مطالب

The purpose of this research is selecting the Most Effective Strategic Capability for Sustainable Development under Risk and Uncertainty in the Oil Industry by Rough Set Theory. The research methodology is qualitative and quantitative. The target population in the qualitative section included 14 industrial management specialists at the university level and in the quantitative section 32 senior managers in companies active in the Oil Industry. In this research, were used Meta-synthesis and Delphi analysis methods were used to identify the components and propositions of the research and in a small part, the analytical approaches of Ruff collection. The results showed that among the 15 final statements of risk and uncertainty in the Oil Industry, the risk of change in domestic law relative to political / economic diplomacy in the development of infrastructure for the Oil Industry X5 as the most important risk statement and uncertainty in the field. Political and legal risks that have been identified as a measure of the strategic viability of sustainable development. Finally, it was found that, despite the most probable risks selected in this study, namely the risk of changes in domestic law to political / economic diplomacy in the development of infrastructure of the Oil Industry "X5" Existence of sanctions of the world powers "X1" Strategic capabilities of sustainable economic development is the most important feature that should be considered in the country's inflationary conditions.

The present article aims to argue indirect expropriation in international petroleum agreements and to analyse the response of international arbitrations. In particular, international arbitral awards by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the Yukos case as an Energy Charter Treaty Arbitration and certain North American Free Trade Agreement cases have been examined. The recent trend shows that taking of foreign investors’ property may take place not only through legislation or nationalisation but also by indirect methods that can have the same effect as direct expropriation. Indirect expropriation does not necessarily require transfer of legal title from the international oil company to the host state. Hence, it is difficult to make a distinction between legitimate regulation and measures, which are tantamount to expropriation with the payment of compensation. The identification of an indirect expropriation is complex and depends upon the examination of the legitimate expectations of the investor concerning enjoyment of its investment. Host governments may employ different methods to achieve what amounts to direct taking, but without acknowledging it as such, to avoid legal consequences of expropriation and then payment of compensation.