioned the validity of Inference, Testimony and Analogy. In contrast, the Epicurean philosophers seem to agree with the definition of Cognition as the ‘true and justifiable conviction’. In spite of believing in the originality of matter and regarding the ‘clarity of sensory perception’ as the criterion of truth, Epicureans consider also Inference, General Concepts and Emotions as the resources of cognition. Epicureanism’s epistemology is entirely rational, but that of Charvaka is irrational, empirical, contradictory, sense-based and contrary to Reality.

Considered the second face of Illumination philosophy after the Shaykh al-Ishraq Suhrawardi (1154-1191), Muhammad Ibn Mahmud Shams al-Din al-Shahrazuri (d. after 1288), in most part, hold fast to Suhrawardi’s illuminationist doctrines. As a case study on celestial bodies, the allegiance may well be at question level.The nine celestial spheres and sublunary world held managed by ten separated intelligences. Suhrawardi depicted the celestial spheres in his allegorical works. Suhrawardi usually speaks of eleven symbols, for instance, eleven mountains in “The Red Intellect” and the eleven layers of a basin in “The Sound of Gabriel’s Wing”. But the eleven celestial bodies, including ether and zamharir rule out Divine Pedestal (al-kursi) and Divine Throne (al ’arsh) of Muhyiddin al-Andalusi. Surprisingly, in his mystic work called Kitab al-Rumuz wa-l-Amthal al-Lahutiyya fil-Anwar al-Mujarradat al-Malakutiyya, Shams al-Din al-Shahrazuri nor except in passing has considered the celestial bodies. In al-Rumuz of Shahrazuri, the number of celestial beings has not been mentioned. Speaking of Divine Pedestal (al-kursi) and Divine Throne (al ’arsh) of Ibn Arabi, Shahrazuri does not consider zamharir and ether.

The present article explains and analyzes the impact of Suhrawardi's eschatology on Mulla Sadra's philosophy and Sadra's critical evaluation of it. In this research, we have tried to explain and analyze Mulla Sadra's critiques of Suhrawardi's thought about identity, celibacy, self-occurrence, self-survival, and post-mortem souls, and in general, relatively clear pictorial resurrection from Suhrawardi's position in the philosophical system. Let's present Sadra. In this research, we first try to explain and analyze Suhrawardi's eschatology theory in the form of concepts such as the abstraction of occurrence, survival of soul, and finally the state of soul after departure from the body, and then the effect of Suhrawardi's resurrection on Mulla Sadra's thought. We explain and at the end of Mulla Sadra's critiques of Suhrawardi we evaluate and show that most of Mulla Sadra's critiques on the most important issues of Suhrawardi's eschatology do not seem logical. Here, too, we have tried to provide the reader with a fairly accurate analysis of this subject by remaining faithful to the texts of both philosophers and using the opinions of the commentators and experts of these two thinkers.

In Hegel's view art is not just an artistic creation. Art is an introduction to liberation. Today, Hegel's philosophy is a substitute for many challenging issues, and also an obsolete for past points, Hegel interprets works of art with key elements of his philosophy such as "absolute", "freedom" and "consciousness." Hegel divides the history of the transformation of art into three periods of symbolic, classical, and romanticism. But Hegel also mentions classical architecture and romantic architecture, which in fact transforms architecture into an artistic service which come from other types and are not considered independent. This paper examines art and architecture in Hegelian thought and explains the types of art and architecture and their meanings in the eyes of this philosopher. Absolutely undergoes three steps in the process of self-consciousness-art, religion, and philosophy. Art, as the first step of this Trinity, brings absolute liberty directly into the sensible thing. This is a logical necessity and opens the way for ultimate self-awareness of the soul. Hence, epistemic beauty is worthwhile. This view towards beauty or a beautiful issue is an epistemological phenomenon and unmatched in the history of philosophy. The beauty of value is equal to consciousness. Or at least as a prerequisite for knowledge.

Early Muslim philosophers, theologians, logicians and experts in jurisprudence understand knowledge as “firm true belief supported by evidence”. They consider conjectures as a kind of ignorance, the domain of certain knowledge confined in necessary truths; and the domain of uncertain knowledge limited to contingent facts. From their definitions and postulates, we can conclude that they took “having appropriate source” as the criterion of knowledge. For this reason, they included the qualifications “firm” and “immutable” in their definition of knowledge in lieu of distinction between the definition and the criterion of knowledge and separation of cognitive characteristic features of beliefs from the non- cognitive ones. Their approach in epistemology is externalistic but it accommodates foundationalism and fallibilism while evading epistemological relativism. In this approach, knowledge is defined as true belief with proper source. Having proper source is a criterion for knowledge which is not explicitly stated but is implied by different qualifications introduced by them. A source of belief is proper iff it bears a causal relation of some sort to the state of affairs the belief depicts.

Although for a couple of centuries empiricism was prevalent in physics circles , the development of various schools of philosophy of science, during the second half of the twentieth century, made it clear we do not encounter nature with empty minds and that scientists always use some assumptions in their scientific work. In this article. We argue that metaphysical assumptions play an important role at various stages of science activity. But these assumptions are usually taken from various schools of philosophy or religions. Monotheistic religions can provide such principles. Thus, metaphysics works as a bridge between science and religion.