Emergence

The paper addresses the main questions to be dealt with by any semantic theory which is committed to provide an explanation of how meaning is possible. On one side the paper argues that the resources provided by the development of mathematical logic, theoretical computer science, cognitive psychology, and general linguistics in the 20th Century, however indispensable to investigate the structure of language, rely on the existence of end products in the morphogenesis of meaning. On the other, the paper argues that philosophy of language, which, either in the analytic or the structuralist or the hermeneutical tradition, made little use of such resources (when they are not simply rejected). Left the main question unanswered. Though phenomenology intended to focus on the constitutive process, it ended up mostly with philology. Cognitive semantics paved the way to focus on patterns of bodily interaction within the natural environment out of which basic schemes emerge and are metaphorically “lifted” to any universe of discourse. The explanatory commitment is thus endorsed through two hypotheses: (1) these schemes, of topological and kinaesthetic structure, determine the range of forms of atomic sentences of any natural language, and (2) the category-theoretic notion of universality allows for a proper analysis of how such schemes are “lifted”.

How does unconscious matter become conscious? How does our physical part, which lacks consciousness, have such a subjective quality? This is the explanatory gap in the problem of consciousness or the hard problem of consciousness which comes from a physicalist (eliminativist physicalism) point of view. From the opposite point of view, that is, dualism, the mind-body problem has led to the problem of consciousness and the explanation of how our unconscious physical (matter) part (substance) is related to our conscious mental part (substance). If the problem of consciousness is the result of such views (eliminativism and dualism), is it possible to adopt a different perspective so that the problem does not arise at all? Or find a solution for it (maximum answer) or at least determine the right way to solve the problem (minimum answer)? The current research goes into this issue by adopting subjectivism and holism to make its subjective holism theory. Therefore, it gives a positive (maximum and minimum) answer to the above questions.

This study employs a descriptive-analytical method and a critical comparative approach to examine, critique, and compare the proofs for the existence of God in Western and Islamic philosophy. The introduction clarifies the meaning of proof and distinguishes it from faith and reasoning. It then outlines key concepts necessary for a deeper understanding of the proofs for God’s existence, including the role of Western and Islamic philosophers in shaping these arguments, the distinction between horizontal and vertical proofs in Western and Islamic traditions, and the empiricist and rationalist approaches to these arguments in both intellectual traditions. Following this foundation, the article systematically analyzes four categories of arguments for God's existence: ontological, cosmological, teleological (design), and moral arguments, as presented by Western thinkers. These arguments are then examined and critiqued based on the principles of Islamic philosophy. Throughout the discussion, the study highlights how misunderstandings or misinterpretations of key concepts and rational principles unique to Islamic philosophy—particularly in general and special metaphysics—have contributed to certain misapprehensions in the history of Western philosophy regarding proofs for God’s existence.

What does it really mean to be human? In this context, “real” refers to the most precise comprehension of human experience from a subjective and phenomenological perspective. When exploring human nature in the realm of philosophy of mind, we confront not only the mind-body problem (a fundamental challenge in substance dualism) and the hard problem of consciousness (a hurdle for eliminativism) but also the explanatory gaps that stem from an objective and partitive interpretation of human nature. What if we were to shift this perspective to one that is the aspective-holistic and subjective viewpoint? The principal aim of this paper is to argue that subjectivism requires a holistic perspective to effectively confront eliminativism. The authors propose a shift in perspective, labeling it “Subjective Holism,” which is not a definitive solution to the issues at hand; rather, it serves as a framework for understanding human nature. This approach aligns with our intuition–considering oneself subjectively as a whole–and possesses enhanced explanatory power by treating humans as integrated complex systems. It clarifies how mental and physical states emerge as properties within this system. Through a holistic-subjective approach, the query about human nature evolves into: How do I, as a unified whole with various aspects, possess qualia such as insideness and uniqueness, which are exclusive to the subject’s conscious experiences? As a human being, I exist as a complex system (whole) with real conscious experience as my high-level and emergent property.