نقش راهبری شرکتی در رابطه بین اجتناب مالیاتی و تشکیل امپراتوری توسط مدیران (مقاله پژوهشی دانشگاه آزاد)
درجه علمی: علمی-پژوهشی (دانشگاه آزاد)
آرشیو
چکیده
اهداف: براساس نظریه نمایندگی، مدیران لزوما تصمیماتی نمی گیرند که به بهترین نتیجه برای سهامداران منجر شود، بلکه آنها گرایش به حداکثر رساندن منافع خویش دارند. قدرت طلبی مدیریتی از طریق فعالیت های اجتناب مالیاتی شرکت ها تشدید می شود. از عوامل مؤثر بر ایجاد امپراتوری مدیریتی، اجتناب مالیاتی و راهبری شرکتی است. این پژوهش نقش راهبری شرکتی را در رابطه بین اجتناب مالیاتی با تشکیل امپراتوری توسط مدیران بررسی کرده است.روش: به منظور آزمون فرضیه های پژوهش با استفاده از روش حذف سیستماتیک، نمونه ای متشکل از 119 شرکت از بین شرکت های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران طی سال های 1395 تا 1400 انتخاب شده است. به علاوه، الگوهای رگرسیونی چند متغیره به روش داده های ترکیبی به کار برده شد.نتایج: نتایج نشان دهنده آن است که اجتناب مالیاتی با تشکیل امپراتوری توسط مدیران رابطه معناداری ندارد و راهبری شرکتی در میزان اثرگذاری اجتناب مالیاتی بر تشکیل امپراتوری توسط مدیران نقشی ندارد؛ بنابراین مدیران برای ممانعت از نگرش منفی نسبت به آنها دست به اجتناب مالیاتی نمی زنند یا اینکه سیاست های دیگری را برای قدرت طلبی خود برمی گزینند.The Role of Corporate Governance in the Relation between Tax Avoidance and Managerial Empire Building
The aim of this study was to explore the impact of corporate governance on the link between tax avoidance and managerial empire building. According to the theory of managers' personal considerations, managers may not always prioritize decisions that benefit shareholders, but rather focus on maximizing their own interests. The existing literature suggests that managerial aspirations for power can be heightened through corporate tax avoidance activities. Tax avoidance and corporate governance are identified as influential factors in the formation of managerial empires. To test the hypotheses, a sample of 119 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange between 2015 and 2021 was selected. A multivariable regression model was employed in this study using the composite data method. The findings indicated that tax avoidance did not significantly contribute to the formation of managerial empires and corporate governance did not mediate the impact of tax avoidance on managerial empire building. Consequently, managers may refrain from tax avoidance and pursue alternative strategies for power acquisition in order to avoid negative perceptions. It is also noted that corporate governance guidelines were not fully implemented in the companies under study.Keywords: Managerial Empire Building, Tax Avoidance, Corporate Governance. IntroductionEnhancing available funds through tax avoidance can either generate wealth for shareholders or exacerbate agency issues (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). By avoiding taxes, the company retains more income, thereby potentially increasing stock value (Wilson, 2009; Shams et al., 2022). Tax strategies resemble investment decisions that generate economic resources for the company through tax avoidance (Francis et al., 2014). However, high levels of tax avoidance can prompt managers to undertake costly activities to conceal tax avoidance, diminishing financial statement transparency and leading to opportunistic behavior (Desai & Dharmapala, 2007). Separation of management from ownership results in conflicting interests and representation issues with different stakeholder groups seeking to maximize their conflicting interests. Corporate governance mechanisms are designed to reconcile these conflicting interests (Mashayekhi & Seyyedi, 2015). Consequently, companies are motivated to establish and uphold corporate governance mechanisms to minimize costs. This study aimed to investigate whether managers employing tax avoidance strategies allocate company resources to build their business empires and the role corporate governance mechanisms play in either facilitating or impeding this process. Materials & MethodsTo test the hypotheses, a sample of 119 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange between 2016 and 2021 was selected. The panel data model with fixed effects was deemed suitable for the research models based on Chow and Hausman tests and panel regression models with Generalized Least Squares (GLS) were employed. Research FindingsThe results indicated that tax avoidance did not have a significant relationship with the formation of managers' empires. Consequently, the managers might refrain from tax avoidance or opt for alternative strategies for empire building in order to avoid negative perceptions. Furthermore, corporate governance was found to have no impact on the relationship between tax avoidance and empire building by the managers. It could not be concluded that corporate governance mechanisms mitigated the impact of tax avoidance on the managers' empire building. Conversely, weaknesses in corporate governance increased the likelihood of tax avoidance and the formation of the managers' empires. In other words, in companies with weak governance and inadequate supervisory mechanisms, the executives wielded greater power and engaged in more tax avoidance to build empires. Discussion of Results & ConclusionManagers are sufficiently incentivized to utilize company resources for their own commercial gain, aiming to fulfill their desires for higher rewards and attainment of position, power, and prestige, essentially building a managerial empire. This study examined the influence of corporate governance on the relationship between tax avoidance and empire building by managers.According to the findings, the managers did not resort to tax avoidance as a means to build their empires. This outcome could be attributed to the circumstances surrounding the companies; tax avoidance measures elicited a negative response from the market and other stakeholders toward company managers, tarnishing their reputation. Consequently, managers refrained from tax avoidance and pursued alternative strategies for power acquisition in order to avert this negative perception.Furthermore, the research indicated that corporate governance did not impact the adoption of a tax avoidance strategy for empire building by managers. Therefore, it could not be concluded that corporate governance mechanisms mitigated the influence of tax avoidance on the construction of managers' empires. Conversely, deficiencies in corporate governance increased the likelihood of tax avoidance and establishment of the managers' empires. In other words, in companies with weak governance and inadequate supervisory mechanisms, the executives wielded greater power and engaged in more tax avoidance to build empires. One possible reason for rejecting this hypothesis could be related to CEO-related criteria where the interests of the CEO might not align with those of the shareholders. Instead of effectively monitoring tax avoidance behaviors, they might align with the executives and seek to build empires and increase their own interests.
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