Intentionality

This study tries to show that how viewpoint functions in discourse. As it will be clarified, it is highly related to the intention of the speaker/writer, and as a result, the orientation (s)he adopts in the discourse. Deictic markers function as discourse markers to fix and anchor time, place, agent, and other discursive elements. In this way, the viewpoint adopted by the enunciator/utterer is determined. Different types of viewpoint, then, are introduced and exemplified. Its relation with perspective is also examined.

My aim in this paper is to show how Josiah Royce’s philosophy contains many themes that will be at the core of Husserl’s philosophical investigations. This paper is divided in two sections. The first one outlines the start point of these two philosophers, contextualizing their background and showing how they share a common purpose: put the experience at the center of their thought. For this reason, I want to analyze how they treat the concept of attention in relation to that of intentionality to argue that their philosophies are strictly anchored to the givenness of the experience. In the second one I deal with the rising of the precategorial dimension (prior to any objectivation), as a possibility of experience itself, making a parallel between the Husserlian concept of Lebenswelt and that Roycean of World of Appreciation. Through this distinction they both criticize the scientific, naturalistic and objectivistic Weltanschaung, showing how its method is founded in an intuitive and non-thematic relation with the world experience that comes ontologically before the scientific description.

The mind-body problem is one of the most fundamental and complex issues in the philosophy of mind, addressing the relationship between mental states and brain processes. John Searle, the contemporary American philosopher, has attempted to offer a distinctive response to this problem through a theory known as biological naturalism. In his view, mental phenomena such as consciousness are not only the result of biological processes in the brain, but also constitute higher-level features of those processes. By distinguishing between causal reductionism and the ontological irreducibility of consciousness, Searle seeks to establish a middle path between reductive physicalism and dualism. Key concepts in his view—including intentionality, mental causation, and emergent properties—play a central role in explaining the workings of the human mind. Nevertheless, his theory has faced significant criticism from philosophers such as Dennett, Nagel, and Chalmers, some of whom consider Searle’s biological naturalism to be a new form of property dualism. This paper analyzes the theoretical foundations and structure of biological naturalism, aiming to assess its explanatory power in addressing the mind-body problem and to clarify its relation to competing philosophical approaches.

Intentionality is a form of received and perceptual awareness through which humans relate to their geographical lifeworld. This awareness is acquired both objectively and, at times, subjectively, and is shaped through various mediating factors. In the context of urban tourism, the structure of such intentionality is grounded in phenomenological and post-phenomenological approaches, emerging from the relational dynamics between humans and tourism elements. The present study aims to explore the manner and conditions of tourists' intentional perception—tourists being positioned as the observer (subject) toward tourism artifacts and sites—considered as the observed (object). The research methodology is qualitative, based on phenomenological and post-phenomenological perspectives, and employs semi-structured interviews conducted with tourists in the city of Zanjan.Data were analyzed using the grounded theory model, involving open, axial, and selective coding. The resulting categories were interpreted and classified within the contextual framework of factors, mediators, and symbols of intentionality. Findings indicate that tourists’ awareness and understanding differ between initial (prior) and subsequent (posterior) stages of intentionality and follow a developmental trajectory. Categories such as attractions, religion, handicrafts, traditional markets, contemporary history, and mummification—which characterized the initial stage—give way in the subsequent stage to religion, culture and beliefs, architecture and identity, history and civilization, diversity of heritage, and heritage preservation, reflecting a shift in the mental structure of perception. As a result, touristic intentionality is influenced by direct observation, length of stay, and various intermediating factors (such as services, support systems, interpretation, and guidance). Ultimately, it is a function of the volume and quality of information received from the objects (tourism elements) through the mediating role of the subjects (tourists).

Intentionality, as a fundamental concept in the philosophy of mind, is essential to understanding how mental states are directed toward objects, concepts, or states of affairs. This article examines the theory of intentionality presented by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi, with a focus on his Islamic philosophical framework. The research begins by defining the problem of intentionality, which concerns the nature, possibility, and content determination of mental states. We highlight how Tabatabaʾi’s grounding of intentionality in mental existence and immaterial knowledge provides a distinct perspective compared to contemporary naturalistic approaches. The study employs a qualitative, analytical, and comparative methodology, examining primary texts from Islamic philosophy, including works by Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi, alongside modern Western discussions on intentionality. Through this critical lens, we identify Tabatabaʾi’s key contributions: the essential revelatory character of knowledge, the abstraction process in content determination, and the inseparable connection between mental existence and intentionality. The research findings reveal that while Tabatabaʾi’s model offers a metaphysically robust explanation of intentionality, it encounters significant challenges when evaluated in the context of contemporary cognitive science. Critiques include the lack of empirical testability, potential conceptual ambiguity for modern scholars unfamiliar with Islamic metaphysics, and the absence of a clear mechanistic explanation that aligns with materialist paradigms. Nevertheless, the article underscores the innovative nature of Tabatabaʾi’s approach in bridging classical Islamic thought with modern philosophical discourse. It also suggests potential interdisciplinary dialogues, especially with phenomenological perspectives that similarly emphasize the inherent directedness of consciousness. The findings contribute to a broader understanding of intentionality and open new avenues for future research on the integration of metaphysical and empirical frameworks in the philosophy of mind.