US Foreign Policy

This article examines the rise and fall of the Peace Process and questions the reason for which the United States of America was successful in bringing the two sides to the negotiating table during the 1990s. It investigates the reason for which the process ultimately failed, as well as the reason for which Washington was unsuccessful in restarting the peace process in the past decade. It is argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the Arab states’ most important ally, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)’s decision to back Saddam Hussein during the First Persian Gulf War, and the rise of Islamic movements in the occupied territories were the main reasons for which the PLO decided to negotiate with Israel. The subsequent Peace Process was a major political, economic and public image success for Washington and Tel-Aviv, while it was damaging to the Palestinian cause. Not only did the PLO recognize Israel and the Zionist movement, but it also ceded most of the West Bank in the process. Finally, it is argued that after the collapse of the process during the early 2000s, Donald Trump has attempted to restart the negotiations, but has failed thus far due to the inexistence of strong leaders in both Palestinian and Israeli sides, the rise of Hamas as a resistance movement, and the disenchantment of the Palestinian people with the Peace Process.

Both in the U.S. and in Iran, foreign policy making is the result of a complex negotiation process between the different bodies of the government. In both countries, anti-Iranian and anti-American sentiments became the hallmark of the conservative elites’ thinking, which has been effectively blocking a political détente between the parties. The argument of this analysis departs from the dogmatism of the elites and states that the failure of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement was not only the result of the tight constraint of domestic actors on each country’s win-sets, but also due to the fact that both countries denied the addition of Level 3 to Putnam’s Two-Level Game Theory, that is, negotiation with the alliance blocs of the respective parties. Both negotiators failed to recognize the importance of the regional players and their threat perceptions that had not been limited to Iran’s nuclear capability, but at the same time involved Iran’s military ambitions. The analysis argues that widening the scope of the nuclear negotiations to three levels would prove the unfeasibility of a nuclear agreement concluded in the current geopolitical context. Only the deconstruction of the Western double standard – that American military presence in the Persian Gulf is normal while Iranian military presence is unacceptable aggressiveness – could lead to the possibility of a strong and widely accepted deal on the Iranian nuclear activities. The author of the analysis thus suggests the necessity of limiting the military expansion of both the U.S. and Iran as a precondition for a successful three-level negotiation process.

Since the late 19th century, Iraqi immigrants have formed a community in the United States, which is widely known as a part of the Arab-Muslim diaspora in the country, while the reality is rather different, since the majority of this community is non-Arab and non-Muslim. The focus of this paper is to investigate the US-based Iraqi diaspora identity regarding its formation and evolution by reviewing its history and exploring its diversity, which could inform readers about the major identification modalities taken by members of the community in the American context. The key question discussed in this paper is therefore the following: how does Iraqi diaspora identity diverge or converge within the American context, influenced by historical, ethnic and religious elements? Using analytical narratives as our corpus of study, we will discuss the way in which Iraqi-Americans present their identity by commenting on their ethno-religious diversity and the impact of the diversity on the community. Findings indicate that affected by US-Iraq relationships as well as different contexts in both homeland and the host country throughout the last three decades, a divergent dynamism has serious potentials to influence the future of this diaspora community in the United States.

The “Black Lives Matter” civil rights movement has left profound effects on the international approach of the US government toward human rights. This movement reached its peak in 2020 and profoundly affected culture, politics, and policy making in the US. The two major parties reacted differently – the Democrats showed support but Republicans opposed it. These reactions help us analyze the US international policy toward human rights. US human rights policy has been embedded in the theory of “American exceptionalism”, which considered US the best incarnation of human rights and its interests as a superpower equal to its protection. But the Black Lives Matter movement challenges this narrative and claims that human rights violations are an untold part of this story. The Democrats have adopted a new approach to American exceptionalism in response which considers The US to have an exceptional potential to embody human rights values but this potential is yet to be realized. Joe Biden has also prioritized human rights more than his predecessors since 1980s by criticizing the US and also adopting harsher policies toward US allies that violate human rights. It can be predicted that the Democrats will adopt a more normative approach toward human rights in the future.

The US foreign policy in the post-World War II has been marked by periods of unilateralism, while in other periods, multilateralism has been more prevailing. The existing works, while explaining certain periods of unilateralism by various domestic and international factors, such as neo-conservative ideology and superpower rivalries in the Cold War, are unable to explain the reason for which in some periods, the US foreign Policy has been more dominant. This article seeks to explain the difference by referring to the conceptual complexity of US presidents. We analyzed the content of news conference transcripts for 11 post-WWII US presidents using the Flesch-Kincaid text readability index to measure presidents’ conceptual complexity. We used the index in our previous study to explain the unorthodoxy of Donald Trump’s foreign policy. Findings suggest with statistical significance that Presidents with low levels of conceptual complexity do not consider many factors as important and prefer unilateral actions by emphasizing short-term achievements. On the contrary, presidents with complex cognition are less likely to believe that the US can solve critical or long-term international issues alone.