مصطفی اژدری

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war, Russia lost a significant portion of its gas market in Europe. This market had been a crucial tool for bargaining and exerting pres-sure on the West, and it also brought substantial economic benefits to Moscow. This was espe-cially true for gas exports to Germany, which had seen the construction of the Nord Stream pipe-line, with plans for Nord Stream 2 also underway before the war began, leading to the halting of both projects. Consequently, energy relations between Russia and Europe deteriorated. Following the Ukraine war, Europe was compelled to secure its gas supply from the United States, despite incurring significantly higher costs. Currently, the U.S. is the largest supplier of gas to Europe. This process led Russia to seek alternative markets for its gas exports. China and India, two ma-jor global consumers, are markets Russia is eager to capture. Currently, Russia is China's largest supplier of gas. Although a large gas pipeline already delivers Russian gas to China, Moscow isn't content with this alone and aims to diversify its methods of product delivery. Iran is a cru-cial option for Russia to transport gas, as it is close to India and can also meet some of China's needs. Furthermore, Russia is considering physically connecting its economic interests with the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, particularly the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Rus-sia believes that by doing so, it can establish a major gas economic bloc and become a counter-weight to competitors, especially the United States. From this perspective, it could be argued that the Iran-Russia gas pipeline is, in fact, a replacement for Nord Stream and could transform Iran into a regional energy hub. This article aims to explore the possibility of Iran becoming a region-al energy hub through economic cooperation with Russia in the energy sector, thoroughly exam-ining the opportunities and challenges involved. The research method employed was SWOT analysis.